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Background, objectives, and methodology 
In accordance with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
and the Accra Agenda for Action, the Government of Rwanda has 
enhanced the division of labor between the donors that support 
Rwanda. In 2010, as a consequence, the German Federal Gov-
ernment agreed to the request of the Government of Rwanda to 
discontinue its support to the health sector by the end of 2012. 
This has provided a unique opportunity to review and assess 30 
years of cooperation in the Rwandan health sector by means of a 
summative evaluation. There is an overarching interest in striking 
a balance after so many years of cooperation, based on an array 
of aid modalities and instruments of German Development 
Cooperation (GDC) (project- and program-based approaches, 
basket funding and sector budget support, policy dialogue, 
technical assistance – including advisory services and training 
– and financial cooperation (provided by GTZ / GIZ, DED / GIZ, 
InWEnt / GIZ, and KfW), which have come into play.
The evaluation was conducted by DEval between July 2012 and 
October 2013.1 The results shed light on how development 
cooperation in one sector (health) has developed over many 
years, while experiencing changing political and socioeconomic 
contexts and aid modalities. By documenting the entire process, 
including the phasing out and identifying of successful approach-
es, Rwandan partners can use the findings for their own man-
agement of the health sector and their cooperation with other 
development partners. GDC, at the same time, can draw lessons 
for future support to sector development in partner countries. 
The specific objectives of the evaluation are to provide evidence 
and an assessment of the following:
1. How Rwandan-German cooperation has developed in the 
health sector.
2. The relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability, 
coherence, coordination, complementarity, and harmoniza-
tion of Rwandan-German cooperation in the health sector.
3. Successful and less successful aid modalities and instruments, 
as well as their interaction and adaptability to changing 
conditions within the sector and with regard to socioeconom-
ic and political developments.
4. The phasing out of GDC in the health sector.
To reduce the complexity inherent in the time period covered 
by the evaluation, German interventions in the Rwandan health 
sector have been reviewed for paradigmatic shifts that would 
allow for a temporal disaggregation for this period. Mapping 
the interventions between 1980 and 2012, according to (1) the 
implementing agency, (2) their duration, (3) the mode of delivery 
and strategic alignment, and (4) thematic focus, has implied that 
1994 / 1995 and 2003 / 2004 can be considered turning points. In 
addition, the 1994 Rwandan genocide marks a period sufficiently 
serious to require consideration. The year 2003 constitutes the 
onset of a transformation within Rwandan-German development 
cooperation from the standpoint of project-mode to a more 
integrated form of cooperation. Accordingly, the analysis has 
focused on three phases: (I) 1980 – 94, (II) 1995 – 2003 and (III) 
2004 – 12. 
Phases I and II, in particular, posed challenges regarding the 
availability of interview partners, relevant documentation, and 
secondary data. While emphasis was placed on documenting the 
evolution of Rwandan-German cooperation and the adaptation 
to changing situations during these phases, the focus of Phase 
III was to provide evidence for a theory-based evaluation design, 
based on the criteria of the Development Assistance Committee 
of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD-DAC): relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and 
sustainability. In addition, the design would include criteria 
formulated by the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (BMZ): coherence, complementarity, coordi-
nation, and harmonization. Evaluation approaches for attributing 
health effects in the Rwandan population to German support 
had proved unachievable due to program implementation 
design. While advantageous, according to the aid effectiveness 
model, the significant alignment to national health priorities 
further complicated attribution analysis and, therefore, led to 
the adoption of a theory-based contribution analysis. Further 
key questions with regard to the evaluation of Phase III relate to 
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the phasing out of Rwandan-German cooperation with regard 
to health and the assignment of the different aid modalities and 
instruments and their interaction. 
The following methods have been applied: (1) document analysis; 
(2) standardized online survey among former development 
workers; (3) interviews with different groups of key stakeholders; 
(4) statistical data analysis of the most recent Demographic and 
Health Survey in Rwanda; and (5) a comparative case study of 
four district health systems, using focus group discussions and 
qualitative interviews. 
Key findings and conclusions 
Rwandan-German cooperation between 1980 and 1994  
(Phase I)
The political situation during this period of Rwandan-German 
cooperation was characterized by an ideology centered on the 
idealization of rural farmers and their manual work, represented 
by the majority ethnic group. This ideology came under con-
siderable pressure at the end of the 1980s, when commodity 
prices – especially for coffee – fell and the price for imported 
goods increased, partly as a result of the World Bank’s structural 
adjustment programs. Not only did this challenge food security 
and nutrition; it also impacted on the economic situation of 
Rwandan households and had severe implications on the health 
of the population. GDC reaction to this socioeconomic deteriora-
tion has been limited. The motivation for change originated more 
so from the individual initiatives of development workers in their 
work place rather than from the directions of GDC organizations. 
In accordance with its mandate, GDC contributed to an improve-
ment in health services, especially maternal and child health 
care and birth assistance, as well as in the supply of medicines 
for health care facilities. The decrease in the fertility rate and the 
increase in the use of modern contraceptives suggest positive 
outcomes from GDC projects and programs. Family planning 
activities, however, were undermined by the continuing high 
child mortality rate and by the negative idea of family planning 
due to conservative Catholicism and traditional beliefs. GDC 
family planning activities, in any case, cannot be viewed in 
opposition to government interests, since the regime appeared 
to unconditionally support family planning. 
German development workers, during this phase, primarily 
worked to fill the human resources gaps in the rural health 
sector. They considered the high staff turnover in the public 
health system and the increased movement of labor to the 
private sector as major factors hindering development. 
Discriminatory treatment of staff in the health sector – based 
on ethnic group – took place, as well as in daily work life. The 
interviews that were conducted, however, do not point to open 
discrimination in the treatment of patients; rather, they point to 
discrimination based on a patient’s socioeconomic situation. 
The already volatile socioeconomic situation further deteriorated 
when the regime of Juvénal Habyarimana was attacked by the 
Rwandese Patriotic Army in 1990. In 1993, the Arusha Accords 
ended the three-year civil war, but the negotiated power-sharing 
agreements between the Government of Rwanda and the Rwan-
dese Patriotic Front were only slowly implemented and did not 
halt the violence. The ethnically loaded conflict peaked in April 
1994, when Hutu extremists seized power within hours after the 
assassination of Habyarimana, and a state-orchestrated genocide 
began, resulting in a tremendous death toll. 
GDC interventions did not change, in essence, during the first 
phase. While there was a call for attention from within GDC and 
internationally on the increasing conflict, GDC misjudged the 
situation and reacted on the outbreak of violence only by evac-
uating all German project staff. GDC personnel began returning 
to Rwanda in March 1995, when it became evident that nearly all 
effects of their activities from the first phase had been erased as 
a result of the genocide and its consequences. 
Rwandan-German cooperation between 1995 and 2003  
(Phase II)
As a consequence of civil war and the genocide, an estimated 
80 % of health professionals working in Rwanda were killed or 
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had fled the country by July 1994. For the period directly follow-
ing the genocide, when Rwanda had received extensive interna-
tional assistance, the evaluation found no trace of international 
health policy intervention or initiatives in Rwanda. This, however, 
changed in 2000, when Rwanda adopted a health development 
strategy, based on decentralized management and district-level 
care in the spirit of the Lusaka Declaration of 1985. In alignment 
with this strategy, GDC activities focused more on strengthening 
health services at the district level. Consequently, the direct 
support from development workers to individual health centers 
within a district was phased out, and a full range of prevention 
and treatment services was supported. Since the health system, 
however, needed to be re-established immediately following 
the genocide, a minimum package of health services to the local 
population was viewed as a priority. 
GDC support in primary health care effectively contributed to a 
substantial improvement in the provision of health services in 
specific rural areas. GDC support with regard to HIV prevention 
contributed to improved services, especially at the health center 
level. Rwandan partners appreciated the flexibility of GDC 
in providing support and the participatory project planning 
process. The qualifications of counterpart staff in health facilities, 
nevertheless, can be viewed somewhat critically. In 2000, GDC 
also began to support tertiary-level education in medicine for 
students and junior doctors, mainly through practical training, 
which would lead to quantitative and qualitative improvement of 
the medical education for students and resident doctors.
While there have been some elements of continuity in GDC sup-
port during Phase II, its flexibility to a changing situation is seen 
as a major component. GDC combined advisory and assistance at 
the national level with support to implementation at the district 
level. As health became a key sector for GDC in Rwanda in 2002 
and program development began in parallel, GDC consequently 
developed a program-based approach. 
Rwandan-German cooperation between 2004 and 2012  
(Phase III)
Rwanda strongly commits to the Paris Declaration of 2005 and 
has developed its aid policy accordingly since 2006. Decentraliza-
tion of aid began in 2000 and entered its second phase in 2005, 
with an administrative reorganization in relation to the minimum 
requirements for geographic coverage. Poverty Reduction 
Strategies have identified priority areas since 2002, while health 
sector priorities have been outlined in the form of Health Sector 
Strategic Plans since 2005. 
During Phase III, Rwanda witnessed a major expansion of aid dis-
bursements in the health sector (from USD 32.99 million in 2002 
to USD 322.26 million in 2011). Rwanda’s health expenditure, 
therefore, still relies heavily on external funding, with 63 % of to-
tal health expenditure financed by donors (2010). This expansion 
of donor support to the health sector has been driven, to a large 
extent, by population policies and programs and reproductive 
health aid disbursements (USD 220.8 million in 2011). They have 
included, in particular, control of sexually transmitted infections, 
including HIV / AIDS. German bilateral aid disbursements peaked 
in 2009 when GDC began to engage in budget support to the 
health sector (EUR 13 million between 2009 and 2012).
GDC support to the health sector was gradually aligned to the 
Rwandan national health sector planning and implementation 
process. In 2007, a Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Government of Rwanda and eight development partners officially 
launched a sector-wide approach (SWAp) as a mechanism to 
coordinate and harmonize development partner interventions to 
the health sector. GDC participated with its first joint program 
of German implementing organizations. It defined, as its overall 
cooperation goal, an improvement in the health of the Rwandan 
population and covered three components: (1) health financing 
(HF), (2) sexual and reproductive health (SRH) and (3) human 
resources development (HRD). The other major partner countries 
were Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and 
United States. The United States, as the major development 
partner, contributed 39 % of external aid to the health sector 
(2011), while the GDC contribution amounted to 3 % (2011).
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Sector-wide approach, sector budget support, and capacity 
development pooled funding: 
SWAp comprises an alignment to national priorities, better 
coordination among donors, and joint financing modalities. 
Only a few development partners, however (i.e., Belgium, GDC, 
Switzerland, and United Kingdom), were also engaged in joint 
financing modalities. 
GDC support to SWAp has reflected, to a large extent, the 
priorities of the Rwandan and German Governments. The same 
has applied to GDC engagement in joint financing methods. 
Technical assistance, however, has reflected the priorities of the 
German Federal Government to a larger extent, given that the 
Government of Rwanda has given clear preference to budget 
support and pooled funding. The aid arrangements, supported by 
GDC, have been appropriate to reach the objectives established 
with Rwandan partners. 
SWAp structures and mechanisms at the national level have 
worked effectively at varying degrees in terms of different 
Technical Working Groups. The quality and effectiveness of 
SWAp have appeared to depend very much on the strength of 
the respective Technical Working Group. GDC has contributed to 
the effective performance of these structures and mechanisms. 
While there is some evidence of positive effects from decentral-
ization in terms of improved coordination among the different 
stakeholders related to health system development, there are 
also indications that SWAp structures and mechanisms at decen-
tralized levels (e.g., district health management teams and joint 
action development forums) are not yet sufficiently effective. 
The effectiveness of sector budget support (SBS) has been 
hampered by the unexpected and considerable delay in the use 
of these funds. The consequential earmarking of these funds for 
the provision of equipment to hospitals and health care centers 
actually has reflected priority interventions in accordance with 
the national health sector strategy. There is some evidence 
of a leverage effect through SBS by privileged access to the 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN) and 
by a more focused dialogue on health sector performance. The 
opportunities for the leverage effect on policy dialogue, however, 
have been restrained by the fact that SBS actually constituted a 
relatively small proportion of aid flowing into the health sector 
(6.25 % of all donor funds in 2010). This has made it difficult 
to bring up the politically emphasized increase of domestic 
contribution to the health sector budget as one of the key topics 
for policy dialogue as had been intended.
The capacity development pooled fund (CDPF) was established 
in order to effectively coordinate the various efforts of develop-
ment partners supporting capacity development in the health 
sector in Rwanda. Evidence on the effectiveness is not conclusive. 
Capacities (e.g., of managers at the district level or of specific 
target groups in district hospitals) have been developed and 
strengthened, but there is no evidence on how these capacities 
have been made use of. After rechanneling its support in 2011, 
the CDPF has focused on long-term training of health care staff, 
particularly in line with secondary health care. 
Overall, the SWAp process has lost momentum, despite the 
strong ownership of MINECOFIN and the Rwandan Ministry of 
Health (MoH). This is underlined by the fact that the Joint Health 
Sector Review did not take place as planned in April, 2013, and 
the health sector working group was not successful in organizing 
its work effectively and proactively. With some development 
partners leaving the health sector and others joining, the role of 
the United States as the major development partner in health 
care became even more dominating. This is also demonstrated by 
the major US-funded initiative to support human resources for 
health care development in Rwanda being implemented through 
project-directed aid, instead of using the CDPF as a joint financ-
ing modality. There are indications that bilateral cooperation (i.e., 
between the Governments of Rwanda and the United States) has 
taken the lead, to the detriment of the SWAp process. Develop-
ment partners joining the health sector may soon display a level 
of commitment that might contribute to revitalizing SWAp. 
Health financing: 
The Government of Rwanda was innovative in introducing a 
country-wide health insurance system, which was previously 
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considered impossible to establish and sustain in a low-income 
country. Near-universal coverage was achieved in record time. 
The global awareness of problems relating to the motivation 
of health care personnel and the quality of health care delivery 
influenced the Government of Rwanda to equally address 
them. Community-based health insurance (CBHI)2 and perfor-
mance-based financing (PBF)3 thus could be considered flagship 
programs within Rwandan health reform that have been imple-
mented quickly and with strong political commitment. 
The Rwandan-German health financing component was aimed 
at increasing the responsiveness of the Rwandan health system 
– especially towards the poor – by increasing the percentage of 
the population covered by health insurance and improving the 
structural quality of health care services through PBF. CBHI has 
been accompanied by capacity building, including training and 
coordination support at different levels (i.e., including Technical 
Working Groups, the Health Financing Unit at MoH, and the 
management of CBHI at the district level). The so-called social 
funds, arranged by GDC, have subsidized the costs relating to 
medical treatment at the hospital level, which were not covered 
by CBHI for patients who could not afford them due to a capita-
tion fee system. Furthermore, GDC was the only development 
partner under the Division of Labor policy to have signed and 
carried out a local subsidy contract to directly finance PBF in the 
district hospital of Ruhengeri. 
CBHI and PBF were both aligned to Rwanda’s national and sector 
objectives, as well as to BMZ priorities. Following a multi-level 
approach, the Rwandan-German program was highly relevant 
in eliminating the weak spots at the district level due to the 
high pace of implementation. Prior to the replacement of the 
capitation fee by an income-stratified premium system in the 
policy reform of 2010, GDC introduced social funds to support 
the poor. The temporary introduction of social funds, however, 
created non-aligned and parallel arrangements within the 
Rwandan health system, despite its relevance for the additional 
development objective regarding health equity in CBHI.
Policy advice and capacity building by GDC to the CBHI unit at 
MoH has contributed to harmonized strategies and resources. 
This has been strengthened by German facilitation of the 
disbursement of USD 34 million by Global Fund for AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) as a direct contribution to 
CBHI, which was crucial to achieve CBHI coverage and subsidies 
for the indigenous. 
The increase in the rate of CBHI coverage demonstrates a very 
positive development in achieving a responsive health system. 
The assessment of health equity shows that the barriers to 
access to finance have been reduced for the poorest, although 
the significantly high costs relating to treatment and CBHI fees 
have been placed on better care for higher income levels. Before 
the phasing out of social funds in 2010, the GDC approach eased 
program costs and has, since then, become an effective tool to 
increase access to finance and the use of health care services. 
Evidence confirms that PBF increases service distribution and 
the outputs of health care professionals. It also suggests that the 
negative motivation and resource constraints, as side effects, 
are real and may limit overall effectiveness. For this reason, 
some GDC members, based on experience from Ruhengeri, have 
seriously questioned the relevance and effectiveness of PBF.
Systemic challenges for the efficiency of CBHI and PBF have 
fragmented the Rwandan health finance system and have created 
the sometimes long delays for reimbursement, at the central 
level, of district facilities (hospitals, health care centers). The high 
coverage rates of CBHI and the policy reform of 2010, supported 
by German contributions, indicate that efficiency is now high 
and that improvements regarding transfer of funds are gaining 
ground. Regarding PBF, available figures point to sufficient 
efficiency when measured by the percentage of overhead costs. 
As overheads do not include all costs related to resource-intense 
performance verification and reporting procedures, it remains 
questionable whether PBF is, as yet, adequately efficient to 
overcome the lack of quality in the performance of health care 
services.
2  Rwanda’s current CBHI has been introduced as a social security system, using risk pooling as a key mechanism to achieve universal coverage. Financial contributions by CBHI members depend on their 
capacity to pay. 
3  Performance-based financing in Rwanda aims to overcome the under-utilization and poor coverage of health services. MoH, therefore, has introduced financial incentives for health service providers to not 
only quantitatively and qualitatively improve their performance, based on a defined set of services, but also to improve the management of services and facilities. 
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The evidence that has been gathered suggests that sustainability 
should continue to be considered low due to the continuing 
high dependency on external funds. Recent policy and legal 
reforms, such as the cross-subsidization of the national CBHI risk 
pool, paired with a large share of household-generated funding, 
however, promise a positive increase in the sustainability of 
CBHI in the long term. The GDC social funds have proved to 
be unsustainable; they were not designed to be self-sustaining 
arrangements, and while Rwandan arrangements have taken 
their place, there remain gaps. Since German support of PBF at 
the district level (i.e., Ruhengeri hospital) has led to a setback in 
maintenance and recruitment, the German contribution to PBF 
has been unsustainable. 
Sexual and reproductive health: 
Within the SWAp architecture, joint efforts in sexual and 
reproductive health are aimed at reducing the rate of morbidity, 
infant mortality, and maternal mortality by improving access to 
quality care and promoting equality and equity among women 
and men. The overall objective of the program’s SRH component, 
therefore, has been to contribute to the improvement of all 
aspects of SRH care and family planning, thus focusing on impact 
indicators as a total of fertility rate, HIV / AIDS prevalence rate, 
and infant mortality rate. 
At the national level, technical support to strategies and national 
plans were provided through Technical Working Groups in 
relation to family planning, adolescent SRH, and gender-based 
violence. At the decentralized level, GDC has continued its long-
term support to various levels of the Rwandan health districts. 
During the course of cooperation, family planning services have 
been extended to the health care center and community level. 
GDC also has supported the national concept of peer educators.4 
One of the most prominent strategies in the SRH component has 
been to support private sector social marketing.
GDC support to SRH has reflected the priorities of – and is fully 
aligned with – the objectives set by the Government of Rwanda 
and the German Federal Government. Its multi-level approach 
and its focus on the public and private sectors have enabled it 
to reach the respective target groups and objectives. Technical 
and financial support to the private sector, however, has fallen 
short of sufficiently strengthening the role of the private sector 
to provide contraception and information services in a sector 
environment where MoH was required to play a crucial role. 
Further strengthening of the private sector would have met the 
priorities of the Government of Rwanda and helped to reduce 
future public sector costs.
At the decentralized level, GDC has contributed to health care 
service delivery. This has resulted in a significant improvement 
in (1) antenatal care, (2) clinical-based deliveries and postnatal 
care, (3) HIV testing and counseling, (4) coverage of antiretroviral 
treatment, and (5) treatment of tuberculosis. Joint efforts by 
MoH and development partners have led to an increase in (1) the 
rate of modern contraceptive prevalence, (2) condom usage, (3) 
knowledge relating to family planning and HIV / AIDS, especially 
among youth, and (4) changed attitudes.
Although service utilization has continuously increased, coverage 
is still not universal and regional differences remain in terms of 
access and usage of modern contraceptives. In spite of the re-
markable success of extending access to contraceptives through 
social marketing, the effectiveness of information campaigns on 
sexually transmitted infections and HIV / AIDS is questionable, 
especially with regard to rural communities in remote areas.
The main objectives of and targets for SRH have been achieved. 
GDC, therefore, has contributed effectively to health care 
service delivery through both technical and financial assistance. 
Relevant programs have been supported and linkages between 
the different actors (public and private) and intervention areas 
(e.g., HIV prevention and tuberculosis) have been implemented. 
At the national level, Technical Working Groups have been useful 
and have provided the policies and plans that were appropriate 
to achieve the objectives set at the national and decentralized 
levels. GDC has contributed effectively by setting its agenda and 
carrying out its technical activities (e.g., in relation to adolescent 
4  The concept of peer education is to establish community-based distribution networks of basic health care and youth-friendly services in sexual and reproductive health. In Rwanda, young educators are 
selected by local health centers and trained in SRH and communication methods.
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SRH care). The financial and technical contributions of GDC to 
social marketing have been moderately effective in reaching their 
targets and objectives. While most outcomes have been reached, 
there remain geographic and socioeconomic differences with 
regard to access to quality health care services. 
The high chance of sustainability of the program’s SRH achieve-
ments is due to the recognition of SRH as a key priority in the 
health sector strategy of Rwanda. The technical knowledge of 
health care professionals, however, remains limited and there 
are considerable geographic and socioeconomic variances with 
regard to access and use of health care services. In addition, 
there has been no proposal to clarify the roles and responsi-
bilities of private and public actors, which is required to foster 
sustainable development of the private sector and commercial 
social marketing strategies in Rwanda – outlined in the latest 
Family Planning Strategic Plan.
Human resources development: 
The objective of the HRD component was to increase the number 
of well-trained health care professionals, who are available to 
serve the Rwandan population. The component was composed 
of three sub-components: (1) medical education, (2) hospital 
management, and (3) health technology management. 
Medical education and hospital management reflect the pri-
orities of the Government of Rwanda and the German Federal 
Government. Partners of GDC at the central and district levels 
also have confirmed their relevance as part of HRD efforts to 
strengthen the health sector. There is conclusive evidence that 
the capacity development interventions, relating to medical 
education and hospital management that were put in place, have 
responded to the needs of target groups (health care profession-
als and hospital managers). 
In particular, the support provided by development workers with 
regard to internship training and the International Leadership 
Training program in hospital management has contributed to 
an increased number of Rwandan health care professionals, 
enhanced their skills and knowledge, and improved the quality 
of care in Rwandan hospitals. The training also has increased 
motivation, a sense of responsibility, and the ability to take 
charge of patients. Poor working conditions in district hospitals 
and poor equipment and their lack of maintenance have nega-
tively affected the motivation of Rwandan doctors to remain in 
district hospitals. 
International Leadership Training alumni, in their place of work, 
have improved various aspects of hospital management. Many 
transfer projects have had a positive effect on the quality of 
care. In their effort to promote change, International Leadership 
Training alumni often have been confronted with resistance to 
innovation by staff and a continuing limitation of autonomy by 
hospitals with regard to the management of human resources. 
Scaling-up efforts have been achieved through the establishment 
of a hospital management task force within MoH and a coun-
try-wide training program of hospital administrators. The high 
turnover rate of administrative staff, however, has limited the 
effectiveness of these short-term, in-service training activities. 
The effect of the International Leadership Training, which was 
conducted in Germany, can be considered inferior when com-
pared to the lower cost of a comparable course in Tanzania. 
The potential for sustainability lies in the political will of the 
Government of Rwanda to continue to invest in human resources 
for health. The Government now places a priority on medical 
education in the training of specialist physicians. The subsequent 
long-term engagement of these specialists in public hospitals 
remains questionable, however, given that the migration of phy-
sicians to the private sector could constitute a serious challenge. 
Rwandan district hospitals, therefore, are most likely to continue 
to depend on a revolving workforce of well-trained generalist 
practitioners in the future if working conditions in the public 
health sector do not substantially improve. The continuation of 
a practical internship program, therefore, will play an important 
role in the training of general practitioners. The conclusion, so 
far, is that the continuation of internship training in the long 
term can prove to be a positive and systems-building element of 
GDC support. 
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Overall assessment according to OECD-DAC criteria: 
In terms of relevance, the joint health program has significantly 
reflected the priorities of – and was fully aligned with – the 
objectives set by the Government of Rwanda and the German 
Federal Government. GDC support, however (delivered as 
technical assistance), has reflected the priorities of the German 
Federal Government, to a larger extent, given that the Gov-
ernment of Rwanda clearly prefers budget support and pooled 
funding. The social funds, which created non-aligned and parallel 
arrangements, have not been relevant in terms of design; rather, 
they have been very relevant to – and have complemented – the 
aim for CBHI to ensure health equity. 
The effectiveness of the joint health program can be classified as 
moderate to high. This is reflected in GDC support to SRH-re-
lated health care service delivery and to CBHI, which is demon-
strated by the increase in CBHI coverage rates. GDC contribution 
to make SWAp structures and mechanisms effective can also be 
highlighted, including its support to HRD (i.e., medical education 
and hospital management). Effects on SBS have been only moder-
ate due to deficient coherence among development partners and 
limited leverage, since SBS has constituted only a relatively small 
proportion of aid to flow into the health sector. GDC support to 
PBF has contributed to increased services and outputs of health 
care professionals, but can only be rated as moderately effective 
due to negative motivational side-effects and resource con-
straints. GDC has been highly effective in ensuring that pooled 
funding, relating to capacity development, has been operational 
and has strengthened its strategic orientation. 
The efficiency of the joint health program could only partly be 
assessed, as most GDC inputs contributed to commonly defined 
outputs and outcomes. The same applies to the evaluation of 
the efficiency of SBS as it flows into the overall health budget. 
Evidence suggests GDC support to CBHI has been moderate to 
high, given its impressive target achievement and its increasing 
transfer efficiency. With regard to PBF, it is not yet evident 
whether such a resource-intense procedure as PBF is yet suffi-
cient to overcome the quality issue in the performance of health 
care services. The efficiency of the International Leadership 
Training on hospital management can be rated as low due to its 
high cost compared to alternative training opportunities. Provid-
ing GDC support in terms of SWAp and joint financing modalities 
have led, only in part, to reducing transaction costs for MoH, 
but not for development partners. When efforts were combined 
with those of development partners, most program performance 
indicators were achieved on time; some even exceeded their 
target. In conclusion, the efficiency of the joint health program 
can be considered moderate. 
With regard to impact, Rwanda has made impressive progress in 
terms of family planning and SRH care within the SWAp period 
(2004 – 12). Since 2005, the program indicator of the total fertility 
rate decreased from 6.1 to 4.6 children per woman in 2010. In 
spite of this impressive success, regional, socioeconomic, and 
age-specific differences remain. First, the total fertility rate is 
higher in rural areas compared to those in more urban areas. Sec-
ond, the total fertility rate remains higher for the less educated 
and low-income population strata. Third, teenage fertility has 
declined at a slower rate and young motherhood remains more 
common in rural areas.
GDC support to maternal and child health care has contributed 
to a decrease in maternal mortality rates, with Rwanda making 
considerable progress towards achieving the Millenium Devel-
opment Goal (MDG) target of reducing the rate from 1,300 per 
100,000 live births in 1990 to 325 in 2015. By 2010, the maternal 
mortality rate stood at 487. Rwanda has reduced its maternal 
mortality rate at an extremely high pace in comparison to other 
countries in the region within the last decades. 
Today, Rwanda has one of the lowest HIV prevalence rates in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Besides malaria and HIV / AIDS, tuberculosis 
and tropical diseases are relevant threats to the health of the 
Rwandan population, which can best be addressed through 
integrated strategies. The GDC health system strengthening 
approach has contributed to integrating prevention and treat-
ment of tuberculosis and HIV. The incidence of tuberculosis 
significantly has decreased in Rwanda and nearly all registered 
tuberculosis patients have been tested for HIV.
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While the GDC approach to health systems strengthening has 
been an essential element within the Rwandan health care 
architecture, a significant part of the impressive progress has 
depended on the large financial efforts of some vertical programs 
in the areas of malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV prevention. More-
over, the multi-level approach of GDC has been highly effective 
with regard to the improvement of overall coverage and access 
to health care services through the support of flagship programs, 
such as CBHI and PBF. GDC support, however, has lacked focus 
on some specific target groups and remote areas. Consequently, 
socioeconomic, age-, and gender-specific disparities, as well as 
rural-urban disparities in the health of the Rwandan population, 
have been reduced only moderately. 
By and large, the sustainability of the joint health program can 
be rated as moderate. Despite the strong ownership of the 
Government of Rwanda, there are indications that the SWAp 
dynamic has lost momentum during 2013. This also has applied 
to the scope and prospects of joint financing modalities in a 
situation where the health sector still very much depends on 
external funding. This is also the reason why the sustainability of 
CBHI should continue to be considered as low. Legal and policy 
reforms, however, promise sustainability of CBHI in the long 
term. Given that German support to PBF at the district level has 
led against its intention to setbacks in health maintenance and 
recruitment, it is considered to be unsustainable. With regard 
to SRH achievements, sustainability may be high due to SRH 
having been recognized as a key priority in the future health 
sector strategy of Rwanda. The same applies to HRD; however, 
there are questions about the lack of long-term engagement of 
medical doctors in the public sector due to the difficult working 
conditions. 
In terms of coherence, complementarity, coordination, and 
harmonization, the evaluation revealed that the program is well 
aligned with the national health strategy and has worked through 
the structures and mechanisms of SWAp. GDC has been proac-
tive in promoting the notion of SWAp at the level of the various 
components. Furthermore, it continuously has contributed to key 
forums for donor coordination. 
Regarding SBS, GDC has put special effort into harmonizing the 
contributions by Belgium, GDC, and the United Kingdom. The 
SBS provided by Germany and Belgium was jointly designed and 
included pre-requisites for disbursement, performance triggers, 
and benchmarks. Yet, as the United Kingdom designed its SBS 
separately, negative implications arose relating to the ability of 
the SBS donor group was unable to speak with one voice.
GDC has placed special effort to establish the CDPF. It has 
proved, however, to be more cumbersome than expected to 
reach joint understanding of how to support capacity develop-
ment most effectively and how to agree on joint procedures.
The quality of donor coordination, in general, has relied on key 
participating actors from development partners to put forward 
their enthusiasm and commitment, and GDC health sector 
coordinators have played an important role. Donor coordination 
weakened during 2013, however, when GDC was no longer in a 
position to contribute. 
There is sufficient evidence to conclude that synergies between 
technical and financial cooperation have been realized. Coor-
dination and cooperation mechanisms have been developed 
between both organizations and are proving to be working well. 
Cooperation between DED and GTZ has become more intense 
through the gradual process of program development having 
been, overall, perceived as a difficult integration process. 
Successful and less successful aid modalities and instruments:
GDC has played a major role in the process of designing SWAp, 
as well as in establishing and strengthening the different 
structures and mechanisms. While GDC has not been one of the 
major donors in the health sector in terms of aid volume, it has 
created an increased leverage effect by combining different aid 
modalities and instruments. 
GDC has deliberately focused on health systems strengthening 
(i.e., a horizontal approach to improve the coverage and quality 
of health care services) as being complementary to vertical 
programs. Vertical programs, especially funded by the United 
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States and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria, have become increasingly important in terms of aid 
volume flowing into the health sector. GDC thus has helped 
towards redressing the balance between vertical and horizontal 
programs. 
SBS can be considered as relatively successful in terms of 
channeling funds directly to the national budget with a special 
emphasis on allocating a greater proportion of public funds 
to district health systems strengthening. SBS could have been 
more successful if all contributing donors had harmonized their 
procedures to the point of signing a joint agreement with the 
Government of Rwanda. The leverage effect of SBS could have 
been higher if a higher percentage of donor funds had been 
channeled through SBS.
Technical cooperation has successfully followed the multi-level 
approach (i.e., combining advisory support on the national 
and district levels). The same has applied to capacity building. 
This has placed GDC in a position to apply best practices from 
implementation at the district level into its concept and strategy 
development at the national level, with Technical Working 
Groups playing a major role.
GDC has successfully combined various instruments, such as 
technical (GTZ / GIZ), financial cooperation (KfW), and advisory 
services from development workers (DED / GIZ), and it has 
integrated experts from the Center for International Migration 
and Development (CIM) and human capacity development 
(InWEnt / GIZ). In this way, GDC has provided its support through 
a mix of project-directed aid and joint financing modalities 
under SWAp. There is sufficient evidence of synergy between the 
various instruments.
Phasing out process: 
While a two-year phase-out period of German support to the 
Rwandan health sector had been planned, the period proved to 
be rather short for some interventions. As the transition took 
effect in parallel to the ongoing program cycle, the handover 
process was highly challenging. The initial coordination schedule 
for the handover process, until the end of 2011, was neither 
adhered to by the Government of Rwanda nor by the German 
Federal Government due to other priorities and time constraints 
at the ministry level. At the same time, some counterparts felt 
inadequately informed, which led to misunderstandings regard-
ing the division of labor and the implications at the central and 
decentralized levels. Despite the process having been initiated 
by the Government of Rwanda with MoH responsible for leading 
the handover, coordination with other development partners and 
decentralized levels was limited and, to a great extent, left to 
GDC. 
Recommendations
Sector-wide approach, sector budget support, and capacity 
development pooled fund
MoH 
1. The results of the evaluation clearly support that further 
improvement in the overall health of the Rwandan population 
requires the continuation and intensification of poverty-, 
gender-, and age-specific interventions in order to tackle 
inequality and inequity in the course of the current Health 
Sector Strategic Plan. 
GDC
2. The evaluation has indicated that there has been a high 
leverage effect through the combination of different aid 
modalities and instruments in terms of SWAp to the health 
sector. A diversified portfolio of aid modalities and instru-
ments, therefore, will have the potential to increase overall 
effectiveness in implementing program-based approaches. 
This needs to go hand in hand with sound policy dialogue. 
3. To increase the effectiveness of SWAp not only to the health 
sector, future strategies should put more emphasis on 
improving coherence among development partners, especial-
ly with regard to joint financing modalities. This should be 
applied in combination with strengthening the commitment 
of major development partners to align their interventions 
to a SWAp. This will certainly require the efforts of different 
development partners in leading roles with regard to SWAp. 
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GDC should explore the possibilities to act as broker, which 
would enable it to influence multilateral institutions, such as 
the World Bank. 
4. Future strategies to establish basket funds for capacity 
building, in relation to program-based approaches in the 
health sector and beyond, should put more emphasis on their 
strategic orientation and joint management as a means to 
increase the effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of ca-
pacity building in a specific sector. This will require technical 
assistance to be provided from program inception. 
5. More emphasis should be placed on the decentralization of 
SWAp from program inception, given that core institutional 
reforms have been initiated. This will allow local actors to 
participate in the decentralization process, which should 
be supported by capacity building at both the central and 
decentralized levels and, ideally, through pooled funding. 
Health care financing
MoH
6. Since the payment modalities for CBHI premiums – such as 
the number of installments; need to enroll the entire family; 
and one-month waiting period from premium payment to 
health care entitlement – are perceived to be restrictive, 
MoH should consider lowering the restrictions to ensure 
equitable and consistently high CBHI coverage.
7. For a further investigation into the PBF in Rwanda, the 
aspects of effectiveness and efficiency merit increased 
methodological research. In particular, the following should 
be included: (1) ruling out alternative explanations, such as 
a motivation in terms of increasing health care professional 
wages without performance evaluation, and (2) appraising 
the cost-effectiveness of the arduous verification and 
reporting process.
8. To avoid the lack of motivation and / or manipulation of 
the PBF system due to its unrealistic goals and indicators, 
PBF in Rwanda should be combined more concentratedly 
with capacity development in health care facilities and with 
improvements to the physical work environment. 
9. The speeding up of reimbursements at the decentralized level 
should be tackled to encourage financial autonomy by health 
care facilities at the sector or district levels. 
10. While the Ubudehe classification (the Rwandan participa-
tory poverty assessment tool to classify the population’s 
economic vulnerability) is under the aegis of the Ministry of 
Local Government, MoH should advocate a more stringent 
application of the classification system to avoid the misclassi-
fication of CBHI members. This would safeguard the trust of 
CBHI members in the equity of the insurance scheme.
GDC
11. Overall evidence on the effects strictly attributable to PBF, 
their sustainability, and the efficiency remains shaky. With 
regard to the research requisites recommended to Rwanda’s 
MoH, GDC should support rigorous methodological studies 
on these aspects in other contexts to assess the potential of 
this approach and to broaden the international knowledge 
base.
12. Future PBF intervention should be combined more systemati-
cally with capacity development for supervision and manage-
rial staff with, at best, interventions to improve the physical 
work environment. Otherwise, the goals and indicators 
established will be perceived as unachievable and may lead to 
lack of motivation or false reporting of goal achievement.
13. The existence of a country-wide participatory poverty map-
ping in Rwanda has facilitated the transition from a capitation 
arrangement to an income-stratified premium system for 
CBHI members. Similar categorization systems should be 
incorporated when designing or supporting equity-oriented 
social security systems in other partner countries of GDC.
14. The Rwandan case highlights the fact that social funds that 
guard insurance schemes can temporarily increase equity. 
For future strategies, social funds should be designed to 
alleviate the catastrophic costs of health care services that 
affect the economically vulnerable, especially during a period 
of policy transition from a capitation arrangement to a more 
equity-oriented contribution system.
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Sexual and reproductive health
MoH
15. Support to the private sector should be encouraged to 
increase its market share for contraceptives and to strength-
en its overall role in the Rwandan health system, in addition 
to contributing to a decrease in costs to the public health 
care system. Synergies should, therefore, be encouraged 
through linkages between the public health system at the 
community-level and commercial marketing techniques from 
the private sector. At the policy level, the roles and responsi-
bilities between private and public actors should be clarified 
to encourage coordination and planning capabilities.
16. Future campaigns in the context of social marketing should 
focus more explicitly on specific and disadvantaged target 
groups, especially in remote areas. Accordingly, synergies 
between large-scale information campaigns and more specific 
approaches through concepts of community health care 
workers and peer educators at the community level should be 
strengthened. 
GDC 
17. For future social marketing strategies under similar condi-
tions, GDC should put a special emphasis on providing advice 
to clarify the roles and responsibilities between the public 
and private sectors, in order to enhance the potential for 
commercial marketing techniques and to decrease the costs 
to the public health system.
18. In comparable country contexts, community-oriented 
concepts, such as peer-educators, should receive further 
attention. Interventions should focus more specifically on key 
persons within a community to create a multiplier effect that 
will also lead to potential synergy between the private and 
public sectors at the community level.
Human resources development
MoH
19. More emphasis should be placed on strengthening the 
capacities of district hospitals to properly train and supervise 
medical students during their internship. This also requires a 
joint effort by MoH and the Ministry of Education to improve 
the direction and monitoring of the national internship 
program. 
20. The potential of International Leadership Training alumni 
experience in hospital management should be applied to the 
medical health care curriculum, which is being implemented 
in cooperation with the School of Public Health and Yale 
University.
GDC
21. To further strengthen future health system programs, more 
emphasis should be placed on supporting medical education 
in partner countries, hand in hand with policy dialogue. This 
will strengthen the commitment of partner countries to 
allocate sufficient financial and human resources to medical 
education. Moreover, a combination of individual knowledge 
transfer and advisory support at the national level, including 
the use of pooled funding, should be selected to increase the 
overall effectiveness of support to HRD.
Phasing out cooperation
GDC
22. The process to phase out cooperation, under similar circum-
stances, should include relevant stakeholders at the decen-
tralized level, who are strongly committed. Adequate human 
resources and time should be provided to allow for a gradual 
process. GDC should encourage policy dialogue as a means to 
let the line ministry take strong ownership of the phase-out 
process. This should be seen as a precondition for guarantee-
ing the sound management of institutional knowledge. 
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1. Evaluation background
In accordance with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
and the Accra Agenda for Action, the Government of Rwanda 
(GoR) decided to enhance the Division of Labor between donors 
supporting Rwanda. Consequently, in 2010 the German Federal 
Government agreed to the request of GoR to end its support to 
the health sector by the end of 2012 and focus on two priority 
areas in the future – decentralization and sustainable economic 
development – with special emphasis on the private sector and 
vocational training. This provided a unique opportunity to review 
and assess 30 years of cooperation in the Rwandan health sector, 
learn from past experiences, and draw lessons to improve aid 
effectiveness and health management in the future. During the 
government negotiations in November 2011, therefore, Rwanda 
and Germany agreed to conduct an independent evaluation 
prior to the end of German support. The newly founded German 
Institute for Developmental Evaluation (DEval) was mandated to 
carry out the evaluation and it began its preparatory work in July 
2012.
The evaluation report is divided into three parts: Part A includes 
the evaluation background and methodology, the context in 
which the health support was provided, and the limitations 
faced by the evaluation. Part B provides the findings of the 
evaluation, according to the various phases of Rwandan-German 
health cooperation that lasted from 1980 to 2012. It comprises 
a condensed overview of the evolution of cooperation and an 
explanation of how cooperation had adapted to changing condi-
tions by referring to the context analysis described in Part A. For 
the last phase of cooperation, it tackles the criteria of relevance, 
effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability, according to 
each of the Rwandan-German health program’s components. The 
criterion for impact is presented across the components, as are 
the criteria for coherence, complementarity, coordination, and 
harmonization. The subsequent section includes an assessment 
of the theory of change (ToC), reflecting the intervention logic 
of the Rwandan-German health program between 2007 and 
2012. An analysis of two additional key topics concludes Part B: 
the planning, management, and implications of the phase-out 
process of Rwandan-German cooperation in the health sector 
as it came to an end in 2012; and the identification of successful 
and less successful aid modalities and instruments. Finally, in 
Part C, conclusions are drawn from the evaluation results and 
recommendations are provided for decision-makers in the 
Rwandan MoH, German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (BMZ), and German implementing agencies. The 
Annexes provide additional detail on the many issues discussed 
in this report. 
1.1 
Purpose, goal, and objectives 
The experience gained from 30 years of Rwandan-German coop-
eration in the health sector in Rwanda (1980 – 2012) constitutes 
the object of this evaluation. During this period, a range of aid 
modalities (project- and program-based approach, basket funding 
and SBS, policy dialogue, technical assistance, including advisory 
services and training) and instruments of GDC came into play: 
financial cooperation was provided by the German Development 
Bank (KfW); and technical cooperation was conducted by the 
German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), German Development 
Service (DED), Center for International Migration and Devel-
opment (CIM), and Capacity Building International, Germany 
(InWEnt), all on behalf of BMZ (including KfW). In 2011, GTZ, 
DED, and InWEnt merged to form the Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ).5 The types, importance, 
and combination of modalities and instruments changed 
considerably during these three decades. Reflecting on 30 years 
of Rwandan-German cooperation in the health sector, three 
distinct phases have been identified: (I) rural health care services 
and family planning (1980 – 94); (II) primary health care (PHC) 
services, human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), and acquired 
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) (1995 – 2003); and (III) health 
sector, reproductive health, and human resources (2004 – 12).
5  This report refers to the implementing agencies of projects and programs before 2011 by the former acronyms GTZ, DED, and InWEnt. The acronyms GTZ / GIZ, DED / GIZ, and InWEnt / GIZ denote the 
implementing agencies during the transition period. After the merger in 2011, technical cooperation was implemented by GIZ and CIM. 
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The purpose of this final, summative evaluation is to demon-
strate the contribution of the German aid effort to the Rwandan 
public health sector over the past 30 years, to strengthen the 
development of German aid policy, and to draw knowledge and 
learning from German aid strategies in health and from Rwandan 
strategies in international cooperation. 
The evaluation intended to shed light on how development 
cooperation in the health sector has developed over many years 
through changing political and socioeconomic contexts and aid 
modalities. By documenting the entire process and identifying 
successful approaches, Rwandan partners can use the findings 
to improve their own management of the health sector and 
cooperate with other external partners. Given the entire range 
of aid modalities and instruments that have been applied during 
Rwandan German Health Cooperation, Germany has an interest 
to document how these have developed over the years and to 
assess how they have interacted in the context of a multi-level 
approach, while at the same time, highlighting the elements of 
continuity and the process of change. Furthermore, the findings 
can be of value in the decision of the kinds of aid modalities and 
instruments that could be applied to health sector development 
in other countries. 
A review of the entire period of Rwandan-German cooperation in 
the health sector is a means to provide evidence that the results 
and achievements gained during this period reflect a crucial 
building block on which the joint health program was based in 
2004, leading to the sector-wide approach (SWAp) in 2007. 
The specific objectives of the evaluation were to provide 
evidence and an assessment of the following:
1. How Rwandan-German cooperation has developed in the 
health sector.
2. The relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability, 
coherence, coordination, complementarity, and harmoniza-
tion of Rwandan-German cooperation in the health sector.
3. Successful and less successful aid modalities and instruments 
and their interaction and adaptability to changing conditions 
within the sector and with regard to socioeconomic and 
political developments.
4. The exit strategy with regard to the phase-out process and 
end of German development cooperation in the health sector.
1.2
Scope and evaluation questions
Together with reference groups in Germany and Rwanda, a set of 
overarching questions has been developed to assist in fulfilling 
the evaluation objectives (cf. Chapter A.1.1). During the explora-
tory phase, however, it became clear that for the relevant period, 
not all questions could be responded to in a similar way. In order 
to be able to assess the complexity of the evaluand, DEval has 
reviewed Germany’s activities in the Rwandan health sector for 
paradigmatic shifts that would allow for a temporal disaggre-
gation of the evaluand in three phases. As expected, it became 
evident that the earlier the point of interest, the less sources 
of information were available. It therefore was agreed with the 
reference groups to apply a different weight on the various 
phases, focusing on each specific evaluation question. Figure 1 
illustrates which evaluation questions were to be answered for 
each phase. 
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Figure 1. Overview of key evaluation questions over time
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partners manage the 
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EQ6: What are success-
ful and less successful 
aid modalities and 
instruments as well as 
their interactions?
This set of key questions can be aligned to the evaluation criteria 
of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD-DAC) (and 
the BMZ criteria of coherence, complementarity, coordination 
and harmonization), as presented in Table 1. 
With regard to Phase III, the priority of questions was estab-
lished, based on feedback from the reference groups. The 
evaluation matrices (cf. Annex A) have been adjusted accordingly. 
Table 1. OECD-DAC evaluation criteria over time
Evaluation Criteria Phase I Phase II Phase III
Relevance X X X
Effectiveness X X X
Efficiency X
Impact X
Sustainability X X X
Coherence, Complementarity, Coordination, Harmonization X X X
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2.  Methodology of the 
evaluation
The evaluation imposes a methodological challenge of how to 
manage complexity. To overcome this, DEval reviewed German 
activities in the Rwandan health sector for paradigmatic shifts 
that would allow for a temporal disaggregation for this period. 
Mapping the interventions between 1980 and 2012, according 
to (1) the implementing agency, (2) duration, (3) mode of 
delivery and strategic alignment, and (4) thematic focus of 
the interventions, has suggested that the years 1994 / 1995 and 
2003 / 2004 were turning points (cf. Annex C). These phases are 
characterized by differing thematic priorities of intervention. In 
addition, the 1994 genocide in Rwanda marked a critical turning 
point that should be taken into account. On the other hand, 
2003 constitutes the onset of transformation within Rwan-
dan-German development cooperation from a project mode to 
a more integrated form of cooperation. Aside from framing the 
evaluation, DEval has developed a framework to include the most 
relevant analytical concepts that make up this assessment. While 
the following chapter provides an overview of the evaluation’s 
methodology, a more detailed outline is presented in Annex B.
Figure 2. Analytical framework
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2.1
Analytical framework
The analytical framework (cf. Figure 2) serves as a tool to 
disaggregate the object of the evaluation into analytically 
operable units and defines the key concepts. In accordance with 
other related frameworks, it maps the relationship between 
the concepts and identifies them within three overlapping and 
interlinked layers: (1) Rwandan-German cooperation, (2) Rwandan 
health system, and (3) broader Rwandan country context. Not 
only does this generic framework include the theme, it also forms 
the basis for constructing more detailed theories of change.
2.2
Evaluation designs
The evaluation designs build on phase distinction (Phase I: 
1980 – 94; Phase II: 1995 – 2003; Phase III: 2004 – 12) and the 
analytical framework. Due to the summative character of the 
evaluation, the availability of resource persons, relevant docu-
mentation, and secondary data has been limited, especially in 
relation to the earlier periods.
Phases I and II
The turbulent political circumstances, open violence, and volatile 
post-conflict situation in Rwanda from the 1980s until the new 
regime’s consolidation (marked by the 2000 and 2003 elections) 
called for a more flexible approach to Phases I and II. To ensure 
that key information was not lost due to the relatively limited 
availability of official documentation, DEval embarked on a 
very open, rather inductive data collection approach, guided by 
the evaluation questions. Given that former DED development 
workers, who had been seconded on a long-term basis to partner 
organizations, worked close to the target groups, they filled the 
need for resource persons. Statements and assessments from 
both a survey and in-depth follow-up interviews thus provided a 
fabric reflecting the historical realities and framework conditions 
on the ground. Time-witness accounts are complemented by 
reports from implementing agencies, BMZ, and the records of 
individuals.6 In addition, DEval has interviewed key Rwandan 
actors in the health system. Project and process documentation, 
relating to the cooperation (e.g., Minutes of workshops), were 
useful in identifying the changes in the planning and evolution 
of development cooperation in the health sector. Interviews with 
former German staff (development workers and their survey 
results) and their Rwandan counterparts have been useful in 
assessing implementation and achievements. Aid disbursements 
and critical junctures for development cooperation were 
identified through portfolio and context analysis to assess how 
GDC performed in the larger country context.
Phase III
The main methodological challenge for Phase III has been to 
adequately evaluate a program with multiple components and 
intervention levels in the multi-donor environment of SWAp 
under strong national ownership.
During the inception phase of the evaluation, the DEval team 
explored the feasibility of evaluation approaches to attribute the 
health effects in the Rwandan population to German support. 
Applying a (quasi-) experimental approach proved impossible, 
since neither had the Rwandan-German program been imple-
mented following randomization nor would the scarcity of avail-
able data allow to satisfactorily eliminate the threat to internal 
validity. Lastly, by definition, (quasi-) experimentation demands a 
close control by the evaluator to establish cause-effect rela-
tionships and, therefore, it often focuses on a narrowly defined 
set of variables. The authors of a recent working paper of the 
United Kingdom’s Department for International Development 
(DFID) highlight the downside to this when they conclude that 
in evaluation, “there is a tradeoff between scope of a program 
and strength of causal evidence” (Stern et al., 2012, p. ii). Further 
aggravating this scoping problem is the degree of alignment of 
the program to national health priorities in the framework of 
SWAp. While desirable in itself, according to the Paris and Accra 
paradigm, this has further complicated attribution analysis and 
has led the evaluation team to embark on another approach to 
evaluate Phase III. The DEval team has adopted a contribution 
6  DEval refers to unpublished documents with the pseudonym “Doc.” plus a consecutive number for relevant papers, documents and data sets from both ministries, the development organizations and their 
implementing partners or if proper citation would infringe on the privacy of the author(s). Interviews are pseudonymized in a similar way (cf. section 2.3 in this chapter).
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analysis as the design for evaluating Phase III. Contribution 
analysis is a theory-based approach (cf. Mayne, 2011) that has 
been developed for scenarios when attribution analysis is 
inapplicable or unfeasible. Contribution analysis asks “in light 
of the multiple factors influencing a result, has the intervention 
made a noticeable contribution to an observed result and in 
what way?” (Mayne, 2012, p. 273). As a comparative advantage, 
the logic behind contribution analysis puts stronger focus on 
causal mechanisms and the interplay of influencing factors 
than the (quasi-) experimental rationale. This emphasis makes 
contribution analysis a suitable tool to take stock of the variety 
of experiences gained in the course of the Rwandan-German 
program in a SWAp framework.
Building on the work by Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) and 
Mayne (2012), DEval adapted the key steps of a contribution 
analysis: (1) on the basis of the interim / inception report, the 
reference groups in Rwanda and Germany were invited to 
discuss the preliminary findings and suggest thematic focuses 
to be studied in depth in the consolidation phase of the 
evaluation. DEval gathered the suggestions and decided on 
the final thematic focuses; (2) to reconstruct the theories of 
change, the evaluation team identified and screened the relevant 
planning documents for the Rwandan-German program, using 
the analytical framework as a filter; composed an overarching 
ToC (cf. Annex D); and gathered feedback from former program 
staff for validation, which resulted in a slight adjustment; (3) 
the evaluation team created evidence analysis tables (cf. Delahais 
& Toulemonde, 2012) for stand-alone branches of the ToC and, 
therein, collected the existing items of evidence (i.e., information 
confirming or refuting a causal link as postulated in the ToC) that 
was gathered during the exploratory phase of the assessment; 
(4) this exercise allowed for a formal assessment of the extent to 
which the theories of change had already been evidenced; and (5) 
the assessment identified those links in the theories of change 
that still lacked sufficient evidence. 
In order to fill the gaps, DEval applied the following methods and 
data collection tools: (1) a survey among former development 
workers, (2) interviews with different groups of key players, (3) a 
comparative case study of four district health systems, and (4) a 
statistical data analysis of the latest round of Demographic and 
Health Surveys (DHS) in Rwanda. 
Together, these methodological packages were included in the 
contribution analysis as an overarching evaluation approach to 
generate the items of evidence that were necessary for a robust 
assessment of the program’s contributions. The contribution 
claim and corresponding evidence are presented in Chapter 
B.3.3.1 – 3.3.4, under the section relating to effectiveness, and 
Chapter B.3.4, relating to impact.
Critical appraisal of the evaluation designs
With regard to the approach to Phases I and II, the main 
limitation was the lack of available data in terms of identifying 
interviewees for Phases I and II and taking stock of project 
documentation. The evaluation team invested considerable 
time and effort to overcome both constraints and it is convinced 
that it has gathered a critical mass of documentation to outline 
Rwandan-German cooperation in its early Phases. Nevertheless, 
the team has ensured that it avoids making detailed assessments 
of the projects.
Despite reliance on an analytical framework and a contribution 
analysis to manage the complexity inherent in Phase III, the 
theories of change underlying the program are still fairly intricate 
and contain a multitude of causal links to be tested (cf. Annex 
D). With regard to evaluating this and similar programmatic 
approaches, two fundamental issues arise. First, every additional 
link under examination increases the resource demands for the 
overall study. Only deliberate decisions regarding the scope of an 
evaluation by its stakeholders and team – taking into account the 
principle of evaluation efficiency – can, thus, ensure a utilization 
focus of future and similarly complex studies. For the evaluation 
at hand, the team is convinced that the contribution analysis has 
delivered robust results, primarily relating to the OECD-DAC 
criteria of effectiveness and impact, but it acknowledges that this 
may have been at the expense of certain questions especially 
tied to the efficiency criterion. Second, programs operating in a 
SWAp environment reshape the attribution problem. In the case 
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of strongly aligned and well-harmonized support, the tracing of 
more proximal effects back to single development partner (DP) 
deliverables becomes increasingly difficult. A lesson learned has 
been that sufficient resources should be devoted to explicitly 
formulate and collect other influencing factors and rival expla-
nations to question the program’s contribution. The team has 
allocated considerable time and resources to this step to identify 
the ToC, and it is confident to have gathered sufficient evidence 
on the mechanisms of the program to solidly back the conclu-
sions drawn. For future complex evaluations, however, the team 
anticipates untapped potential from a stricter testing of ToCs by 
placing more focus on competing explanations, invalidating their 
postulated influence, and focusing more on validating the ToC 
with key stakeholders.
2.3
Methods and data collection tools
This section outlines the methods and data collection tools 
applied in this evaluation. It is important to keep in mind its 
two-fold purpose over the period. While the emphasis of this 
evaluation of Phases I and II (1980 – 94 and 1995 – 2003, respec-
tively) rests on documenting the evolution of Rwandan-German 
cooperation, the adaptations to the country’s contexts and 
achievements – the focus of Phase III (2004 – 2012) – lies on 
the delivery of items of evidence, feeding into the theory-based 
contribution analysis.
Survey of former DED development workers
Former DED development workers are considered to have been 
key players by the evaluation team due to their long assignments 
in the health sector and direct relationship with target groups. 
In order to document and assess the instrument of development 
workers, DEval designed a two-stage process balancing both 
analytical “breadth” and “depth” through (1) a standardized 
mixed-mode survey (online versus paper-and-pencil mode to 
the same questionnaire), based on the tailored design method 
(cf. Dillman, Smyth, & Christian, 2009),7 followed by (2) in-depth 
semi-structured interviews with a purposive sub-sample of the 
survey respondents in the first stage.
Of the survey’s target population of 111 individuals (equaling the 
total number of development workers in the Rwandan health sec-
tor between 1980 and 2012), 82 were contacted and 52 returned 
a completed questionnaire, resulting in a response rate of 63 % 
of those contacted and a response rate of 47 % of the overall 
population. Statistical χ²-tests have revealed no systematic 
deviations of the sample from the overall population with regard 
to gender composition and placement periods. The efforts made 
for sampling and triangulating survey responses with narratives 
from follow-up interviews should outweigh problems connected 
to the small sample size. Nevertheless, one should understand 
the survey results stated in percentages as an indication of trend 
rather than a precise statistical estimate.
Interviews
The extended evaluation team conducted 136 interviews with 
316 interviewees during the exploratory phase of the evaluation 
and another 128 interviews during the consolidation phase.8 An 
additional 24 interviews and 28 focus group discussions were 
held for the comparative case study. The interviews during the 
exploratory stage emphasized on scoping the evaluation, as-
sessed the feasibility of different evaluation approaches, “getting 
to know” the program and its context, and gaining preliminary 
insights for Phase III regarding the OECD-DAC criteria. The 
interviews conducted during the consolidation stage aimed to 
corroborate the preliminary results of the exploratory stage by 
producing items of evidence along the ToC that fed into the 
contribution analysis for Phase III. The in-depth interviews with 
former DED development workers marked an exception in that 
regard by simultaneously serving to test the hypotheses derived 
in the context analysis.
7  Henceforth, items of evidence referring to individual survey respondents will be referred to as SDW [Survey of Development Workers], plus a consecutive number as a pseudonym identifier. 
8  Note that the overall total number of interviewees during the exploratory phase is due to a double-counting of interviewees who have been interviewed on more than one topic. In fact, 238 people have been 
met. Some key resource people also were interviewed several times on different topics during the consolidation phase. 
A.  |  Background,  Methodology, and Context 12
Main target groups for the interviews during the consolidation 
stage comprised former beneficiaries of human capacity de-
velopment interventions (35), former project and program staff 
(including development workers and CIM integrated experts 
(47), former counterparts and Rwandan project / program staff 
(17), key informants in the health SWAp (25), and other DPs in the 
Rwandan health sector (4). To safeguard respondents’ privacy, 
items of evidence generated in the interviews are referred to by 
pseudonym identifiers, consisting of an acronym for the target 
population and a consecutive number for the interviewee (cf. 
Table 2). In some cases, target populations share the same acro-
nym to avoid the traceability of their identity. End-users of health 
services were targeted by the comparative case study approach.
Table 2. Interview of target populations
Target population Pseudonym Number of interviews
Former DED development workers INT InD DW 13
Former development workers in junior doctor / intern program INT HRD DW 9
Former beneficiaries of International Leadership Training (ILT) INT HRD HM 15
Former junior doctors / interns trained by development workers INT RP 20
Rwandan project / program staff, counterparts, resource persons INT RP 17
Resource persons of other DPs INT DP 4
German project / program and headquarters staff INT EXP 22
CIM integrated experts INT EXP 3
Resource persons regarding SWAp INT SWAp 25
Note: This table provides an overview of interview target populations, their pseudonyms, and the number of interviews conducted in the consolidation stage. Interviews conducted in the explor-
atory stage were coded in the following way: G = Group; INT = Interview; GEN = General (not component-specific); SWAp, HF, HRD, SRH = component abbreviations. The last number is randomly 
assigned for each of the interviews. In addition, the following pseudonyms are used: InD = In-depth interview; EXP = German experts; RP = Rwandan partners. For a more comprehensive overview 
containing the interviews conducted during the exploratory phase, please refer to Annex B.
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To avoid the negative influence of self-assessments on the data 
quality, the evaluation team put special emphasis on diminishing 
privacy concerns and memory effects, while capitalizing on 
triangulation in collecting and analyzing interview data.
Comparative case study of four district health systems
The comparative case study was designed to scrutinize whether 
Rwandan-German cooperation in the health sector has contrib-
uted to addressing the core problems of (1) unattainable health 
Figure 3. Comparative case study approach
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service costs, (2) low service quality, and consequently (3) low 
health care utilization. Case studies, especially with further 
sub-cases, are suitable for collecting evidence that covers the 
large range of a ToC (Delahais & Toulemonde, 2012, p. 285). DEval 
thus commissioned a Rwandan research team to assess four 
district health systems as cases9 to focus on the following key 
stakeholders representing further sub-cases (cf. Figure 3): (1) 
health care providers at different care levels, (2) end users / pa-
tients, and (3) those responsible for steering and managing the 
health system at the district level. Health equity is treated as a 
cross-cutting issue along the aspects previously mentioned. In 
total, the study team conducted 28 focus-group discussions and 
24 interviews to collect and compare appraisals and perceptions 
(building on Krueger & Casey, 2009). Two of the four district 
health systems under study were previously supported by the 
program and were purposely selected, while the other two allow 
for a comparative perspective on the program’s contribution, 
both within and between the districts.
Deviations from the study design during implementation, 
limiting the comparative aspect of the case study approach, 
have received too little attention in the analysis. While DEval 
reallocated internal resources to overcome this constraint, the 
endeavor was rather diminished when compared to comparative-
ly connecting case studies, making it difficult to carve out the 
unique characteristics of the districts and to conclude whether 
cooperation did, indeed, provide added value compared to other 
districts. Despite this limitation and the minor deviations from 
the sampling design with regard to the end users, however, the 
four case studies fulfilled, by and large, their designated purpose 
and provided useful insights from key groups regarding the 
decentralization of the Rwandan health system.
Figure 4: GDC program districts and comparison districts
Note: Own illustration,
using QGIS Desktop 2.0.1
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9  Items of evidence, generated by the comparative case study, will be henceforth quoted as such. 
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Secondary data analysis of Demographic and Health Surveys
In the frame of the contribution analysis, specific links between 
the concepts as specified in the ToC have been tested using 
statistical and econometric analysis. The main constraint in 
applying such methods is a lack of data availability. With regard 
to the evaluand, the DHS provide the most reliable and relevant 
data set. Using the latest survey round of 2010, the secondary 
data analysis focused on quantifying the outcome of social 
interactions in the adoption of modern contraceptives and 
desired fertility to provide a link between direct outputs of the 
program and resulting effects (outcome) of the social marketing 
projects. The methodology applied was a spatial autoregressive 
model with overlapping peer groups and instrumental variables 
for identification. Limitations of the study derived from strong 
assumptions about both peer groups and instrumental variables. 
The study’s results are representative for women between 15 and 
49 years of age at the national level in Rwanda.
3.  Context of Rwandan- 
German cooperation in  
the health sector
The following chapter sheds light on the context in which 
Rwandan-German development cooperation has operated over 
30 years. The analyses in the following approach are undertaken 
from two different angles. The first is a context analysis that iden-
tifies the long-term performance of the health sector in relation 
to the socioeconomic and political development of Rwanda. The 
second is a portfolio analysis, outlining the monetary framework 
conditions prevailing in Rwanda, the Rwandan health sector, and 
the German portfolio. In combination, both approaches should 
provide useful background knowledge and are drawn upon in 
later chapters to assess the contributions of the Rwandan-Ger-
man cooperation over time.
3.1
Context analysis
The context analysis attempts to embed Rwanda’s health policy 
on a broader canvas and seeks to establish links between the 
health sector and the “big” political arena in the turbulent years 
between the 1980s and 2012. Against this background scenario, 
the context analysis distinguishes three phases (1980 – 94; 
1995 – 2003; 2004 – 12) and deduces hypotheses relating to 
context factors. The respective chapters for each phase include 
these hypotheses and seek to prove or invalidate them, based 
on interviews 10 and document reviews. The findings are assessed 
for relevance and effectiveness (cf. Chapter B.1.1.2. and B.2.2.2.). 
An exception to this relates to Phase III, which outlines Rwanda’s 
overarching policy architecture and major international trends, 
while further framework conditions relating to the program 
and its components are more detailed and, therefore, assessed 
in-depth elsewhere (cf. Chapter B.3.3.1 – B.3.3.4). Furthermore, 
the context analysis will inform readers, who are unfamiliar with 
Rwanda’s history, about the larger framework conditions in which 
Rwandan-German development cooperation took place. 
The findings presented here derive from a review of academic 
and grey literature, interviews with time witnesses, and an ap-
praisal of selected health-related indicators (Annex F). The main 
limitation of this context analysis is the absence of a meta-theory 
on health sector development over time to help identify which 
influencing factors should be taken into account and which are 
irrelevant. While the DEval team is confident that it has man-
aged to carve out some context conditions that merited closer 
examination in this evaluation, it would be overconfident to 
claim completeness. A second caveat relates to the phase distinc-
tion of the context analysis: cutting the historical continuities 
of a country context into mutually exclusive phases is, strictly 
speaking, impossible. The evaluation team, however, deliberately 
decided to define phases bound by specific years that signify 
major changes from the perspective of Rwandan-German 
cooperation. By structuring the following section along these 
three phases (1980 – 94; 1995 – 2003; 2004 – 12), it knowingly 
10  The same methodological caveats, outlined in the chapter on the methodology (A.2.3.) relating to interviews, hence, apply to this approach of hypothesis testing. 
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accepts an oversimplification of the fuzziness that is inherent in 
such a distinction.
3.1.1 Economic decline and growing political tension (1980 – 94)
Having been a German colony under indirect rule (1897 – 1916) 
and, subsequently, a Belgian colony (1916 – 59), Rwanda formally 
became an independent republic, headed by President Grégoire 
Kayibanda in 1962. The first independent government ended 
when the then Major General Juvénal Habyarimana seized power 
in a bloodless military coup in 1973, ousting former President 
Kayibanda (cf. Prunier, 1995).
The second republic under President Juvénal Habyarimana 
(1973 – 94), was deeply influenced by an ideology centered on the 
glorification of rural farmers, manual work, and the majority eth-
nic group supposed to represent this idea: the Hutu (Lemarch-
and, 1970; cf. also Verwimp, 2000). This strong and centralist 
single-party state was backed by the military and strived for a 
predominantly agrarian development ideal with clear political 
instructions, demanding subordination from every single citizen 
(Mamdani, 2001). In addition to the omnipresent ethnic division 
of Hutu and Tutsi, there were at least two other main features 
of clientelistic stratification at that time: clans and regions (cf. 
Asche, 1995; Orth, 2001; Prunier, 1995; Verwimp, 2000).
This ideology of a developmental dictatorship came under severe 
pressure at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, 
when commodity prices – especially for coffee – fell and prices 
for imported goods, in turn, increased, partly because of the 
World Bank’s structural adjustment programs (Schicho, 1999; 
Uvin, 1998). Disputes in the population occurred more often 
about the unequal distribution of land and, more generally, about 
the increased inability to meet basic needs from subsistence 
agriculture due to a significantly increasing population density. 
The regime’s stability also was endangered by external pressure. 
On October 1, 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Army, the armed wing 
of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), launched an offensive 
to capture their Rwandan homeland and take over power. In 
1993, the Arusha Accords ended the three-year civil war, but the 
negotiated power-sharing agreements between GoR and RPF 
were only slowly implemented and did not halt the violence 
(Stettenheim, 2002; Straus, 2006). 
Given the overall economic decline and ethnic tensions, there 
are indications that the overall health situation worsened. This 
notion is supported by socioeconomic data from that period 
regarding life expectancy and undernourishment (cf.World Bank, 
2014, and Annex F). To assess the relevance and effectiveness of 
GDC engagement in the Rwandan health sector, this points to a 
first critical juncture to be examined in more detail.
Context Hypothesis 1: Rwandan-German interventions in the 
health sector have been sufficiently adapted to the deterioration 
of the socioeconomic conditions in Rwanda since the mid-1980s to 
remain relevant and effective.
While all kinds of social and partly economic indicators present-
ed Rwanda as a declining society under stress at the end of the 
1980s, the international donor community remained convinced 
that it was worthwhile to continue development cooperation 
with Rwanda throughout the years until the genocide of 1994 
(cf. Uvin, 1998, p. 41). The positive image Rwanda maintained 
was based on the perception of having a low incidence of 
corruption, an efficient administration, and the general belief of 
donors – arguably best summarized – that Rwanda was able to 
‘get things done’ (cf. Uvin, 1998). What does not appear in this 
scenario, however, is the precarious socio-political and ideolog-
ical background of the regime of an ethnically divided society 
and a region- and clan-based power system that excluded many 
relevant societal actors. Nevertheless, the policies of GoR in the 
1980s followed an ethnically discriminatory motive in different 
sectors and politics: favoring Hutu was the rule rather than the 
exception. Tutsi, for example, were systematically excluded from 
higher positions in the political system and the military; Tutsi had 
a 9 % quota in the education system – at first loosely enforced 
and, with the upcoming political crisis that occurred later, more 
so strictly (Prunier, 1995, pp. 74 – 92). Against this background 
scenario, it appears likely that similar policies discriminating 
against the Tutsi minority group existed in the health sector. 
Obviously, this kind of policies stood in sharp contrast to the 
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human rights obligations of GoR, as Rwanda had ratified the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(UN, 1966a) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (UN, 1966b) in 1975. Regarding the provision of services 
in the health sector, the ethnocentric second Rwandan republic 
might have been opposed to the principle of non-discriminatory 
treatment, outlined in these covenants, as well as to the univer-
sal access to PHC, outlined in the Declaration of Alma-Ata (WHO 
1978). To assess how GDC has steered through these scenarios 
during the 1980s, the evaluation team has probed into another 
context hypothesis.
Context Hypothesis 2: Health policies during the Habyarimana 
regime negatively influenced Rwandan-German interventions in 
the health sector with regard to protection of minorities and the 
health equity of services.
Since the 1980s, PHC has been a key strategy to improve the 
health of the Rwandan population. The GoR appears to have 
adopted the PHC strategy shortly after the Alma-Ata conference 
(Mirasano, 1984, p. 33; cf. also Mungwakuzwe, 1985) (cf. Box 1 and 
Annex G). Further governmental priorities were the decentraliza-
tion of tasks, responsibilities, and resource allocations for health 
(INT EXP 21). Rwanda expanded the geographic coverage with 
primary healthcare services and invested in the training of health 
personnel, focusing on PHC professionals and not on specialists.
Box 1. Declaration of Alma-Ata and primary health care
The Declaration of Alma-Ata (1978) can arguably be considered as the single most 
relevant international agreement on health for developing countries and has led 
to the adoption of the concept of PHC as a blueprint for universal coverage with 
essential primary health services. To date, PHC has become – and remains – an 
important health-policy issue in many developing countries. 
PHC is defined as “essential health care based on practical, scientifically sound and 
socially acceptable methods and technology made universally accessible to individuals 
and families in the community through their full participation and at a cost that the 
community and country can afford to maintain at every stage of their development in 
the spirit of self-reliance and self-determination” (WHO 1978: Article VI). 
In 1985, Rwanda adopted a health development strategy in 
the spirit of the Lusaka Declaration, building on decentralized 
management and district-level care (GoR, 2005a), which would 
also be revitalized during the country’s decentralization process 
in the late 1990s (cf. Box 3 in Section 3.1.2 and Annex G). The 
strategy guided forthcoming investment in the Rwandan health 
care sector and helped the country to develop a clear-cut 
planning for hospitals, thus avoiding duplication of financing 
facilities. This was particularly relevant in view of the fact that 
beyond the state, other organizations were providing health care 
to the Rwandan population.11 The previously mentioned drop in 
the price of coffee, combined with external pressure for struc-
tural adjustments, had severe consequences on the economic 
situation of Rwandan households, reducing their resources for 
healthy nourishment. By 1989, the government budget was 
so sharply reduced that the major coping strategy was to cut 
social services (cf. Prunier, 1995, p. 93). From 1975 Rwandans were 
made to pay for health care – exceptions were only made for 
the indigenous and only if facilities had abundant external funds 
(INT EXP 21). Rwanda began to implement the HF policy of the 
Bamako Initiative as of 1989 (cf. Box 2 and Annex G) with the 
principal objective of cost recovery (Schneider, Diop, & Bucyana, 
2000, p. 10).12
Box 2. Bamako Initiative
The Bamako Initiative (1987) was an early expression of “structural-adjustment” 
policies, resulting from a meeting of African ministers of health. The Initiative 
proposed decentralizing health decision-making to local levels and establishing 
realistic national drug policies to enhance the provision of essential drugs for 
sub-Saharan Africans. The resolution of the Bamako conference referred explicitly 
to Alma-Ata and called for promoting PHC by defining and implementing 
self-financing mechanisms at the district level, encouraging social mobilization, 
and ensuring a regular drug supply. The most relevant, well known, and most 
controversial innovation of the Bamako Initiative was the implementation of user 
fees in public health facilities in many African countries. 
In addition to these influences on the Rwandan health sector, 
one of the most important and controversial topics of health 
11  In particular, religious and charitable organizations had set up a country-wide provider system aligned with public facilities. Approximately 60 % of the 272 health facilities that were effective in 1986 were 
operated by the public sector and 50 – 60 % percent of the Rwandans seeking clinical services turned to private centers, mostly operated by the Catholic Church (cf. May, Mukamanzi, & Vekemans, 1990). 
12  The highly controversial report, “Financing Health Services in Developing Countries: An Agenda for Reform”, underscored the need for improved health sector financing and prioritized user fees and patient 
charges as a means to mobilize resources and make health financing more sustainable (Akin, Birdsall, & de Ferranti, 1987). The report refers explicitly to the Alma-Ata Declaration and considers primary 
health care principally under financial criteria. 
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politics at that time should be examined: family planning. It 
appears unlikely that the Habyarimana regime applied the same 
stance on every family in Rwanda, disregarding the respective 
ethnic and, possibly, clan background. Although programmatical-
ly outlined and formally supported by GoR, family planning could 
have been contrary to the politics of Habyarimana of glorifying 
the peasant life-style and to his traditional beliefs in the need 
to have many children in order to guarantee self-sustainability 
in a rural context. For a long time, Habyarimana was reluctant 
to introduce a comprehensive policy to reduce the birth rate 
(Verwimp, 2000) and there are accounts of raids on pharmacies 
selling condoms, which was tolerated by the Ministry of the 
Interior (Prunier, 1995, p. 89). Indeed, population pressure was 
picking up in Rwanda (cf. figure 5) and by 1993, Rwanda ranked 
among the top ten countries in the world with the highest 
population density exceeding 3,000 people per 1,000 hectares, 
on average (World Ressources Institute, 1994). This imbalance 
between policy decision and demographic trends leads to a third 
context hypothesis.
Context Hypothesis 3: A lack of genuine political backing during 
the Habyarimana regime reduced the relevance and results of 
Rwandan-German interventions in family planning.
During the volatile period between the onset of the civil war in 
1990 and the Arusha peace process, it became clear fairly soon 
that the old regime would not be able to maintain its exclusive 
grip to power (Prunier, 1995: 367). International mediators 
pressed for the introduction of a multi-party system and an 
interim government with a proportionate ethnic distribution. 
The prospect of a forced opening up of the political arena drove 
hardliners of the Habyarimana government into an extreme “in-
strumentalization” of ethnicity. Ultimately, parties were centered 
only on ethnic considerations and there was a perception of one 
key alternative: Hutu or Tutsi – ‘us or them’. 
The ethnically loaded conflict peaked when the airplane, on 
which President Habyarimana was on board, was shot down 
over Kigali in April 1994. Hutu extremists seized power within 
hours and the state-orchestrated genocide commenced.13 Ethnic 
hardliners of the Hutu majority systematically exterminated 
Tutsi and moderate Hutu, with an estimated death toll ranging 
between 500,000 (Des Forges, 1999; Melvern, 2000) and over 
one million (GoR, 2013). Concomitantly, the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front started to invade the country from its Ugandan exile. When 
the offensive gained ground, it triggered the mass exodus of an 
estimated 2.1 million Rwandans to the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC; at that time, known as Zaire).
13  As this evaluation focuses on the health sector, the genocide is only briefly covered to ensure continuity for readers not familiar with Rwanda’s history. For more detailed accounts that render justice to this 
undoubtedly worst period of Rwanda’s history, covering the causes leading to the genocide, its onset, and its course of events, refer to the seminal works by Des Forges (1999), Prunier (1995), and Straus (2006).
Figure 5: Rwanda – Population (total) and population growth (annual %) 1980-2010. 
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Figure 6: Rwanda – GDP per capita (current USD) and GDP growth (annual %)
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3.1.2 Emergency relief, continued insecurity, and  
consolidation (1995 – 2003)
Following its military victory, the RPF established a new 
government in Kigali on July 19, 1994. The remainder of the old 
Habyarimana regime reorganized and continued carrying out 
incursions into Rwandan territory from their DRC-based refugee 
camps. In 1996, the RPF responded with troop deployments to 
the DRC, marking the onset of a series of wars that, ultimately, 
involved not only the governments of the DRC and Rwanda, 
but also seven other African countries and numerous irregular 
movements and forces (cf. Prunier, 2009a; Prunier, 2009b). 
This gave rise to a constant feeling of insecurity and an overall 
threatening environment in Rwanda (Ingelaere, 2009), especially 
in the North-West. Domestic security and political stability were 
consolidated several years later.
An international joint evaluation, commissioned to take stock of 
the complex Rwandan emergency, has demonstrated a dramati-
cally changed environment following the genocide (cf. Eriksson 
et al., 1996). An estimated 80 % of health professionals, who had 
worked in Rwanda, were killed or had fled the country by mid-July 
1994. Emergency assistance, mainly provided by non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs) and multilateral agencies, focused 
on internally displaced people and refugees with at least 200 
NGOs involved in the overall emergency response. While efforts 
to rebuild the country’s infrastructure quickly showed results (by 
1996, health delivery systems had largely been rebuilt to pre-1994 
levels), formal cooperation between the international community 
and MoH, however, only progressed slowly due to accountability 
and legitimacy concerns relating to GoR at that time. 
To prepare for bilateral government negotiations for devel-
opment cooperation in this context, BMZ commissioned an 
evaluation in 1998 of a selection of projects in the German health 
portfolio (Wolff & Mehler, 1998). The aim was whether projects in 
the areas of refugee reintegration, justice, education, and media 14 
since 1994 could alleviate the drivers of conflict. In 1998, armed 
unrest in Rwanda was still widespread, resulting in about one 
third of the country classified as insecure and, therefore, making 
it impossible for access to external assistance. As a corollary to 
the report by Wolff and Mehler, the German health portfolio 
was not subjected to fundamental strategic re-orientation at 
the time. The evaluation, however, provided an overview of 
the health sector. While 86 % of the government’s total health 
expenditure came from foreign sources, Wolff and Mehler report 
that health spending by an average household was about 5.4 % 
of annual income (between 2,700 and 3,700 RWF at that time). 
Consistent with the findings of the joint evaluation, the evalu-
ation study also found that nearly all health facilities had been re-
habilitated and re-opened, albeit the proliferation of health staff 
and drugs and the geographic and financial access to health care 
were problematic. Directly after the genocide, Rwanda received 
extensive and relevant international assistance. This allowed for 
health services to be free of charge until the end of 1996, when 
most international NGOs phased out their support (INT HF 32; cf. 
Soeters, Musango, & Meessen, 2005). As a consequence, the use 
of health services dropped to 0.25 consultations per capita per 
annum by 1999 (INT RP 1; cf. also Schneider, 2005). 
Further core problems, identified by Wolff and Mehler and relat-
ing to health, were the high proliferation of poverty, low-quality, 
and coverage of social services (especially health), and demogra-
phy. The genocide’s death toll, by 1998, was balanced by the large 
repatriation of refugees,15 which led to an estimated population 
of approximately 8 million and equaling the pre-genocide level 
(cf. also Figure 5). The core issues relating to health before 
the genocide, therefore, were still relevant, and the volatile 
post-conflict period presented even more problems to resolve. 
To assess their relevance and effectiveness, it is necessary to 
examine how German development cooperation has responded 
to this challenging situation, which leads to the following context 
hypothesis:
Context Hypothesis 4: German bilateral cooperation followed 
its pre-genocide agenda in the health sector rather than having 
delivered strategic and programmatic support.
14  Media projects refer to support to Radio Rwanda. It should be noted that the media (especially Radio Télévision Libre de Mille Collines, RTML) played a significant role in igniting hatred and mobilizing for 
the genocide. All projects under evaluation in 1998, therefore, conform to a wider definition of today’s concept of “transitional justice”.
15  A period of tension between the Tutsi and Hutu groups in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the so-called Rwandan Revolution, led to the flight of an estimated 600,000 – 700,000 Tutsi to countries neighbor-
ing Rwanda (Prunier, 1995, p. 63). Many of these refugees and their descendants returned after the RPF captured Rwanda.
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On the individual level, the Rwandan population had to cope 
with imitima yarakomeretse, “the disease of the wounded hearts” 
(Prunier, 2009a, p. 37) after the traumatic events experienced 
during the civil war of 1990, the genocide, the RPF invasion, and 
regime change. About 73 % of the population reported having 
lost at least one family member (Pham, Weinstein, & Longman, 
2004). Rural families, therefore, were not receptive to the family 
planning communication after 1994 (INT InD 12, 33), which leads 
to the next context hypothesis:
Context Hypothesis 5: German cooperation continued to support 
family planning after the genocide without major changes, rather 
than having adapted it to a changed scenario to ensure relevance.
The evaluation team found no trace of Rwanda having adopted, 
in the mid- and late 1990s, any significant international health 
policies or initiatives (cf. Annex G). Therefore, the period since 
the onset of the civil war in 1990 to the turn of the 21st Century 
could be considered as the country’s “lost decade”. There has 
been, however, impressive progress since 2000, when Rwanda 
adopted a health development strategy, based on decentralized 
management and district-level care in the spirit of the Lusaka 
Declaration of 1985 (cf. GoR, 2005b).
Box 3. Lusaka Declaration
The Lusaka Declaration (1985) on the decentralization of the national and district 
health systems has neither significantly attracted the attention of policymakers 
nor of scholars. In Rwanda, however, the declaration was pronounced loudly in 
Rwandan policy papers ten or more years later (GoR, 2005a, 2005b). The Lusaka 
Declaration promotes three strategies to improve the quality and access to health 
services: (1) decentralization of the health system using the health district as the 
basic operational unit; (2) development of PHC systems; and (3) reinforcement 
of community participation in the management and financing of services (GoR, 
2005b, p. 5). 
3.1.3 Reconciliation – security – development (2004 – 12)
While it is a challenge to provide a clear-cut end to the post-con-
flict period, this evaluation considers 2000 and 2003 as critical 
periods. The security situation in Rwanda drastically improved 
following the Lusaka Accords of 1999 and the Pretoria Agreement 
of 2002. Ever since, domestic peace in Rwanda has remained 
stable.16 Furthermore, the first presidential election following 
the genocide reflected improved political consolidation.17 The 
government under Paul Kagame has pursued a comprehensive 
and deliberate policy to bridge the ethnic rift in Rwanda’s society 
and to rebuild the Rwandan nation. Major building blocks can 
be summarized along a legal, social, and security dimension. 
From a legal aspect, a three-level judiciary system is responsible 
for genocide perpetrators. The United Nations International 
Tribunal for Rwanda has sought to prosecute individuals accused 
of planning the genocide and crimes against humanity, while the 
Rwandan national court system and the Gacaca lay courts (with 
elected judges at the community level) handles the trials of gen-
ocide suspects accused of all other genocide-related crimes (UN, 
2013). A leading principle of these Gacaca courts is forgiveness, 
in which perpetrators confess, apologize, and are sent to serve 
their sentences by doing community service activities (Rugege, 
2006). From a social angle, the creation of the National Unity 
and Reconciliation Commission can be considered a major policy 
effort. Created in 1999, its goal promotes freedom and mutual 
respect, denouncing destructive actions in an effort to erase the 
negative consequences of the genocide on the Rwandan people 
(GoR, 1999). By organizing national summits, meetings, and con-
ferences on unity and reconciliation, as well as workshops as part 
of ‘civic reeducation’ or ‘solidarity’ camps, the National Unity and 
Reconciliation Commission aims to reduce tensions within the 
population (Zorbas, 2004). With regard to security, domestic and 
external resources have been allocated to regional frameworks 
to support disarmament, demobilization, and the reintegration 
of ex-combatants in the greater Great Lakes region, such as the 
Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration program from 
16  In these accords, the DRC committed to handle the presence of irregular fighters threatening Rwanda from Congolese soil. The GoR, in turn, was to draw back its military forces (International Crisis Group, 
2005). The conflict in Kivu in the east of DRC continued after the Rwandan withdrawal on a geographically smaller, but by no means less bloody, degree. In 2009, Rwanda intervened a third time in the DRC 
with the Congolese Government during the joint military operation, Umoja Wetu (“Our unity”). Until today, sporadic explosions on Rwandan territory and artillery ricochets from the DRC prevail. 
17  The former commander of the RPF and then Vice-President and Minister of Defense, Paul Kagame, was voted for President by Parliament in 2000 and was reconfirmed by the 2003 elections. However, 
international observer groups do not yet rate Rwanda as a consolidated democracy. Compare this to the country profile of Freedom House (Freedom House, 2013) or the Bertelsmann Transformation Index 
for Rwanda (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2012). Both indices go back to a liberal understanding of democracy and, more concretely, to Dahl’s concept of ‘polyarchy’ (Dahl, 1989), which may prove difficult when 
applying it to a country with a similar history to that of Rwanda. 
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2002 to 2009 and its successive program, currently in operation 
(World Bank, 2010).
The shift towards legal reform and the safety of Rwandan 
citizens has been accompanied by a development-oriented 
administration, the latter of which is a continuation rather than 
an innovation in the Rwandan context.18 Rwanda has maintained 
its pragmatism and its relatively low degree of corruption from 
the pre-genocide years, and the West has continued to provide 
Rwanda with aid at an exceedingly high rate (cf. Zorbas, 2011, 
and the portfolio analysis chapter). Together, these trends mark 
the end of the post-conflict situation and provide the basis for 
increased legitimacy and stability to tackle policy reform.
In the meantime, Rwanda has become one of the permanent 
drivers of the ongoing African economic revival. The Rwandan 
economy has continuously shown growth rates above 7 % (except 
in 2003, 2007, and 2009 due to the global financial crises). 
According to the World Bank, gross domestic product per capita 
has more than doubled between 2000 (USD 580 per capita in 
purchasing power parities) and 2011 (USD 1,251 per capita in 
purchasing power parities) (World Bank, 2014). Economic and 
administrative efficiency, consequently, have been, and are, at the 
forefront of many initiatives of Rwanda’s government subsequent 
to 2000. While a degree of domestic security not witnessed 
for a long spell prevails in Rwanda, this comes at the cost of a 
restriction on democratic rights, such as freedom of speech and 
the right to form associations and parties (Longman, 2011).
Currently, GoR has embarked on a number of high-level policy 
processes. The single most important policy statement for Rwan-
da stems from the so-called Vision 2020: “The VISION seeks to 
fundamentally transform Rwanda into a middle-income country 
by the year 2020.” (GoR & MINECOFIN, 2000, p. 9). Rwanda 
expects to reach this goal in a pro-poor way, with six pillars 
comprising sub-targets, including ones to lower population 
growth and improve citizens’ health (p. 14). The building blocks 
of the Rwandan policy architecture are aligned with Vision 2020. 
The commitment to achieve the MDGs by 2015 (cf. Box 4) and 
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process are seen as 
intermediate steps leading to the long-term goal of Vision 2020.
Box 4. Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
The Millennium Development Goals, following the United Nations Millennium 
Summit and Millennium Declaration in 2000, define eight time-bound targets 
that, when achieved, would end extreme poverty worldwide by 2015 (UN, 2000). 
In particular, MDGs 4 (reduce child mortality), 5 (improve maternal health), and 
6 (combat HIV / AIDS, malaria, and other diseases) relate to health. The MDGs 
arguably have become the most relevant landmark in international cooperation. 
Based on an interim PRSP (GoR 2000), the first large-scale 
efforts for medium-term planning began in 2002. The first PRSP 
(PRSP I; GoR, 2002) identified priority areas that were strongly 
influenced as a result of the closing of the emergency period, and 
it aimed to assist in a recovery from the genocide legacy and to 
consolidate the achievements up until 2002 (GoR, 2007, p. 7). It 
also reflected the findings of the Commission on Macroeconom-
ics and Health (Sachs, 2001) by following the new paradigm that 
investment in health be considered an important condition for 
development and poverty reduction (cf. Annex G). The focus on 
health included an emphasis on the strong potential to prevent 
diseases and PHC, as stated in the Declaration of Alma-Ata, 
with priority set on selected infectious diseases – prompted by 
the MDGs and GFATM (cf. also Box 5) – pro-poor HF, and health 
systems strengthening, according to World Bank policies of that 
time.
Box 5. Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM)
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria was created in 2002 as a 
consequence of the United Nations Special Session on HIV / AIDS (cf. Annex G) of 
2001 to tackle the challenge of achieving MDG 6 (to combat HIV / AIDS, malaria, 
and other diseases) by 2015. The GFATM began operations in January 2002 as an 
international finance organization to generate and allocate additional resources 
to prevent and treat the three diseases. The main role of the GFATM is a financial 
mechanism where implementation is done by the in-country Country Coordinating 
Mechanisms that include the various national stakeholders involved. 
The successor to PRSP, the Economic Development and Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (EDPRS), covered the period 2008 – 12. The 
18  On the other hand, compare this to (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012), who attempt to demonstrate a new aspect of Kagame’s policy, which they term ‘developmental patrimonialism’. 
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EDPRS contained three “flagship programs” (GoR, 2007): (1) 
sustainable growth for jobs and exports, (2) poverty reduction 
in rural areas through the Vision 2020 Umurenge Program; and 
(3) governance. The EDPRS, furthermore, provided the national 
priorities within which the strategic sector plans should be 
developed. Health is anchored under “complementary sectoral 
interventions to achieve the EDPRS targets” (p. 91), with special 
emphasis on strengthening health programs, slowing down 
population growth, and extending social protection (cf. also 
Doc.41).19
The 2002 PRSP already had acknowledged the importance of 
elaborating and harmonizing sector strategies to achieve the 
formulated goals (GoR, 2002, p. 35). The first Health Sector Stra-
tegic Plan (HSSP I) dates back to 2005 and outlined the health 
sector priorities of the Rwandan MoH until 2009 (GoR, 2005b): 
(1) ensuring the availability of human resources; (2) ensuring 
the availability of quality drugs, vaccines, and consumables; (3) 
expanding geographic accessibility; (4) improving financial ac-
cessibility of health services, (5) ensuring quality of and demand 
for services in controlling disease, (6) ensuring the quality of and 
demand for services in national referral hospitals and research 
and treatment institutions; and (7) reinforcing institutional ca-
pacity. The subsequent HSSP II for 2009 – 12 (GoR & MoH, 2009) 
categorized program areas along two pillars: client-centered 
service delivery and support services. Client-centered services 
included “all objectives and outputs directly related to improving 
the health of the people” (p. 21), such as family planning, SRH, 
maternal and child health, and prevention through attitude and 
behavior change. The support services included “objectives and 
outputs that provide an enabling environment for service deliv-
ery to be optimally effective and efficient”, thus relating to health 
systems strengthening (p. 21). German program areas, such as HF 
and HRH were explicitly stated. HSSP II underwent a mid-term 
review in 2011 (IHP+, 2011), combined with a Joint Assessment of 
National Strategies (IHP+, 2012), which has fed into what is now 
HSSP III (cf. Doc.28). The HSSPs were, in turn, operationalized 
through more specialized policies – e.g., for CBHI (MoH, 2010a) 
or Human Resources (GoR & MoH, 2006a) – which are reflected 
when assessing the components of the Rwandan-German 
program.
Rwanda was very effective in applying for funds from the GFATM 
(cf. Box 5 and Annex G). It became the largest grant recipient at 
the regional level. More recently, Rwanda has appeared among 
the few countries that have attained universal access to antiret-
roviral therapy, which is defined as coverage of at least 80 % of 
the population in need (UN, 2012, p. 42). In addition, GFATM 
resources have paid over 1.5 million annual insurance premiums 
for very poor people and 146,130 annual premiums provided 
for people living with HIV / AIDS (Benn, 2009, p. 65). Rwanda 
presents a noteworthy exception to the usual modus operandi of 
GFATM: GFATM resources were not only used to finance vertical 
efforts, but also used to cover the poor with social health pro-
tection (cf. Schmidt, 2012, p. 134). There is an on-going debate on 
whether the vertical approach (versus horizontal or health sector 
approaches) undermines the overall health of large populations 
and fosters an imbalance in the provision of health care services 
by focusing on specific illnesses and, thus, diverting human and 
capital resources from PHC services, contradicting the Alma-Ata 
Declaration (Global Health Watch, 2011). The international 
community has, in the meantime, started to recognize the 
counter-productive effects of illness-related programs and has 
begun to shift the debate back to horizontal schemes. The under-
standing of what health systems strengthening means, however, 
is quite unclear and variable and, as observed in the Lancet, “no 
consensus exists for the operational definition of health-system 
strengthening” (Reich & Takemi, 2009, p. 509).
Two other policy strands merit description when outlining the 
health sector policy architecture, and they will be addressed 
more depth elsewhere. These are the development effectiveness 
agenda and decentralization (cf. also B.3.7 and B.3.3.1). Rwanda 
strongly commits to the agenda laid out in the Paris Declaration 
of 2005 (cf. Box 6) and issued an aid policy as early as 2006 to 
manage external support, according to the Paris principles (GoR, 
2006). The policy also raises critical questions with regard to 
international aid, in particular vertical programs, and it calls for 
19  EDPRS 2, implemented in 2013 / 14 and setting Rwanda’s agenda until 2017 / 18, was in progress when this report was drafted. In future, health will be factored in less prominently (cf. INT EXP 9) under 
“foundational” issues or, in the case of HIV / AIDS, “cross-cutting” issues (cf. GoR 2013). 
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aid effectiveness and alignment with government priorities and 
systems (cf. also Box 6). To harmonize development support 
and make international aid more effective in accordance with 
its national priorities, Rwanda introduced a policy of Division of 
Labor among the DPs for implementation in 2010 (MINECOFIN, 
2013). The cessation of German support to the health sector, due 
to the Division of Labor policy among DPs, can be traced back to 
this agenda.
The decentralization process commenced in 2000 and entered 
its second phase in 2005, with an administrative reorganization,20 
including the minimum requirements for geographic coverage 
(one hospital per district; one health center per sector; one 
health post per cell. Throughout all the levels of administration, 
accountability has been included as a key principle for the GoR 
to follow. Despite these decentralization efforts, a study by the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
(Fox, Ravishankar, Squires, Williamson, & Brinkerhoff, 2010) 
shows, that the institutional accountability for end users of 
health services remains insufficient. Key managers of the health 
sector (e.g., CBHI) often do not have the capacity to supervise 
and monitor the daily activities of local health facilities (cf. 
MoH, 2011b). Due to misinformation and a lack of clearly defined 
responsibilities, they often do time-consuming work, for which 
they are not responsible and their relationships between the 
district person “in-charge-of-health”, health facility managers, 
and district council are ill-defined.
Box 6. Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005 addresses the absence of 
coordination between national and international development efforts and the 
lack of harmonization of international aid. The five fundamental principles of the 
Declaration (ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results, mutual 
accountability) have gained significant momentum in the health sector, where 
partners work together to support a single, country-led national strategy in a 
well-coordinated way. 
The specific relevance of the Paris Declaration for development strategies in 
the health sector lies in achieving the right mix of flexibility and predictability; 
alignment to country priorities and reduced transaction costs associated with 
donor finance for better planning; budgeting; and implementation capacity in the 
health sector. 
The relative ease with which GDC was able to cooperate with 
GoR throughout the time under scrutiny and, especially during 
the last decade, partly can be explained by the Rwandan stance 
on development, which paralleled international development 
paradigms to a high degree. Although Rwanda can also claim 
ownership of development processes, there is doubt whether 
government ownership includes the Rwandan people. On the 
other hand, however, one can conclude that policies are mostly 
linked to periodic checks and, more often than not, this is done 
with clear indicators. Ultimately, Rwanda’s success, in economic 
terms, is one of the many indicators legitimizing Rwanda’s 
approach for the time being.
3.2 
Portfolio analysis
The portfolio analysis aims to provide information about the 
resource allocation across sectors and over time by GoR, DPs, 
and bilateral Rwandan-German development cooperation. 
This is relevant in order to understand the role of GDC in the 
health sector and to examine the size of the aid contribution in 
absolute and relative terms. The analysis, therefore, focuses on 
change over time and investigates the flow of aid to the health 
and other sectors. The analysis covers the period 1980 – 2012 
in terms of bilateral cooperation through the data information 
system of BMZ (BMZ, 2012b), donor contributions in the period 
2002 – 11 through the Creditor Reporting System21 of the OECD, 
and all health expenditures for the latest financial year of 2011 / 12 
through the Rwandan Health Resource Tracking Tool (HRTT).22 
In addition, public expenditures are analyzed using available 
National Health Accounts.23 The main limitation of the portfolio 
20  During this phase, the number of provinces (previously called préfectures) was reduced from 15 to four (in addition to Kigali) and the number of districts from 106 to 30. Below the district level, there are 416 
sectors (imirenge), 2,150 cells (akagari) and almost 14,826 villages (imidugudu) (cf. GoR & MoH, 2009, p. 15). 
21  The Creditor Reporting System is maintained by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. The information in the Creditor Reporting System database is submitted by donor agencies and 
verified by the OECD. Information is published annually. The data cover the commitments of official development assistance (ODA) (as of 1995) and disbursements (as of 2002). 
22  The HRTT was established in 2010 with the support of the Clinton Health Access Initiative and the US Government to track funds provided to the health sector by DPs. The tool is meant to support planning 
capacities of public administration and to identify the gaps in allocative effectiveness. The tool, therefore, supports public financial management, especially at decentralized levels. 
23  National Health Accounts 2006 (GoR & MoH, 2008), 2003 (GoR & MoH, 2006b), 1998 (PHR, 2000). 
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analysis, however, has been the lack of data. The evaluation has 
very limited information about Rwanda’s national budget, the 
contributions of donors, and the various aid modalities across 
sectors and time. 
In addition to this chapter, more detailed and comprehensive infor-
mation is provided in additional tables and figures in Annex H. As 
the focus of the evaluation is beyond the project level, information 
on the disbursements of single projects is not part of the portfolio 
analysis. Relevant information at the project level is provided 
within the respective parts of Phases I-III (Chapter B.1.-B.3.). 
Government spending and the role of aid
Rwanda, while still among the poorest countries in the world 
today, has made remarkable progress since the dramatic event 
of the genocide, which severely affected Rwanda’s social and 
economic development in the mid-1990s. While gross domestic 
product (GDP) dropped below USD 800 million during the 
war (1994), GDP per capita amounted only to USD 130 in 1995 
(measured in current US dollars) (World Bank, 2014). Since then, 
continuous GDP growth above 5 % has led to a GDP of USD 6.4 
billion in 2011 (Figure 6) with a GDP per capita of USD 570 (World 
Bank, 2014). Nevertheless, this still leaves about 80 % of the 
population (11 million) under the poverty line at USD 2 per capital 
per diem (NISR, 2012). 
Today Rwanda’s development strategy is based on economic 
growth, transformation, reduced aid dependency, and pro-poor 
development, and the country is now on track to achieve most 
MDG targets by 2015. It remains, nevertheless, the fifth most 
aid-dependent country in the world, accompanied by high pover-
ty levels and economic inequality (Abbott & Rwirahira, 2012).
Figure 6: Rwanda – GDP per capita (current USD) and GDP growth (annual %)
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In 2011, the Rwandan national budget stood at RWF 1.1 trillion 
(USD 1.9 billion) (MINECOFIN, 2012b), with the amount of RWF 
129.6 billion (USD 218 million) – or 11.5 % in 2010 – allocated to 
the health sector. This was well below the minimum target of 
15 % for health that was stated in the 2001 Abuja Declaration24 
(GoR & MoH, 2012). The latest budget plan further reduces this 
share to 9.5 % for Fiscal Year 2013 / 14 (Abbott & Malunda, 2013). 
In comparison, the national budget for infrastructure, education, 
and agriculture accounted for 22 %, 15 % and 6 %, respectively 
(OECD, 2013).
Overall, ODA disbursements in Rwanda have been steadily 
increasing between 2002 and 2011 – from USD 335.9 million to 
USD 1.3 billion (Table 3) (OECD, 2013). This development was 
24  In 2006, the 15 % target of the Abuja Declaration was also included in the Maputo Plan of Action, agreed by 48 African countries, among them Rwanda. 
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accompanied by a shift from humanitarian-oriented assistance 
in the post-genocide period to a development-oriented type 
of assistance. SWAp agreements have been signed with DPs in 
seven sectors to reduce transaction costs and fragmentation. 
ODA disbursements peaked in 2006, when Rwanda was given 
debt relief, most of which was provided by the World Bank’s 
International Development Assistance (USD 877.1 million) and 
the African Development Fund (USD 315.2 million) (OECD, 2013). 
Aid dependency fell from 86 % in 2000 to around 40 % in 2011 
(Abbott & Rwirahira, 2012; OECD, 2013). This change of direction 
will be pursued in accordance with Vision 2020 and EDPRS 2 
(Abbott & Malunda, 2013).
Table 3. Total aid disbursements in the Rwandan health sector (in millions of current US dollars)
  DAC 5 Code* 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Health 120 & 130 32.99 36.16 85.20 99.51 141.9 166.06 245.56 258.32 305.79 322.26
% / all 9.8 % 11.4 % 17.4 % 16.3 % 7.4 % 24.3 % 27.8 % 28.1 % 29.8 % 25.3 %
All 335.87 318.12 488.76 611.63 1,909.67 682.54 881.90 918.56 1,024.6 1,272.53
Source: Creditor Reporting System database (OECD, 2013).  
Note: In the Creditor Reporting System, data on the sector of destination are recorded using five-digit purpose codes. The first three digits of the code refer to the corresponding DAC5 sector or category. Code 
120 includes general health (e.g., health policy, medical education and research) and basic health (e.g., health infrastructure, disease control, nutrition and basic health care). Code 130 includes population 
policies and reproductive health (e.g., reproductive health care, family planning, STI control and HIV / AIDS).
In Rwanda, program- and project-based support accounts for the 
biggest share of ODA. However, the 2006 Rwandan Aid Policy 
prefers General Budget Support (GBS), sector budget support 
(SBS) and basket funds to ensure alignment with government 
priorities and to reduce delivery and transaction costs (MINE-
COFIN, 2011b). Before 2004, up to 30 % of Rwanda’s aid was 
delivered through budget support and remained, on average, 
between 10 – 20 % in the subsequent years. Budget support 
was mainly provided by donors, such as the European Union, 
Sweden, United Kingdom, and World Bank. Other donors, such 
as Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, and United States have 
recently joined this group. In the period between 2009 and 2012, 
GDC was engaged in GBS and SBS with a total of EUR 31 million 
and EUR 13 million, respectively. GDC support to SBS was only 
provided to the health sector. Basket funding of EUR 0.6 million 
in the health sector was provided in the form of the CDPF. 
Program- and project-based support is managed through Single 
Project Implementation Units25 (Versailles, 2012). 
According to OECD-DAC categories 120 (health) and 130 (popu-
lation policies / programs and reproductive health), the share of 
aid disbursements on health relative to total aid disbursements 
peaked in 2010 (29.8 %), forming the most important sector 
assisted by foreign donors in that year (Table 3). The period 
2002 – 11 has witnessed a major expansion of aid disbursements 
in the health sector, rising from USD 32.99 million in 2002 to 
USD 322.26 million in 2011 (measured in current US dollars). 
This expansion of donor support to the health sector has been 
driven, to a large extent, by population policies and programs 
and reproductive health aid disbursements (USD 220.8 million in 
2011), in particular, STI control (including HIV / AIDS).
The major donors financing STI control, including HIV / AIDS, 
have been GFATM and the United States.26 Germany had also 
provided considerable funds between 2008 and 2011 (Table 4). 
Besides HIV / AIDS, Germany has focused on reproductive health 
issues through GTZ / GIZ, DED / GIZ, and KfW (DSW, 2010).
25  In order to keep best practices in project implementation identified in the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action, GoR established Single Project Implementation Units across all government 
ministries and project implementation agencies in 2011 to coordinate program- and project-based support. 
26  Worldwide, the GFATM made a total of USD 22.9 billion available for some 1,000 programs in 151 countries from 2001 to 2011; Germany has committed more than EUR 1.3 billion (approximately USD 1.6 
billion) to the GFATM since it was set up, contributing approximately 7 % overall. 
A.  |  Background,  Methodology, and Context 26
Table 4. STI control including HIV / AIDS in Rwanda (in millions of current US dollars)
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
United States 1.64 11.15 19.72 24.08 43.15 57.25 66.31 84.49 92.34 102.09
GFATM 2.11 10.50 15.64 12.87 31.48 47.26 31.35 103.37 101.26
Germany 0.40 0.87 0.99 1.45 0.68 0.79 2.47 11.31 3.00 3.45
Other donors 0.73 3.76 9.91 14.83 19.93 17.84 14.61 7.93 4.12 2.37
All GFATM 2.77 17.89 41.12 56.00 76.63 107.36 130.65 135.08 202.85 209.18
Source: Credit Reporting System database (OECD, 2013).  
Note: In the Creditor Reporting System, STI control (including HIV / AIDS) is recorded under code 13040, the first three digits referring to the DAC5 category 130 (Population Policies / Programmes and 
Reproductive Health).
Portfolio development of the Rwandan health sector
Between 2000 and 2010, total health expenditure quintupled, 
from USD 73 million to USD 401 million (GoR & MoH, 2012) – 
USD 39 per capita per annum (compared to USD 34 in 2006) – a 
low average compared to international standards. Against the 
macroeconomic trend of reduced aid dependency in Rwanda 
within the last decade, health expenditures relied heavily on 
external funding, with 63 % of total health expenditure having 
been financed by donors in 2010, compared to 33 % in 2002 (GoR 
& MoH, 2012). While the World Bank (2013) estimates of external 
resources to the Rwandan health sector differ in absolute terms, 
the relative share of external funds in the Rwandan health sector 
is high in comparison to other countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Figure 7). Including private sources, all external funds amounted 
to USD 336 million, or 84 %, in 2010 (Table 5). The largest share of 
funds, therefore, came from new global disease initiatives, such 
as GFATM, the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, and 
his Malaria Initiative. At the same time, the government share in 
total health expenditure declined from 25 % (2002) to 16 % (2010). 
Figure 7: External resources for health (% of total expenditure on health)
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Figure 8: Total German bilateral ODA in Rwanda and the health sector (in millions of EUR)
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German development cooperation to the health sector peaked in 
2009 (USD 12.9 million) and 2010 (USD 10.1 million), when most 
of the funds were disbursed among the population and to the 
reproductive health sub-sector. The bulk of German bilateral aid, 
however, had been disbursed to the general health sub-sector 
since 2002 (DAC 5 code 120). This is in contrast to other donors 
who focused mainly on the population and reproductive health 
sub-sector (DAC 5 code 130). The funding priorities also under-
lined the GDC focus on broader health systems strengthening. 
Over the years, the US Government has been the largest donor in 
terms of health. In 2011, USD 126.9 million was disbursed, which 
accounted for 39 % of donor funding (USD 322 million) (Table 6).
Table 5. National health expenditures 
  1998 2000 2002 2003 2006 2010
Total GoR expenditure (millions of US dollars) 304.5 384.8 327.7 432.7 756.2
Total health expenditure (public, private, donor) (millions of US dollars) 82.4 73.0 80.8 142.1 307.3 401.0
GoR health expenditure as % of GoR total expenditure 2.50 4.70 6.10 9 6.50 11.5
Financing sources distribution as a % of total health expenditure 
Public (in %) 10 18 25 32 19 16
Private (in %) 40 30 42 25 28 21
Donor (in %) 50 52 33 42 53 63
Source: Data for 1998 – 2006 from National Health Accounts 2006 (GoR & MoH, 2008); data for 2010 from HSSP III (GoR & MoH, 2012). Note: The figures in this table do not allow for recalculation of total 
GoR expenditure and are not directly comparable to the data provided in Table 6 due to different data sources and definitions. All US dollar amounts are in constant 2006 US dollars. 
Multilateral aid disbursements to the population and the 
reproductive health sub-sector soared in 2010; this large increase 
was driven by a rise in GFATM disbursements (cf. Table 4). 
Consequently, multilateral aid disbursed to the population and 
reproductive health sub-sector surpassed multilateral aid dis-
bursements in the general health sub-sector from 2010 onwards.
Table 6. ODA health disbursements in Rwanda (in millions of current US dollars)
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
All Donors 32.99 36.16 85.2 99.51 141.9 166.06 245.56 258.32 305.79 322.26
Bilateral (all) 22.38 27.45 39.24 45 71.88 92.93 137.38 157.27 154.62 166.91
Germany 0.57 1.86 2.87 3.72 4.31 3.72 5.5 12.94 10.1 9.39
USA 9.51 15.43 23.85 27.81 49.03 68.67 93.59 113.42 113.06 126.93
Multilateral 10.61 8.71 45.96 54.51 70.02 73.14 108.18 101.05 151.17 155.36
Source: Creditor Reporting System database (OECD, 2013).
Program- and project-based aid remain the dominant aid modal-
ities in the health sector. Between 2008 and 2012, only USD 61.6 
million had been disbursed through SBS (Synergy International 
Systems, 2013). In 2010, the share of SBS to total donor funding 
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amounted to 6.25 % (USD 16 million). Three donors contributed 
to SBS between 2008 and 2012, including Belgium, Germany, and 
United Kingdom (Table 7). In addition, basket funding in the form 
of the CDPF was provided by these three donors, together with 
Switzerland (Doc.53). Between 2009 and 2012, a total of EUR 3.1 
million CDPF funds had been disbursed.27 GDC contribution to 
CDPF included EUR 0.5 million from GIZ and EUR 0.1 million from 
KfW until mid-2011. EUR 1.3 million, EUR 0.9 million, and EUR 0.5 
million was provided by the Belgian Technical Cooperation (BTC), 
DFID, and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
(SDC), respectively (Doc.53). 
Table 7. SBS in the health SWAp (in millions of disbursed US dollars) 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total
Belgium 4.76 5.55 6.57 6.25 24.27
DFID 8.62 5.17 4.31 2.58 20.68
Germany 7.14 4.90 4.62 16.67
Total 13.38 17.86 15.78 7.20 6.25 61.63
Source: Development Assistance Database for Rwanda (Synergy International Systems, 2013).
The 2011 mid-term review of the second Rwandan Health Sector 
Strategic Plan (HSSPII) identified the large share of off-budget 
funds28 as a key challenge with regard to donor harmonization 
and alignment to Rwandan priorities. Very few donors are using 
the available pooled funding mechanisms, such as SBS or CDPF. 
The high share of off-budget aid flow, thus, is perceived as one 
of the largest constraints to strategic resource allocation and 
management at the central and district levels. 
A comparative view at the central and district levels shows that 
in 2010, 74 % of the budget related to national-level spending 
(GoR & MoH, 2011b). Bilateral and multilateral aid, however, 
played a significant role at the district level. The German devel-
opment cooperation disbursements targeted Gicumbi, Gisagara, 
Huye, Musanze, and Nyaruguru districts (cf. Annex H). In these 
districts, German aid played a significant role, relative to overall 
bilateral disbursements, particularly in Musanze where GDC 
provided a share of approximately one third of overall bilateral 
health disbursements for Ruhengeri hospital (HRTT, 2012).
Portfolio of Rwandan-German cooperation in health 
development
German bilateral cooperation with Rwanda began with the 
country’s independence in 1962. Since then, various forms of 
assistance, instruments, and modalities have been applied in 
different sectors. Between 1980 and 2012, disbursed German 
bilateral aid totaled EUR 690.3 million29 (BMZ, 2012b). During 
this period, the budget allocation to health was EUR 66.4 million, 
approximately 10 % of total aid. In the early 1980s and mid-1990s, 
priorities were placed on other sectors and interventions, 
including infrastructure and emergency aid, with health being 
less important in financial terms (Figure 8). Since the introduc-
tion of three priority sectors in Rwanda in 2003, however, the 
health sector has gained relative importance and total bilateral 
ODA increased significantly in terms of health, justice, and good 
governance / decentralization. In the context of SWAp, EUR 26.7 
million had been disbursed in health, including EUR 16.4 million 
in financial cooperation, of which 80 % was allocated through 
joint financing modalities and 20 % through project funding, 
as well as EUR 9.8 million for technical cooperation, making 
Germany a medium-sized donor in the Rwandan health sector.
27  Since January 2012, CDPF funds are managed by SPIU (Doc.53). 
28  Government Revenues that include revenues generated from taxation, loans, grants, donations, and DP contributions through government procurement systems, such as GBS, SBS, or pooled funding, are 
understood as “on budget”; project- and program-based aid as “off budget”. 
29  In 2002, BMZ had transferred all funds previously recorded in deutsche marks at the official exchange rate of 1.95583 (EUR 1 = DM 1.95583). 
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Figure 7: External resources for health (% of total expenditure on health)
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Figure 8: Total German bilateral ODA in Rwanda and the health sector (in millions of EUR)
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Figure 9 presents German ODA disbursements in the health 
sector by implementing agency. In the 1980s, German bilateral 
aid was provided, primarily, through GTZ and the Protestant and 
Catholic churches. Overall, German bilateral aid disbursements 
in the health sector between 1980 and 1986 played only a minor 
role, relative to the subsequent years when cooperation in health 
was enhanced. During this period, most DED placements were 
financed through the GTZ project in rural health and family plan-
ning; hence, no direct DED funding is recorded for this period. 
In the late 1980s, GTZ gradually increased aid disbursements. 
At the same time, aid disbursed through the Protestant and 
Catholic churches reached its highest level. In 1991, KfW began to 
deliver financial assistance to the Rwandan health sector. Since 
2004, InWEnt / GIZ and DED / GIZ funds have been separately 
recorded and account for a significant share of German technical 
assistance. This also marked the beginning of the health sector 
as a priority sector of bilateral cooperation between Rwanda 
and Germany. Since the 1990s, ODA disbursements have been 
partially delivered through CIM, with the largest contributions 
taking place between 2008 and 2011. German bilateral aid 
disbursements peaked in 2009 when GDC began SBS. The largest 
disbursements of German bilateral aid to the health sector 
occurred during the SWAp period, when annual disbursements 
totaled between USD 3.2 and USD 12.3 million (BMZ, 2012b).
Between 1980 and 2012, technical and financial cooperation30 
followed similar trends, with only few exceptions between 2003 
and 2006. In terms of aid volume, technical and financial coop-
eration have been rather similar, except for 2009, when financial 
cooperation disbursements peaked at USD 8.77 million with the 
introduction of SBS. Technical cooperation reached its highest 
level in 2010, with USD 4.8 million disbursed. Between 1980 and 
2012, disbursed financial cooperation totaled EUR 28.2 million 
(USD 36.2 million), while technical cooperation disbursements 
amounted to EUR 38.1 million (USD 46.8 million) (BMZ, 2012b).
The portfolio analysis emphasizes Rwanda’s persistent aid de-
pendency for all sectors, especially for that of health. While the 
most donor contributions targeted vertical programs, such as STI 
control (including HIV / AIDS), GDC focused on health systems 
strengthening, mainly through the OECD-DAC category of 
general health (120). The German bilateral contribution in health 
was significantly increased, when health became the priority 
sector in 2003. In the context of SWAp, innovative aid modalities 
(e.g., SBS and basket funding) had been used, supported by both 
financial and technical cooperation.
30  Financial cooperation includes bilateral aid implemented by KfW, while technical cooperation includes bilateral aid from all remaining German implementing agencies, including churches and NGOs.
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Figure 10: Total fertility rate (births per woman)
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Figure 9: Disbursements by implementing agency (1980- 2012) (in millions of current USD)
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RWANDAN-GERMAN 
COOPERATION IN THE 
HEALTH SECTOR
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T
his part presents the evaluation results according to 
phases, with a special emphasis on Phase III (2004 – 12). 
For Phases I and II, Sections B.1 and B.2, in line with 
the major evaluation questions (cf. Chapter A.1.2), will 
focus on how Rwandan-German development cooperation has 
evolved in the respective periods. Similarly, the sections focusing 
on “Adapting to the changing context” and on “Achievements” 
take a more analytical perspective. There is a special feature for 
Phases I and II; that is, the testing of hypotheses derived from 
the context analysis (cf. A.3.1). 
With regard to Phase III, the sections on “Evolution of Rwan-
dan-German cooperation” and on “Adapting to the changing 
context” are intentionally less comprehensive, compared to 
Phases I and II. This is due to the completely different structure 
of the section on “Achievements”. This section actually follows 
the structure of the joint health program being comprised by 
three components: (1) HF, (2) SRH, and (3) HRD. The respective 
sections (B.3.3.2 – 3.3.4) are preceded by a section focusing on the 
overarching function of SWAp, SBS, and CDPF within the joint 
health program. 
1. Rwandan-German  
cooperation (1980 – 94) 
Rwandan-German cooperation in the health sector began in 1979 
with two DED development workers, followed by a DED-GTZ 
Improvement of Rural Health Services project in 1981 (GIZ & 
KfW, 2012). In addition, there was a position for one CIM hospital 
technician outside the project structure. In 1986, GTZ launched 
the Promotion of Family Planning project, in cooperation with 
the Office National de la Population (ONAPO) (cf. Box 8). Financial 
cooperation commenced in 1991 with KfW’s Sector Program 
Family Health supporting the GTZ cooperation with ONAPO.
The first section of the chapter takes a closer look at the 
evolution of GDC interventions along two focal themes: rural 
health and family planning. A second section identifies influential 
context factors and GDC reactions to them, testing the hypothe-
ses formulated in the context analysis (Chapter A.3.1.1). The third 
and final sections examine project achievements.
1.1 
Evolution of Rwandan-German cooperation
Rural health
Due to large disparities among the rural and urban populations at 
the beginning of the 1980s and insufficient service supply in rural 
areas, the main GDC target group was the rural population. The 
joint DED-GTZ project, Improvement of Rural Health Services, 
integrated up to 18 development workers (increasing until 1994), 
simultaneously, into the Rwandan public health system. The pro-
ject’s mode of intervention and geographic scope focused on the 
health center and hospital levels in the préfectures of Cyangugu, 
Kibuye, Kabaya, and Byumba. The joint project structure between 
DED and GTZ included a combination of experiences from other 
countries (INT EXP 7). In order to improve their effectiveness, 
development workers relied on financial inputs provided by GTZ. 
GTZ did not, however, provide staff or conceptual inputs (INT InD 
DW 19, 37). The project cooperated mainly with public – and only 
sporadically with private, especially Catholic – health facilities. 
Private health providers, in general, benefited from more 
generous funding sources and, therefore, from higher equipment 
standards at that time (Diesfeld, Reitmaier, & Berg, 1987). In 
addition, development workers provided training in nursing and 
laboratory schools. Between 1980 and 1994, GDC contributed 256 
development worker years (Doc.16) and approximately EUR 3.6 
million31 to the project. 
The main objective of the project was to improve curative and 
preventive services, promote basic health services in rural areas, 
and provide training for paramedical staff. Further priorities of 
the project were to enhance the functionality of health facilities 
through better quality equipment, increased service uptake, and 
capacity building. The project intervened at the nexus of health 
and agriculture through a component on nutritional education 
31  Own calculation, based on BMZ Data Information System (BMZ, 2012b). DED project documentation (Doc.16) provides a sum of approximately EUR 3.1 million. The difference relates to administrative and 
overhead costs. 
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and it contributed innovative approaches to Rwanda’s national 
health strategy, such as the integration of traditional midwifery 
into the national health system. Activities in mother-child care 
were implemented in close cooperation with other organizations 
including, for example, MoH and the United Nations Interna-
tional Emergency Fund for Children (UNICEF) for vaccination 
programs, ONAPO for family planning, and the Bureau des 
Formations Médicales Agréées du Rwanda (BUFMAR) (cf. Box 7) for 
medical training and seminars (Doc.13).32
Box 7. Bureau des Formations Médicales Agréées du Rwanda 
(BUFMAR) 
The Bureau des Formations Médicales Agréées du Rwanda is an umbrella NGO of all 
Christian health facilities. DED cooperation started in 1983 in the Department of 
Health Education and Production of Educational Material, which was understood 
to be financially independent from BUFMAR leadership. It was responsible for 
family planning (Doc.7) and the production of material for ONAPO and the 
Ministry of Health. In 1994, a new program, coordinated with BUFMAR leadership, 
was designed in cooperation with national programs, including an integrated 
family planning concept (with the promotion of condoms) (Doc.8). Following the 
genocide, a significant lack of staff, the problematic political situation, and the 
absence of earlier promised support brought BUFMAR into crisis. DED resumed 
its support in 1995 and assigned a short-term technical assistant in 1995 and 1997, 
respectively (Doc.8). 
When assessing the project, the development workers who were 
interviewed reported that “a strategy in terms of DED or BMZ 
standards for [their] work didn’t exist” (INT InD DW 37; cf. also 
INT EXP 7; INT InD DW 10, 12, 17, 33). A project evaluation reports, 
“In the beginning of the project neither a fixed written concept 
existed nor quantifiable project goals had been defined” (Diesfeld 
et al., 1987; Doc.18). This lack of strategy was substituted by 
knowledge and learning and, later, by operational planning 
between development workers, counterparts, and delegates of 
MoH in quarterly meetings (INT InD DW 19, 25; Doc.6; Diesfeld et 
al., 1987). A part-time coordinator supervised DED employees on 
the project, remained in contact with MoH, and represented the 
link between DED development workers and GTZ (Doc.6). 
Apart from DED project staff, CIM sent a hospital technician 
to a Catholic hospital in the préfecture of Gisenyi from 1991 to 
1993. The aim was to maintain the technical infrastructure of the 
hospital and ensure its operability.
Family planning
The increasing population density and the unstable economic 
situation in Rwanda endangered food security. Family planning, 
hence, became increasingly important and an indispensable 
component of GDC in the health sector, aligned to the national 
strategy on food security of 1985. Family planning was not only a 
component of the Improvement of Rural Health Services project, 
but it was also the main focus of the Promotion of Family Plan-
ning project, implemented by GTZ in partnership with ONAPO 
between 1986 and 199433 in the préfectures of Gikongoro, Butare 
(from 1989), and Cyangugu (from 1991). GTZ provided long-term 
experts, short-term professionals, and funds for the construction 
of two ONAPO department offices and health centers, educa-
tional material, and media and education programs (Doc.42). 
Until 1994, the funds disbursed for the project amounted to 
approximately EUR 4.3 million (BMZ, 2012b). 
The main objective of the project was to increase the usage of 
modern family planning methods. Particular emphasis was placed 
on increasing the demand for family planning services and on 
improving the quality of these services, while focusing on the 
advanced training of health staff, sensitization of administrative 
staff at the community and prefecture levels, sex education in 
schools, assistance with the procurement and distribution of 
contraceptives, and improved access to contraceptives (Doc.31; 
Doc.33).
Box 8. L’office national de la population (ONAPO)
The Office National de la Population was created by law in 1981 (May, 1995). It 
was responsible for the promoting family planning and providing consultation 
services in order to maintain the equilibrium between agricultural production 
and demographic growth (Doc.30). As ONAPO was affiliated at the national 
level, it had no direct intervention mechanism at the prefecture level. ONAPO 
was basically financed through donors (the United Nations Fund for Population 
32  Similar to the pseudonymization of interviews (cf. Chapter A 2.3), DEval refers to unpublished documents with the pseudonym “Doc.”, plus a consecutive number if proper citation could infringe on the 
privacy of the author(s). 
33  The project was envisaged to continue until 1996, but subsequent to 1994, resources were reallocated to another project. 
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Activities (UNFPA), USAID, World Bank, and others) (Doc.30). The World Bank 
ended its support 1987 due to deficiencies in the application of funds (Doc.1). Close 
organizational and staff links between ONAPO and the (former) unity party of 
Habyarimana (INT EXP 7; Doc.32) evoked the criticism that party politics in the 
1990s were extended to ONAPO and family planning, in general. GTZ’s final report 
apprehensively mentions Rwandan ONAPO resources as having been, instead, 
spent on war and military defense (Doc.32). With the genocide in 1994, family 
planning activities were suspended and ONAPO was dissolved in 2000 (Muhoza, 
Rutayisire, & Umubyeyi, 2013). 
In 1991, KfW added an innovation to GDC intervention: the 
financial cooperation project, Sector Program Family Health, 
implemented by GTZ, was executed in close cooperation with 
the above-mentioned GTZ-ONAPO project. MoH and Population 
Service International (PSI), a US-based NGO, became the 
implementation partners from 1994 onwards until the end of the 
country-wide project in 1997. Over the entire period, the financial 
input totaled approximately EUR 1.99 million (EUR 1.1 million 
until 1994) (BMZ, 2012b). The program met mainly material 
needs, such as staff wages, offices, vehicles, contraceptives, 
and operating costs (Doc.42). The main objectives before 1994 
were to enhance ONAPO services, strengthen the distribution 
of contraceptives (as requested by the Rwandan partners), and 
improve maternal health care in cooperation with the Rwandan 
health facilities included in the GTZ-DED project (Doc.42). There 
was synergy between technical and financial cooperation and the 
links to DED personnel (Doc.42).
1.2
Adapting to changing contexts
This section provides an overview of how the Rwandan-German 
development program steered through the large-scale socio-
economic conditions at that time and scrutinizes the context 
hypotheses outlined in Chapter A.3.1.1.
GDC support during socioeconomic deterioration
Socioeconomic deterioration since the mid-1980s affected the 
health status of the Rwandan population and health service 
provision. There are reports on poor health conditions for parts 
of the population (Doc.18) due to a lack of financial access to 
health services (INT InD DW 10). On the supply side, salaries in 
the health sector were not adjusted, although the Rwandan franc 
lost 60 % of its value (Doc.6). This pushed medical staff to trans-
fer from the public into the private sector, worsened the already 
severe lack of staff (Doc.6), and further deteriorated the national 
health system. Preventive activities, such as nutrition counseling, 
became impractical considering the severe lack of food supply for 
target groups (Doc.6; Doc.18). These repercussions of deteriorat-
ing socioeconomic conditions raised the question whether the 
Rwandan-German interventions in the health sector sufficiently 
adapted to the changing context in Rwanda as of the mid-1980s 
in order to stay relevant and effective (Context Hypothesis 1: 
Rwandan-German interventions in the health sector have been suffi-
ciently adapted to the deterioration of the socioeconomic conditions 
in Rwanda since the mid-1980s to remain relevant and effective). 
The adaptation of services according to socioeconomic changes 
was reported only in single cases (Doc.6): Examples provided 
during the interviews include the combination of nutritional 
and agriculture counseling (INT InD DW 19) and the provision of 
meals for children in order to attract mothers to attend nutrition 
counseling (INT InD DW 10; Doc.6). When the national govern-
ment reacted to the crisis by reducing its financial support to 
the health sector, a different political strand became increasingly 
important to GDC. The GoR had implemented the Bamako 
Initiative of 1987 in 1990 with the primary goal of recovering 
the cost of essential drugs through patient payments. Along 
this government line, the population was made to self-finance 
medicines and examinations. In addition to its main goals, the 
Rural Health project therefore promoted self-financing initiatives 
and supported the establishment of community pharmacies to 
improve the supply of medicines for the rural population (Doc.15). 
GDC also took part in a MoH working group to lay the legal 
foundations for this (Doc.18). 
The geographic scope for implementing the Bamako Initiative, 
however, was limited to only 124 of 166 public health facilities 
(Habiyambere & Wertheimer, 1993). The World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO) study also shows that cost recovery practices were 
not only bound to health facilities participating in the Bamako 
initiative; rather, some nonparticipating public facilities also 
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charged patients for medications. While the study concludes that 
cost recovery, in general, did improve the availability of facilities, 
only those participating achieved a reduction in price. Qualita-
tive interviews have revealed that patient payments for health 
services had a negative influence on access to health services 
by vulnerable groups (INT InD DW 17, 45). Given the unclear 
geographic scope, it was impossible to retrospectively establish 
whether and how these negative influences, originating from the 
Bamako Initiative, differed from the costs claimed by other health 
service providers.
It can be concluded that GDC reactions to socioeconomic de-
terioration have been limited: the impetus to change directions 
emerged, rather, from the individual initiatives of development 
workers in their work place than from GDC direction. Whether 
or not the resulting problems evoked GDC reaction within other 
sectors beyond health or not has not been examined.
Policies of inequality? 
The Habyarimana regime privileged the majority group of Hutu 
and undoubtedly fueled the ethnic conflict (cf. Prunier, 1995; 
Verwimp, 1999).The discriminatory treatment against Tutsi was 
also witnessed by development workers. In an open question, six 
of 30 survey interviewees explicitly identified the ethnic conflict 
as having been detrimental to their work. 
With regard to the evidences with regard to Context Hypothesis 
2 (Health policies during the Habyarimana regime negatively 
influenced Rwandan-German interventions in the health sector with 
regard to protection of minorities and health equity of services), 
interviewees did not report on differences in the treatment of 
patients due to their ethnicity (INT InD DW 10, 17, 19, 37, 45, 46). 
Preferential treatment did exist, however, based on the economic 
situation and political affiliations of patients, thus indicating a cli-
entelistic structure (INT InD DW 10, 37, 45). Discriminatory treat-
ment, based on ethnicity, may have manifested itself in terms 
of employment quotas in the health sector. The share of Tutsi 
personnel was set at 11 % and similar quotas in the education 
system are reported, although not all respondents confirmed the 
implementation of such quotas within their partner organization. 
Tensions among the medical staff due to ethnic difference, were 
stated as having been a hindrance to daily work (INT InD DW 10, 
25). According to qualitative interviewees, GDC neither prepared 
its employees to cope with the ethnic conflict nor gave them 
instructions on how to cope with the growing conflict.
In conclusion, there has been discriminatory treatment, based on 
ethnic assignment with regard to staffing and daily work life. The 
conducted interviews, however, did not point to openly practiced 
ethnic discrimination in the treatment of patients; rather, they 
pointed to discriminatory treatment, based on the socioeconom-
ic situation of a patient.
Lack of political backing in family planning? 
Habyarimana pursued the politics of an idealized peasant 
life-style and his traditional beliefs in the need to procreate. 
Simultaneously, population was increasing in Rwanda. With 
regard to Context Hypothesis 3 (A lack of genuine political backing 
during the Habyarimana regime reduced the relevance and results of 
Rwandan-German interventions in family planning) and according 
to the survey, most development workers who had worked 
in Rwanda during Phase I generally did not consider national 
health strategies and the general political situation as having 
hampered their work (Survey). In-depth interviews, in addition, 
only partially confirmed a lack of genuine political interest on 
behalf of the Government. Several respondents reported on the 
strong ambitions of the Government, especially with respect 
to President Habyarimana himself, and the high commitment 
to family planning by the ONAPO leadership (INT InD DW 10, 
19, 25, 37; INT EXP 7). Others, nevertheless, reported reluctant 
implementation (INT InD DW 17), a lack of focus on vulnerable 
groups, and a limited success of ONAPO interventions (INT 
EXP 14). Furthermore, interviewees emphasized the ideological 
proximity of ONAPO to Habyarimana’s National Republican 
Movement for Democracy and Development (single party) and 
reported ONAPO as being considered “Hutu-focused” (INT InD 
DW 46). Politicians are stated to have used rhetoric on family 
planning that supported the ethnic conflict and made work in 
family planning difficult (INT RP 6).
B.  |  Rwandan-German cooperation in the Health Sector 36
GDC activities with regard to family planning cannot be con-
sidered contrary to government interests, in general, since the 
regime appears to have supported family planning activities. 
The results of these activities, in any case, may be limited due to 
political interests. 
Discovery of HIV / AIDS
The first cases of AIDS were identified in Rwanda in 1983. As of 
the 1990s, HIV prevention became increasingly important. Facing 
tremendous prevalence rates in urban (17.8 %) and rural areas 
(1.3 %) in 1986 (Rwandan HIV seroprevalence study group, 1989),34 
the response to HIV and AIDS was reflected in the Rwandan-Ger-
man health program. Since 1992, DED-GTZ cooperated with the 
Center for Aids Prevention Studies of the University of California 
in San Francisco, which was financed by the US National 
Institutes of Health (Doc.17). The fight against HIV / AIDS was 
integrated into cooperation with ONAPO (Weis, 1992).
The “time of uncertainty” between 1990 and 1993
The already unstable political circumstances were aggravated 
when the RPF started its invasion in October 1990, leading to 
the evacuation of all DED development workers and GTZ staff. 
The majority returned to Rwanda in December of the same year 
(Doc.15). After the evacuation, several positions at the northern 
borders were temporarily vacant due to the higher security 
risk in the préfectures of Gisenyi, Ruhengeri and Byumba. Three 
development workers were sent to support refugee camps 
(Doc.18). The period between the onset of the civil war in 1990 
and the Arusha peace process has been referred to as Igihirahiro, 
“the time of uncertainty” (Prunier, 1995, p. 367). The deception of 
the international community for a multiparty system to resolve 
the conflict was also shared by GDC employees,35 although 
there were calls for attention to the intensifying situation within 
GDC (INT EXP 12) and in the international arena (Commission 
Internationale, 1993). A reaction to the conflict only transpired 
in April 1994, when the extensive outbreak of violence led to 
the evacuation of all German project staff, ceasing the work of 
national project staff. GDC personnel began to return to Rwanda 
after the genocide in March 1995 (Doc.10).
1.3 
Achievements
The following section assesses GDC interventions in terms of 
the achieved objectives and major challenges. Detailed indi-
cators, measuring the progress and effects of the joint project 
“Improvement of Rural Health Services”, were not defined before 
1995. Project progress reviews in 1987, 1990, and 1993, hence, do 
not go beyond assessing the activities and describing the main 
results. Improvements in health services, especially mother-child 
care, birth assistance, and improved drug supply, are reported for 
facilities in areas not affected by war (Doc.18). It is, nevertheless, 
evident that DED staff, during this phase, primarily filled human 
resources gaps in the rural health sector. By not being able to 
fully live up to their intended role as advisor, the goals regarding 
preventive and promotional activities were not met (INT EXP 
7; INT InD DW 37, 45; Diesfeld et al., 1987). The development 
workers, however, did bolster staff shortages for curative 
activities (Diesfeld et al., 1987), confirmed by survey participants. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, preventive activities became even 
less important. This is consistent with the progressive trend of 
economic deterioration, which began in the 1980s, and which 
put pressure on Rwandan households, worsened their health 
situation, and made curative activities more crucial.
Interviewees repeatedly reported the constant change of 
Rwandan personnel as being a detrimental factor, especially 
with regard to the sustainability of their work (INT InD DW 19, 
25, 45, INT EXP 13; Diesfeld et al., 1987). The situation worsened 
due to the increasing drain of personnel into the private sector 
(INT InD 45, INT EXP 13; Doc.6; Doc.12; Diesfeld et al., 1987). The 
majority of survey participants in Phase I (22 out of 30) however 
reported, based on self-assessments, to have (rather) achieved 
the respective goals for their workplace while about 20 % of 
the respondents express that they have rather not or have not 
achieved their intended changes.
With regard to family planning, the trend in indicators (e.g., 
the decreasing national total fertility rate from 8.6 children per 
34  The World Bank estimates a national average of 5.3 % prevalence of HIV (percent of population ages 15 – 49) in 1990 (World Bank, 2014). 
35  October 26 in 1993 a GDC employee in Rwanda announces: “despite the events in Burundi there are currently no special problems for our cooperation in Rwanda“ (Doc.11).
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woman in 1984 to 6.2 in 1992, as well as the increase of modern 
contraceptive use from 3 – 4 % in 1988 to 12.9 % in 1992 (May, 
1995; May et al., 1990)), suggest positive project contributions. 
In relation to other sources, these exceptional changes, at least, 
may be explained by higher school enrollment rates and an 
increase in the age at marriage (Doc.32; May, 1995). In addition, 
the final project report acknowledges significant differences 
in the program’s performance and results; in particular, close 
organizational and staff relations to the Habyarimana unity party 
and the lack of cooperation with the regional level of the health 
system are stated as having hindered project success (Doc.42; 
Doc.6). Although the provision of PHC had improved, child mor-
tality rates were reported to have remained comparatively high 
and were perceived as a motive to give birth to many children, 
thus further undermining family planning activities. Another 
challenge to the success of family planning was its negative 
connotation due to conservative Catholicism. The church refused 
to support family planning activities (modern contraceptives). 
Because approximately 40 % of health facilities were operated 
by the church (May et al., 1990), this did not provide an enabling 
environment (Survey; Weis, 1987).
With the effects of war and genocide, the program’s long-term 
achievements were severely limited due to the damage to its 
infrastructure and, especially, in view of the high loss of health 
care staff. Survey respondents have confirmed this: approxi-
mately 70 % assessed the positive effects of their work as rather 
impermanent subsequent to their departure.
In conclusion, a range of instruments involving technical, 
financial, and personnel cooperation were implemented. The 
interventions between 1980 and 1994 focused at the decentral-
ized level, with the exception of the national level. Based on the 
scarce but available documentation, the project’s objectives, 
and the mix of interventional instruments, GDC can be rated as 
having been complementary, leading to a realization of synergies. 
GDC interventions in the first phase can be considered relevant, 
given their high alignment to Rwandan priorities and their 
focus on the major deficits within the Rwandan health system 
at inception. The larger political and socioeconomic trends, 
however, would have demanded a change in the direction of 
cooperation. Development workers within the country appeared 
to have been left on their own to cope with the challenges. When 
this grew more serious, effectiveness became very limited. The 
tragic escalation of the socioeconomic downward spiral due to 
the genocide, which resulted in the tremendous death toll and 
destruction, quashed interventional effects and was not condu-
cive to sustaining the support by GDC.
2.  Rwandan-German  
cooperation (1995 – 2003) 
The Rwandan health sector faced serious challenges after the 
genocide, since many doctors and nurses had been killed or had 
fled the country; most of the health infrastructure was either 
destroyed or damaged; and most of the health indicators had 
dropped sharply. In this desperate situation, the country was 
forced to rely on emergency aid provided by various bilateral 
and multilateral donors and international NGOs (cf. Chapter 
A.3.1.2 for more details). GDC joined these efforts to support 
the reconstruction and rehabilitation of health infrastructure, 
in combination with technical assistance in hospitals and health 
centers that suffered from dramatic understaffing. This focus was 
at center stage during the years 1995 / 96, hand in hand with GDC 
support that concentrated on PHC in two préfectures: Byumba 
and Butare.36 Due to the increased HIV prevalence after the 
genocide, GDC support placed emphasis on HIV prevention, with 
family planning – at center stage during Phase I – becoming less 
important.37
36  The project titles were “improvement of rural health in Byumba Prefecture” and “improvement of primary health care in Butare Prefecture”, respectively. 
37  “Sector Program Family Health” (1995 – 96), “HIV-Prevention (Social Marketing) I+II” (1997 – 2003) 
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2.1
Evolution of Rwandan-German cooperation
Primary health care 
In Byumba prefecture, the joint DED-GTZ project “Improvement 
of Rural Health Services” began in March 1995.38 The concen-
tration of efforts in one region came as a result of the lesson 
learned from having dispersed development efforts in different 
regions during Phase I, together with the fact that partly isolated 
health centers had been supported by development workers, 
whose work had not been properly coordinated. For this reason, 
DED ensured coordination of its activities in the health sector.39 
MoH also wanted to strengthen the decentralized management 
of the health system and the provision of PHC (Doc.16). The 
project, therefore, focused more on the strengthening of district 
health services, with the phasing out of direct support from 
development workers to health centers.40 The project supported 
the full range of prevention and treatment services. At first, 
however, it was a matter of offering the minimum package of 
health services to the local population.41
Butare was the other priority region for GDC where a GTZ 
project offered – similar to the project in Byumba – a minimum 
package of prevention, treatment, and health promotion services 
to the local population.42 The focus was, therefore, much broader 
in comparison to the GTZ project, which focused on family 
planning in the same region during Phase I. 
In both regions, it was a challenge to finance the health system, 
given that subsequent to the phase-out of emergency assistance 
in 1996, the free provision of all health services could not be 
continued. The introduction of payments for health services, 
including medicine, resulted in a considerable decrease in the 
use of services (INT RP 1; Doc.36, ; cf. also A.3.1.2). Adjusting the 
rules to reflect a payment for services (e.g., with the exemption 
of antenatal care) did not provide a long-term solution to a 
situation whereby an important segment of the local population 
were unable to afford the payments. This triggered the concept 
of CBHI schemes (mutuelles). Since 1999, both regions have 
been pilot test areas and have developed the CBHI system with 
support from GDC (INT RP 1, 5, 8; INT EXP 18) and in cooperation 
with the international NGO, Partnerships for Health Reform.
The low wages for health staff encouraged the projects to 
provide additional payments in order to motivate counterparts 
and other staff members. Since this extra payment, however, was 
not linked to performance, it was soon perceived as a part of 
the salary and, thus, lost its motivational effect. As a result, the 
idea of performance-based financing (PBF) was developed, for 
which both regions served as pilot areas (INT RP 1, 5; INT EXP 18; 
Doc.37).43 Distortions in the salary system made the introduction 
of PBF very challenging.44
The financial input from 1994 to 2003 for both projects amounted 
to approximately EUR 3.46 million.
HIV prevention and social marketing 
While family planning was one of the main themes of GDC 
support during Phase I, 1995 saw a completely different situation, 
when family planning no longer featured as a health policy priori-
ty in cases where families, having lost their loved ones during the 
genocide, were not receptive to the family planning recommen-
dation. At the same time, with the increase of HIV, its prevention 
deserved special attention (Eriksson et al., 1996). This resulted 
in KfW designing, in cooperation with MoH, the HIV-Prevention 
(social marketing) Program, which was implemented from 1997 
onwards. The preceding Family Health Sector Program (KfW), 
having begun during Phase I, rechanneled its support to HIV 
prevention in collaboration with the GDC-supported projects in 
Butare and Byumba. 
38  Byumba prefecture was selected due to the largely varying socioeconomic situations of the population throughout the prefecture and the massive refugee inflows (Doc.16). 
39  DED created the position of Health Coordinator in 1996. Coordination covered all development workers in the health sector and also the collaboration with GTZ. 
40  This concerned, for example, health centers in Kinjami and Cyangugu. The last work place at the level of a health center was phased out in 1999. This was not only based on DED policy, but responded to the 
concerns of the Rwandan partner (MoH). 
41  At the start, aide-infirmiers were trained in crash courses (three to four months) in order to allow health centers to operate. They were then gradually replaced by qualified nurses (INT EXP 18), whose 
training was directly supported by DED development workers at the Byumba Nursing School. 
42  While the project in Byumba was financed through GTZ, but steered by the DED Country Director, the Butare project was led by a national expert, supported by a DED technical assistant. 
43  At that time, it was known as approche contractuelle. The concept was developed in collaboration with the international NGO, HealthNET. 
44  In 1999, a nurse at the University Teaching Hospital in Butare earned a higher salary than a doctor at Kabutare district hospital (INT RP 1). 
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The new program focused on controlling HIV prevalence rates 
and reducing STIs and unwanted pregnancies among high-risk 
groups during the first program phase (1995 – 98), as well as 
broadening the target group to include the general population. 
HIV prevention was combined with the social marketing of 
condoms in collaboration with the private sector. This program 
was implemented nationally through PSI as the implementing 
agency. For the préfectures of Byumba and Butare, there was 
strong cooperation with regard to the respective projects. The 
financial inputs in the first and second phases of the project 
were EUR 2.556 million, respectively, while the costs in phase III 
amounted to EUR 3.067 million. 
InWEnt offered capacity building for staff involved in family 
planning, HIV prevention, and sexual education – including 
Butare and Byumba préfectures – in order to improve access 
to family planning and HIV prevention services (Doc.52). The 
format comprised international training programs in Germany 
on various topics related to SRH. InWEnt also provided advanced 
training for district health professionals. The financial input 
amounted to approximately EUR 670,000 between 2000 and 
2005 (Doc.51).
In 2000, GDC began to support medical education at the 
University Teaching Hospital in Butare. DED support to the 
medical faculty comprised (1) practical training of medical 
students and junior doctors, including bed-side instruction, and 
(2) contributions to clinical practice and patient care, which led 
to a quantitative and qualitative improvement of the medical 
education of students and resident doctors. The focus was on 
areas and departments that needed to be bolstered to enable 
them to offer post-graduation training: internal medicine, 
surgery, gynecology / obstetrics, and pediatrics. In 2000, the 
first three development workers commenced work in Butare in 
internal medicine, pediatrics, and gynecology, respectively.
Following a general global shift by GDC from 2000, collabo-
ration relating to the Byumba and Butare projects intensified 
subsequent to 2002, when a joint project progress review was 
undertaken (Doc.36).45 While both projects were managed 
separately until the end of 2003, they were integrated into a 
joint program in 2004. Program development promoted stronger 
coordination of technical assistance projects (GTZ) and financial 
programs (KfW). It was made easier by the fact that there already 
existed strong cooperation between DED and GTZ with regard 
to the Byumba project (INT EXP 18), as well as by the assignment 
of a GTZ expatriate expert to coordinate project activities in 
Byumba and Butare (INT EXP 16).
2.2 
Adapting to changing contexts
Hypothesis 4 from the context analysis (German bilateral 
cooperation followed its pre-genocide agenda in the health sector 
rather than having delivered strategic and programmatic support.) 
could only partly be verified. According to some interviewees, 
GDC responded well to the emergency situation in 1995 – 96 by 
providing support for rehabilitation and the reconstruction of 
health facilities (INT RP 1, 8, 23; S DW 48). By concentrating its 
support in two regions, GDC was able to respond to national 
health policy priorities. Focusing on HIV prevention instead of 
family planning also indicated a reorientation of GDC support. 
But despite this – which mainly concerned the Family Health 
Sector Program – support to family planning services continued 
in the Byumba and Butare projects, despite the national low 
priority for family planning.46 Achievements, therefore, were 
moderate (Doc.36) (cf. also the following paragraph). Focusing 
GDC support on a regional basis, already a priority area in the 
pre-conflict period, can be considered a sign of continuity. 
It can be concluded that while there have been some elements 
of continuity in GDC support, its reorientation, according to the 
changing context, can be viewed as the dominant feature. 
Hypothesis 5 from the context analysis (German cooperation 
continued to support family planning after the genocide without 
45  This “program development” was closely linked to the process initiated by BMZ to identify priority intervention areas for partner countries. In this respect, health became a priority intervention in Rwanda  
in 2002 (Doc.36). 
46  It was only after 2000 that family planning reemerged as a thematic area in terms of reproductive health (GoR 2000). 
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major changes, rather than having adapted it to a changed scenario 
to ensure relevance.) could not be verified. There was a clear shift 
in priorities in the Family Health Sector Program, leading to a 
discontinuation of family planning activities. The focus, thus, 
was transferred to HIV prevention and on equipment for health 
facilities at the district and health center levels, and support was 
provided in collaboration with the Byumba and Butare projects. 
Family planning services, however, remained a component of 
both projects as part of reproductive health services.47 This also 
reflected the view of health professionals who believed that 
there was still a need for family planning, regardless of whether 
it was backed or not by national policy (INT RP 1). Both projects 
continued with the cooperation of ONAPO, already a partner 
to GTZ during Phase I. ONAPO, however, had broadened its 
mandate and focused more on general education programs on 
family and reproductive health – in cooperation with the Ministry 
of Education – than on family planning (INT RP 1). There is 
sufficient evidence that the local population was not receptive to 
the family planning communication, especially during the four or 
five years following the genocide (INT InD DW 12, 33; Doc.36). 
The fact that both project regions (Byumba and Butare) became 
pilot areas for CBHI and PBF can be viewed as a positive indica-
tor of GDC’s adaptive ability. The CBHI pilot projects, conducted 
in collaboration with Partnerships for Health Reform, revealed 
important insights and experiences on how to develop a commu-
nity-based insurance scheme to feed into the process of scaling 
up CBHI as of 2004 (INT RP 23; cf. Chapter B.2.1 for further 
information). The results of the pilot projects on PBF also fed 
into the design of a broader PBF system in 2002 (Doc.36; Doc.39; 
Meessen, Musango, Kashala, & Lemlin, 2006).
GDC demonstrated its flexibility when it established an innova-
tive project management structure in the Butare project in 1998 
(INT RP 1; Doc.35; Doc.36). The project was managed – without 
expatriate long-term experts from GTZ – by the medical director 
in the region also assuming the role of GTZ Project Manager. This 
changed in 2001 when the roles were once more separated after 
it became evident that the combination of both functions proved 
too challenging. Instead of assigning a GTZ expert from abroad, 
however, a Rwandan health specialist took over the position as 
GTZ Project Manager.48
The so-called German cash crisis49 of 1999 – 2000 had negative 
repercussions on the ability of GTZ to adapt to changing situa-
tions. It not only affected the Butare and Byumba projects and 
led to a revision of project activities, based on restricted budgets; 
it also created a perception by partner organizations of a lack of 
transparency regarding the reasons and implications for the cash 
crisis. (INT EXP 18; Doc.36). 
2.3 
Achievements
GDC support in PHC contributed effectively towards a substan-
tial improvement in the provision of health services in specific 
rural areas (GTZ 2002; GTZ 2003; INT RP 6, 37; INT EXP 18). This 
comprised a minimum package of curative and preventive ser-
vices being offered, especially by health centers.50 There were no 
indications of increased usage rates because of the persisting dif-
ficulty for poorer segments of the end users to make the required 
payments.51 Substantial improvements have been achieved for 
antenatal care and vaccination programs – the two major pillars 
of preventive services. With GDC contribution, standards for the 
provision of services in combination with regular supervision 
were introduced and applied to improve service delivery. GDC 
also contributed effectively to strengthen the role of the district 
authorities for health system development (INT RP 37; GTZ, 
2002). GDC, nevertheless, constantly faced the challenge of high 
staff turnover at the hospital level, in combination with a lack of 
qualified staff (INT InD DW 33; S DW 18; Doc.36; Doc.42).
GDC support to HIV prevention contributed to improve the pro-
vision of services, especially at health centers. Local innovations, 
47  The project progress review, conducted on the project in Byumba préfecture in 1997, recommended stronger emphasis to be placed on family planning (Doc.33).
48  The project progress review, conducted in 2002, draws fairly critical conclusions about the results of this innovative project management structure (Doc.36). 
49  The so-called cash crisis (“Barmittelkrise“) affected GTZ-supported programs and projects, worldwide, but especially in sub-Saharan Africa. It was due to unexpected cuts in commitment authorizations 
from the German Federal General Budget in 1999 (Doc.34). 
50 Despite support at the policy level, the use of family planning services remained unsatisfactory and the services were not offered by all health centers (Doc.37). 
51 This was due to a health insurance scheme being at an early stage and rural health centers relying, to a large extent, on self-financing. 
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initiated by GDC, comprised voluntary counseling and testing 
services, as well as the use of peer educators for the sensitiza-
tion of young adults (Doc.54). GDC help to improve access to 
condoms52 went hand in hand with education and sensitization 
activities for the behavior change of a sexually active population, 
in general, and young adults in particular. There were some indi-
cations of behavior change, but there was no evidence that the 
declining birth rate was related to the increased use of condoms. 
The challenges with regard to HIV prevention were a result of a 
lack of support by local leaders and the Catholic Church because 
of their view that the use of condoms promoted promiscuity 
(Doc.54). Other challenges were related to the reluctance of 
the MoH to increase the price for condoms and to reduce the 
number of condoms being distributed for free (Doc.54). 
Rwandan partners appreciated the flexibility of GDC in providing 
support and its participatory project planning process (INT 
RP 1, 8, 37). While they mentioned the importance of technical 
assistance (DED and GTZ), they especially emphasized GDC 
support for health equipment and infrastructure.53 GDC support 
for capacity building of health staff was considered very valuable. 
The development worker survey54 revealed a fairly critical 
scenario of the qualification level of counterpart staff in health 
facilities. Nearly half of all respondents considered the qualifi-
cation of their colleagues as “rather bad”. They were also fairly 
critical regarding the complementarity of their qualifications to 
those of their counterparts and to their overall ability to reach 
the objectives set for the work place. While most respondents 
considered their work as having been effective, more than half of 
them had doubts regarding its sustainability. 
It is concluded, therefore, that while there have been some 
elements of continuity in GDC support during Phase II, its 
reorientation according to the changing context can be viewed 
as the dominant feature. In response to national priorities, GDC 
was more oriented towards HIV prevention and less to family 
planning. By concentrating on two regions and following the 
comprehensive PHC approach, it also reflected national priorities 
at the same time as the priorities of German cooperation. De-
spite the challenges, however, GDC can be considered as having 
been effective. By program development proceeding in parallel to 
national health policies, the sustainability of achievements from 
this cooperation in the health sector was favorable during the 
transition from Phase II to Phase III.
3.  Rwandan-German  
cooperation (2004 – 12) 
The following chapter focuses on Rwandan-German development 
cooperation between 2004 and 2012 (Phase III), with the sections 
on “Evolution of Rwandan-German cooperation” and on “Adapt-
ing to the changing context” being intentionally less comprehen-
sive, compared to Phases I and II. This is due to the difference in 
the structure relating to “Achievements” (B.3.3), and it follows 
the joint health program, comprised of three components: (1) 
health financing, (2) sexual and reproductive healt, and (3) human 
resource development. The respective sections (B.3.3.2 – 3.3.4) 
are preceded by one focusing on the overarching role of SWAp, 
SBS, and CDPF within the joint health program. 
Sections B.3.3.1 – 3.3.4 present the results of the contribution 
analysis (cf. A.2.2), according to OECD-DAC criteria. For the sake 
of readability, no explicit reference to causal links and pathways 
is made. The focus of attention, thus, is drawn to the achieve-
ments of the joint health program, according to the following 
OECD-DAC criteria: (1) relevance, (2) effectiveness, (3) efficiency 
and (4) sustainability. 
The fifth criterion (impact) and the additional criteria coherence, 
complementarity, and coordination, privileged by BMZ, are 
intentionally addressed in separate sections (B.3.4 and B.3.5) as 
evaluation results, according to the criteria cutting across the 
various components of the joint health program. 
52 A total of 23 million condoms were provided (through sales and distribution) between 1997 and 2003 (Doc.54). 
53  They also made it clear that they would have preferred if GDC had contributed more in this area. Part of the planned support for construction and equipment had to be canceled because of the cash crisis 
(GTZ 2003). 
54 The survey of development workers yielded 7 respondents for Phase II. 
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The following sections (B.3.6 to B.3.8) also take a cross-cutting 
perspective. The ToC of the joint health program is assessed 
(section B.3.6), taking into consideration how the program was 
implemented. The following section (B.3.7) includes a critical 
review of the phase-out strategy of the joint health program, 
while the last section (B.3.8) delivers a critical analysis of how 
successfully various aid modalities and instruments were brought 
into action. 
3.1  
Evolution of Rwandan-German cooperation
Since 2004, GDC support to the health sector gradually aligned 
itself to the Rwandan national health sector’s planning and 
implementation process in the context of SWAp. In the light of 
national health sector reform in Rwanda, a joint framework of all 
German implementing organizations was established in Decem-
ber 2004 to combine the support of all GDC agencies into one 
program. This framework defined the purpose of cooperation in 
the health sector to improve the health status of the population, 
with the ultimate goal of contributing to social and economic 
development in Rwanda. Three main objectives were set: (1) to 
enhance poverty-oriented health systems development, (2) to 
improve all aspects of reproductive health with a focus on family 
planning, and (3) to foster HRD. These later became the key areas 
for support and the components of the Rwandan-German Health 
Program.
Creating a joint framework of the German implementing 
agencies in the health sector was a step taken by BMZ as a 
means to alleviate friction among, losses to, and fragmentation 
of the GDC projects and programs.55 The DED and GTZ programs 
in the former préfectures of Byumba and Butare (cf. Chapter B.2.1) 
had already introduced the joint management of both projects 
in 2003. Advanced integration and harmonization of GDC 
interventions also included those of the financial cooperation 
(KfW) program, HIV-Prevention / Social Marketing II. From 2005 
onwards, all former projects and programs were integrated into 
one joint health program under the emerging SWAp. 
In 2007, the first joint program proposal of the implementing 
organizations was submitted to BMZ. It defined one overall 
cooperation goal (the health status of the Rwandan population is 
improved) and three component objectives. The indicators for 
the program objective and some of those for the component 
objectives (cf. Annex E) were drawn from the monitoring 
framework, which was established by EDPRS and the first health 
sector strategic plan (HSSP I 2005 – 2009).
3.2 
Adapting to the changing context
The evolution of Rwandan-German cooperation, as presented in 
the previous section, indicates that GDC adapted its support to 
the changing context. GDC integrated its various projects and 
programs successfully as a precondition for aligning its inter-
ventions to national priorities in the health sector, as defined by 
HSSP. These national priorities have been defined as a result of a 
number of high-level policy processes since 2000 (cf. A.3.1.3).
GDC also adapted its interventions to Rwandan aid policy (GoR, 
2006). This translated into a combination of joint financing 
modalities (SBS) and pooled funding through CDPF with pro-
ject-based aid. GDC, especially, played a major role in designing 
SWAp (cf. chapter B.3.3.1). 
In using its comparative advantage of long-term experience in 
decentralized health service delivery (cf. Chapters B.1.1 and B.2.1), 
GDC intentionally directed its focus on health systems strength-
ening as a complement to vertical programs. Vertical programs, 
especially funded by the US Government and GFATM, had 
become more and more prevalent in terms of aid volume flowing 
into the health sector (cf. Chapters A.3.1.3 and A.3.2). 
The following sections include the different components of the 
Rwandan-German Health program, implemented during Phase 
III, and provide more evidence on how GDC adapted its interven-
tions to the changing context. 
55  As this was a BMZ policy for GDC, worldwide, no special reference has been made to eventual friction, losses, and fragmentation, as far as GDC in Rwanda was concerned. 
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3.3  
Achievements
3.3.1 Sector-wide approach, sector budget support, and 
capacity development pooled fund
Evolution of the SWAp in Rwanda’s health sector
SWAps emerged in the mid-1990s in response to slow progress in 
human development in several countries, despite large flows of 
aid (cf. Box 9). In Rwanda, SWAps were fully positioned in seven 
sectors in 2012, including those important to development (e.g., 
agriculture, education, and health) (MINECOFIN, 2012a). In the 
health sector, the National Health Policy (GoR, 2005a) and HSSPs 
I-III (GoR, 2005b; GoR & MoH, 2009, 2012) provided the overar-
ching policy framework for SWAps. HSSP I (2005 – 2009) broadly 
defined the communication and coordination structure through 
the health sector cluster group, several TWGs, and sub-sector 
working groups (GoR, 2005a).
Box 9. Sector-wide approach (SWAp)
In response to criticism of traditional project-based aid being too donor-driven, 
the international development community reformed its methods of aid delivery, 
resulting in the emergence of SWAp. Under SWAp, funds from DPs contribute 
directly to the development and implementation of a defined sector policy under 
a government authority. Key principles of SWAp are: (1) the partner government 
leads and takes ownership of the sector program and (2) that there is a shared 
effort by DPs to support the program, including all or a majority share of funding 
for the sector. Ideally, different aid modalities are combined under SWAp, including 
joint financing. Consistency between what is planned within-sector (SWAp) and 
across sectors (PRSP processes) is important (WHO, n.d.). 
Following a review of the progress achieved by partners in the 
harmonization and alignment process within the Rwandan 
health sector, a number of steps were taken to strengthen SWAp, 
including the reorganization of TWGs, establishing joint review 
mechanisms, and developing coordination mechanisms at the 
district level (Niechzial & Ruginga, 2006). In October 2006, the 
first joint health sector review (JHSR) was undertaken (IHP+, 
2006). In 2007, a Memorandum of Understanding between the 
GoR and eight DPs56 officially launched the SWAp (GoR & MoH, 
2007).
Based on an evaluation of HSSP I, HSSP II (2009 – 2012) was 
adopted in late 2008. In 2009, the SWAp structure was reor-
ganized. The health sector working group (HSWG) replaced the 
former Health Sector Coordination Group and changes in TWGs 
and WGs were effected. A SWAp manual and a roadmap were 
developed with the support of GTZ and other DPs (UNICEF, 
United Kingdom, United States). These documents, which set out 
institutional procedures for SWAp, were adopted at JHSR (IHP+, 
2006). Since 2010, SWAp has been gradually extended to the 
district level through the establishment of health commissions in 
each district under the Joint Action Development Forum (JADF). 
Following a mid-term review of HSSP II in 2011, a draft version of 
HSSP III was developed in a consultative process, including major 
health sector stakeholders (MoH, DPs, district administration, 
professional and civil society associations) in 2012 (IHP+, 2011). 
The health SWAp architecture is currently composed of the 
HSWG as the coordinating body, chaired by the MoH Permanent 
Secretary and co-chaired by a DP representative with another DP 
representative as shadow co-chair. Under the HSWG, about 30 
TWGs and sub-WGs exist (GoR & MoH, 2012, p. 135), each chaired 
by a MoH official and co-chaired by a DP representative. Health 
sector performance is regularly reviewed by DPs and Rwandan 
partners in the biannual JHSR.
Major DPs in the health sector (i.e., Belgium, GDC, Luxembourg, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States) worked through 
SWAp structures and mechanisms. Only a few DPs, however 
(i.e., Belgium, GDC, and United Kingdom), are engaged in joint 
financing modalities (SBS and CDPF). The starting point was 
a joint mission by GDC and Belgium to design joint financing 
mechanisms for the health sector, including SBS and CDPF. This 
set the stage for signing several financing agreements for SBS 
in the following years between MINECOFIN and different DPs.57 
Since 2007, SBS has been supported by Belgium, Germany, and 
United Kingdom with USD 20.68 million, USD 24.27 million, and 
56  African Development Bank, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United Nations Country Team for Rwanda, United States, and World Bank. 
57  BTC and DFID in 2007, GDC / KfW in 2009, and BTC in 2010.
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USD 16.67 million, respectively (Synergy International Systems, 
2013). CDPF was funded by DFID since 2007 (GBP 2 million); 
by SDC (CHF 1.8 million), GTZ, and KfW since 2009 (EUR 0.6 
million); and by BTC since 2009 (EUR 0.5 million). 
According to data provided by MINECOFIN, between 2008 and 
2012 the share of SBS to the overall health budget amounted to 
8.4 % (including other ministries in addition to the MoH) and 
15.9 % of the MoH budget. SBS, as part of overall donor funding, 
provides a different picture: with 63 % of the health sector still 
funded externally (as at 2010), only 6.25 % of all donor funds were 
channeled through SBS. In the health sector, the US Government 
was, by far, the major DP, contributing 39 % of funds provided 
through external assistance (cf. Chapter A.3.2). All contributions 
from the US Government are provided as off-budget funding.58
The development of SWAp in the Rwandan health sector was 
jointly supported by several DPs, as requested by the GoR in 
accordance with its aid policy. Joint financing, joint design, review 
missions, and the shared financing of consultancies and studies, 
were carried out. Many activities supported by GDC, therefore, 
were conducted jointly with other DPs, in particular – but 
not exclusively – with SBS DPs. Table 8 summarizes the major 
activities to which GDC provided substantial inputs in the form 
of funding, policy advice, and technical assistance. 
Table 8. SWAp and joint financing modalities: Inputs and outputs 
Major activities and contribution of GDC Major jointly achieved outputs 
SWAP Development
Support to the conceptualization and design of SWAp 
Support to the elaboration and review of HSSP I (2005 – 09) and HSSP II  
(2009 – 2012), Support to the elaboration of HSSP III
Active participation and facilitation in HSWG, TWG, and JHSR
Support to the development of SWAp in five districts
Establishment of SWAp structures, HSCG / HSWG, TWG, and monitoring and 
review mechanisms
SWAp Memorandum of Understanding
SWAp manual and roadmap
Development and implementation of HSSP I (2005 – 2009), HSSP II (2009 – 2012) 
and HSSP III 
Establishment of JADF health commissions
SBS
Design of SBS
Disbursement of SBS: First tranche (EUR 6.0 million) in 2009; second tranche 
(EUR 3.6 million, including EUR 0.1 million for CDPF) in 2010; third tranche in 2011
Increase of health sector budget and implementation of HSSP II (2009 – 12)
CDPF
Conceptualization and design of CDPF
Disbursement to CDPF: 2010 (EUR 0.6 million59)
Support to external audit of CDPF (2011)
Technical assistance to CDPF management (steering committee, SWAp 
secretariat, SPIU)
Establishment and reinforcement of coordinating units at central level (SWAp 
secretariat) 
Ad hoc support of capacity development interventions at district level until 2011 
Review of HSSP I and development of HSSP II
Implementation of elements of the HRH strategic plan (2011 – 16) since 2012
Sources: Project and program reports of implementing organizations to BMZ; timeline (Doc.25) and milestones documentation (Doc.23) by GIZ Health Program.
Theory of change
The joint Rwandan-German health program had been part of 
SWAp since 2005. The intended change, outlined in the joint 
health program’s ToC (cf. Annex D), is that through support to 
SWAp and through SBS, coordination and cooperation between 
GoR and external DPs has improved (outcome). Support to SWAp 
58  It is interesting to note that the US Government was about to provide SBS to the agricultural sector in 2012, which failed to materialize because of several DPs suspending GBS to GoR in the second half of 
2012 (information by the German Embassy in Rwanda). This sheds a different light on the apparent inability of the US Government to provide SBS due to provisions in the Budget and Accounting Act. 
59 EUR 0.5 million from GTZ and EUR 0.1 million from KfW. 
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and SBS has also led to improved ownership within the MoH 
and improved capacities regarding public financial management 
(outcome). These two outcomes, together with enhanced quality 
care, contribute to making the health system better respond to 
the needs of the population, especially the poor. The enhanced 
quality care (output) results from the strengthening of capacities 
in the health sector, funded from CDPF. The health status of the 
population, ultimately, has improved (impact).
Relevance
SBS and pooled financing mechanisms in the context of SWAps 
are aid modalities that have been strongly enhanced by the aid 
effectiveness agenda. In light of the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness, GoR endorsed its respective aid policy in 2006 
(GoR, 2006). It aims to increase the effectiveness of external 
assistance to Rwanda and provides a basis on which support can 
be mobilized. The preferred aid modality of GoR is un-earmarked 
GBS, followed by SBS. Stand-alone projects should only be 
considered if they are on budget or, at least, aligned to a national 
strategic plan. Donor resources should be pooled rather than 
provided through individual projects (GoR, 2006; GoR & MoH, 
2012; G INT SWAp 2).
The BMZ country strategy for Rwanda (BMZ, 2009b) highlights 
the importance of GBS and SBS and relates them to the following 
objectives and expectations: support to Rwanda's poverty-orient-
ed development policy through funding and continuous policy 
dialogue and harmonization of donor procedures through joint 
financing mechanisms and reduction of transaction costs (BMZ, 
2009b, p. 11). Likewise, the BMZ priority strategy for Rwan-
dan-German cooperation in the health sector underlines that 
GDC is fully integrated into the national planning process, led by 
HSSP I, HSSP II, and the health SWAp and that it is, thus, in line 
with the Paris Declaration (Doc.19). Joint financing modalities are 
seen as appropriate instruments in the context of program-based 
approaches to promote health sector reform and reduce transac-
tion costs. 
Until recently, BMZ very much supported GBS and SBS for 
Rwanda (G INT GEN 2; INT SWAp 9). In view of accusations by 
the United Nations regarding Rwandan support to militia in 
Eastern Congo, however, BMZ has suspended its planned GBS 
for 2012 / 2013 and 2013 / 2014 (BMZ, 2012a, 2012b). Since GBS 
also flows to sector ministries, this will affect the health sector 
budget. As other DPs also have suspended GBS, the aid flow 
has considerably decreased with unavoidable repercussions 
on available national budgets (World Bank, 2013). Given these 
constraints and in recognition of the considerable efforts from 
the GoR to contribute to regional peace consultations, the 
German Government has released part of the scheduled GBS for 
the joint program relating to vocational education (EUR 7 million) 
and decentralization (EUR 7 million).60 The mode of delivery, in 
fact, has changed from GBS to off-budget project funding. The 
remaining EUR 7 million remains on hold (Sandner, 2013).
SBS was intended “to expand the total resource envelope 
available for the poor in the health sector, and hence close 
the HSSP financing gap […] by focusing on items in the health 
budget that address quality health services for the poor and the 
vulnerable” (Doc.48). The link to the component objective (“The 
health system responds better to the needs of the population, 
especially the poor”) is evident. The relevance of SBS is evident, 
as its objectives are aligned with the EDPRS and HSSP. Providing 
SBS is also in line with the aid effectiveness agenda. 
Box 10. Capacity development pooled fund (CDPF)
The Capacity Development Pooled Fund is a co-managed finance pool of the 
Ministry of Health and DPs (BTC, DFID, GDC, and SDC). The primary aim of the 
CDPF was to assure effective coordination and to avoid the duplication and over-
lap of the various efforts of DPs to support capacity building in the health sector 
in Rwanda. The pooling of resources for technical assistance, including capacity 
building, has emerged as an aid modality in the joint efforts of DPs and national 
governments in partner countries to improve aid and development effectiveness, 
following the Paris Declaration (2005). 
CDPF (cf. Box 10) was first conceived as a “transitional mecha-
nism to provide short term capacity development support to op-
erationalize the health SWAp” (Doc.48). The major rationale was 
to rapidly build up capacity in health planning and management, 
in order to avoid the risk that investments in the health sector 
fail to produce sustainable benefits. The establishment of the 
60  Personal information from the BMZ regional desk. 
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CDPF was also conceived as a substitute to the accompanying 
interventions for SBS (INT EXP 10). A more pragmatic rationale 
for CDPF was to bring other DPs that could not engage in SBS to 
participate, at least, in pooled funding (INT GEN 4).
Until 2011, the activities of CDPF were conducted in a rather ad 
hoc manner, without being based on a capacity building needs 
assessment or a coherent strategy. Strategic objectives were 
developed as a follow-up to an external audit conducted in 2011 
(Doc.50).61 In its current design, CDPF aims to increase the num-
bers of trained and equitably distributed staff and to improve the 
productivity and performance of health workers, as well as the 
capacity to plan, develop, regulate, and manage HRH (Republic 
of Rwanda, MoH, & SPIU, 2012). These objectives are aligned to 
the HRH Strategic Plan (2011 – 2016). 
Technical assistance, combined with pooled funding, is viewed as 
important by officials in MoH to ensure an effective implemen-
tation of national health strategies and guidelines (G INT GEN 3; 
INT SWAp 4). Some DPs also share this view. Their main argu-
ment is that such a mix of approaches can enable GDC and other 
DPs to transfer experiences from implementation at the district 
level into the dialogue with Rwandan partners in the TWGs (INT 
GEN 4; INT SWAp 7). 
It can be concluded that GDC support to the SWAp has reflected, 
to a large extent, the priorities of the German and Rwandan 
Governments. The same applies to GDC support to joint financ-
ing modalities. GDC support in terms of technical assistance 
has reflected, to a large extent, the priorities of the German 
Government, since GoR has shown a clear preference for budget 
support and pooled funding. The aid modalities by GDC have 
been appropriate to achieve the objectives established, together 
with its Rwandan partners. 
Effectiveness
In the context of SWAp, GDC has followed a multi-level ap-
proach. Coordination and policy advice was ensured through the 
participation of the health sector coordinator in the HSWG, as 
well as KfW and German Embassy representatives in the Budget 
Support Harmonization Group and JBSRs. GIZ-seconded experts 
also co-chaired and participated in several TWGs and supported 
the development of national strategies and guidelines. At the 
district level, technical assistance and training was provided 
to district and hospital administrators, in addition to health 
professionals. Furthermore, GTZ / GIZ has supported the plans 
of district hospitals and administrations with local subsidy 
agreements. 
The following paragraphs provide information on the final status 
of the indicators relating to the achievement of the component 
objective (“the health system responds better to the needs of 
the population, especially the poor”) in the context of support to 
SWAp (cf. also Annex E).
“The Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(EDPRS) contains health specific strategies, focusing especially on 
the access of the poor to health services, and resource allocation on 
district level is improved” (Doc.26). EDPRS (2008 – 12) objectives 
and its flagship programs focus on pro-poor growth and on 
governance. Health objectives are to maximize preventive health 
development interventions and build capacity for high-quality 
and accessible health care services for the entire population, 
in order to reduce malnutrition, infant and child mortality, and 
fertility, and to control communicable diseases (Republic of 
Rwanda, 2007). In EDPRS 2 (2013 – 18), these health objectives 
figure less prominently. They are ensconced under fundamental 
issues aimed to improve quality, demand, and access to health 
insurance. Improved access is only made explicit in relation to 
improved health insurance for the poor (GoR & MoH, 2012, p. 
80). According to the mid-term review of HSSP, the share of the 
MoH budget, allocated to the district level, increased from 11 % in 
2006 to 40 % in 2011 (IHP+, 2011).
“The joint financing of the health sector of at least two bilateral 
development partners continues” (Doc.26). Following the Division 
of Labor exercise under the leadership of GoR, GDC support 
has been phased out, including joint financing. Only Belgium is 
committed to further providing SBS until 2020, after which DFID 
will phase out its support to the health sector (DFID, 2013). There 
61  While the audit has focused primarily on financial management issues, it serves as an opportunity to reconsider the strategic orientation of CDPF. 
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is still, however, some uncertainty about this commitment.62 
Belgium will most probably continue to finance CDPF, together 
with SDC, but the modalities for the renewal of the grant are 
not yet finalized. Attracting other major DPs to pooled financing 
mechanisms has not been successful so far. 
“The management capacity of the MoH in health financing is 
strengthened as a result of at least 90 % of all actors in the health 
sector (2010: 80 %) entering into the Health Resource Tracking Tool 
[HRTT] more complete data on the amount and use of funds and 
the use of the data base for the annual planning 2012 / 13” (Doc.26). 
Information on the number of stakeholders entering data into 
HRTT is available, but not conclusive to the point that the 
indicator could be verified. It proved more difficult than expected 
to have all actors in the health sector providing the required data 
(HRTT, 2012).63 HRTT did provide data for the annual planning 
2013 / 14. There are indications that the management capacity of 
MoH has been strengthened. The results from the data collec-
tion, however, remain inconclusive.
Sector-wide approach
Between 2004 and 2012, the health SWAp evolved from concept 
to structured cooperation between MoH and its partners. There 
is supportive evidence that SWAp is well-established in the 
context of the Rwandan aid architecture (GoR & MoH, 2012, p. 
94). In its entirety, the structure and mechanisms (HSWG, TWG, 
JHSR) are functional and follow clear and transparent procedures. 
There is a strong role for GoR to coordinate the dialogue among 
DPs (INT SWAp 9, 10). 
Both Rwandan and German former stakeholders in the program 
claim that they played a crucial role in the early stages of SWAp 
development (INT SWAp 16, 19). MoH officials and DP represent-
atives have emphasized that GDC was instrumental in bringing 
SWAp to life, establishing its framework and procedures, and 
consistently advocating for harmonization and alignment (G INT 
GEN 4; G INT SWAp 1, 6, 7, 8, 13). 
The interviews also revealed that some confusion remains 
with regard to the mandate and role of some TWGs and to 
the coordinating role of the SWAp secretariat (INT SWAp 6).64 
Furthermore, the quality and effectiveness of SWAp appeared to 
depend very much on the strength of the respective TWG. Some 
TWGs met often, while others did so rarely. Some chairs of TWGs 
apparently lacked the influence or authority in MoH to enforce 
decisions. Informal power and communication structures in MoH 
still play an important role, bypassing TWG mechanisms. In some 
areas, such as human resources development, dialogue, strategy 
design, and technical advice took place primarily outside of the 
formal SWAp framework (G INT GEN 4; INT SWAp 6, 7, 13, 18; INT 
HRD 21).
With regard to the decentralization of SWAp, MoH officials, GDC 
staff, and DP representatives at the central level concurred in 
their assessments that the respective compositions (i.e., the dis-
trict health management teams (DHMT))65 have been created at 
the district level, but that in many of the districts, they do not yet 
assume their roles and responsibilities in a sufficiently proactive 
and committed manner (G INT GEN 4; INT SWAp 3, 5). The JADF 
and its sub-commission on health appear to operate fairly well, 
when they are supported either by an active local leader (mayor 
or vice-mayor) or by a DP working within the district (INT SWAp 
6, 7). In those communities supported by GDC, the JADF was 
viewed more as an opportunity to regularly exchange informa-
tion on health-related activities in the area than as an avenue for 
strategic planning and shared resource management (G INT GEN 
8, 10, 11). 
The improved coordination among the various stakeholders 
relating to health systems development (comparative case study) 
has been revealed by health service providers – from the focus 
62 For the time being, commitments from Belgium for SBS only cover the period 2011 – 14 (INT SWAP 22). 
63  The use of the data base was voluntary and transparent (for all implementation activities). Consequently, certain amounts spent were duplicated, which made their tracing onerous (INT SWAp 16). 
64  In 2012, DP group continued to give priority to the strengthening of TWG performance, since some TWG members had not responded to the jointly agreed requirements (cf. Minutes of DP group, 2012). 
65  DHMTs were created in order to formalize existing mechanisms and initiatives for health systems coordination, already implemented in some districts prior to 2012. The major role of DHMT relates to 
planning and management, supervision, coordination, financial and resource oversight, regulation, and increasing participation of the local community in the delivery and management of health services. 
The membership is as follows: deputy mayor responsible for social affairs (chairperson), district health unit staff, director of the district hospital, director of pharmacy, director of CBHI, representative of the 
head of health centers, and a representative of CHWs. 
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group discussions and interviews held – as being a positive effect 
of decentralization. DHMTs, however, are not yet in a position 
to play their role effectively, since they have been provided with 
GDC advisory support only during the phasing out period in 
2012. Interviews conducted in the five districts revealed that 
DHMTs still require considerable support and guidance in order 
to operate effectively. Regarding the interface with the JADF, 
clarification is lacking on their respective competencies, roles, 
and responsibilities, as well as on the linkage and reporting 
systems (INT SWAP 1, 4). In addition, informal communication 
systems within MoH appear sometimes to bypass formal SWAp 
mechanisms (INT SWAP 4).
Sector budget support 
SBS was earmarked to fund key interventions in the health 
sector. As had been understood by the core DP group, this 
represented an increase in allocations from the health budget to 
primary- and secondary-level health care, and figured prominent-
ly among performance triggers (INT EXP 6, 10). There is support-
ive evidence that the share of the health budget allocated to the 
district level increased from 11 % in 2006 to 40 % in 2011 (IHP+, 
2011). On closer examination of SBS contributions by GDC, it 
appeared that the first and second tranches (EUR 6.0 million 
and EUR 3.6 million, respectively) had not flowed into the health 
budget. This led to an unexpected and considerable delay in the 
use of the funds, as was disclosed in the report of the Auditor 
General (GoR & MoH, 2010a), accessed by the GDC in November 
2011 (INT EXP 6, 9, 10)).66 KfW had requested the third tranche to 
be transferred in October 2011, based on the JHSR. After bilateral 
discussions between MINECOFIN, MoH, and KfW, a detailed plan 
for the use of the three tranches of SBS funds was submitted to 
GDC by MoH. The funds, in fact, had been earmarked for hospital 
equipment at the district and province levels and health centers 
(Doc.28). There is some evidence that this actually reflected 
priority interventions, in accordance with HSSP II (INT EXP 9, 10).
Budget support is expected to provide donors with a greater 
leverage effect on reform processes by raising policy dialogue 
between donors and partner countries to a more strategic level 
(BMZ, 2008; de Kemp, Faust, & Leiderer, 2011). While this effect 
does not figure explicitly in the program’s ToC, it should be 
considered as one of the target outcomes from the perspective 
of DPs. There is some supportive evidence from the interviews 
that this effect did materialize as was intended. Interviewees 
among GDC and DP staff, who were engaged in SBS in Rwanda, 
claimed that they had more leverage from their privileged access 
to MINECOFIN and as a result of more focused dialogue on 
health sector performance during JHSR,67 which took place twice 
a year (G INT GEN 4; INT SWAp 12, 16).68 Several JHSRs, between 
2006 and 2012, included key issues, such as transparency with 
regard to budget allocation and expenditure, the need to address 
financial sustainability issues in HF strategies, and the harmoni-
zation of data collection and analysis. 
Most of MoH officials, who were interviewed, acknowledged 
the importance of SBS and pooled funding (G INT GEN 3; INT 
SWAp 4). They also emphasized that project-based, off-budget 
funding – in combination with technical assistance – should still 
be viewed as a necessary and complementary modality. 
Interviews revealed that opportunities for leveraging policy dia-
logue were restrained due to SBS constituting a relatively small 
proportion of aid in the health sector (6.25 % in 2010; INT EXP 
19; cf. also chapter A.3.2). This made it difficult to position the 
increase of domestic contribution to the health sector budget as 
one of the key topics for policy dialogue, as had been intended. 
DPs also drew attention to the fact that the principal donor in 
the health sector, the United States, is not only absent from the 
group of DPs providing SBS, but it also provides nearly 40 % of 
health sector aid, thus comparatively increasing its leverage in 
terms of policy dialogue (INT EXP 6, 9, 10, 19).
Capacity development pooled fund 
The different interpretations among DPs and MoH of the 
objectives of CDPF have presented challenges to its timely imple-
mentation as a joint financing modality, a fact that many of those 
66  Beyond the fact that these funds may have been frozen in a special account under MINECOFIN, there is no further evidence on the reason for this delay. 
67 It should be noted that the participation of DPs in the JHSR was not restricted to those contributing through SBS. 
68  DPs providing SBS and GBS – as did GDC and DFID – had access to the budget support harmonization group and the joint budget support review. There are indications that this setting provided substantial 
opportunity for policy dialogue (INT EXP 19), but this has not been further explored in the context of this evaluation. 
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DPs interviewed stressed (INT SWAp 1, 5, 8, 13; INT GEN 4; INT 
EXP 10). While some DPs favored a flexible financing modality, in 
addition to SBS and project-based aid, others emphasized clear 
orientation towards capacity development, mainly due to the 
lengthy process of agreeing on common procedures and on DPs 
tending to micromanage the direction of CDPF (Doc.53).
Some evidence can be provided with regard to the contribution 
of CDPF to capacity development during the first phase. While 
CDPF was used to finance the evaluation of HSSP I and the 
development of HSSP II, the latter national plans constituted a 
key element in SWAp and the development of a unified approach 
towards strategic health management. This is, therefore, an 
indirect but important contribution to capacity development in 
the sector. Since capacity development activities were backed in 
an ad hoc manner and without a common strategic framework, it 
can be concluded that capacities – for example, of CBHI man-
agers at the district level or of specific target groups in district 
hospitals69 – indeed, have been developed and strengthened. 
There is, however, a lack of evidence of how these capacities have 
been utilized. 
Subsequent to the reorientation of its support in 2011, CDPF 
focused on the long-term training of health staff, particularly 
with regard to secondary health care. In compliance with the 
HRH Strategic Plan, the new three-year work plan (2011 – 2014) 
includes, among other development interventions, nursing and 
midwifery training and an upgrade of the program, a physician 
assistant program at the Kigali Health Institute, a hospital 
management program, and the training of biomedical technicians 
(Republic of Rwanda et al., 2012). The programs were implement-
ed in November 2011 and, as the relevant results will be available 
only in December 2014, their effectiveness could not been 
included in the evaluation. 
The role of CDPF as a joint financing modality weakened when, in 
2012, a major US-funded initiative to support HRH development 
in Rwanda was launched and required coordination with CDPF 
(Doc.53) between the United States Government and GDC 
representatives, including the CDPF Steering Committee. It was 
not possible, however, to pool the US funds with those of the 
CDPF-contributing DPs and ensure joint planning and budgeting 
procedures. To the extent possible, effort was made to ensure 
complementarity. In comparison, CDPF funds are modest, when 
compared to the US funds for the HRH program (USD 20 – 25 
million per annum) (INT DP 1).
In conclusion, SWAp structures and mechanisms, on a national 
basis, are operating effectively at varying degrees with regard to 
TWGs. GDC’s support to make these structures and mechanisms 
functional has been effective, as has been evidenced from 
those TWGs where GDC has played a leading role. SWAp, at the 
decentralized level, is yet to operate smoothly, given that GDC 
support could have been more effective by a later phasing out 
period of Rwandan-German cooperation in the health sector. SBS 
could not be fully explored as an aid modality due to a limited 
leverage effect and a lack of coherence among contributing DPs. 
So far, basket funding (CDPF) has helped strengthen institutional 
capacities in the health sector only to a moderate extent. GDC 
has been effective in operationalizing CDPF and in strengthening 
its strategic orientation.
Efficiency
While the inputs provided by GDC for the implementation of 
SWAp – in combination with joint financing modalities (SBS 
and CDPF) – can be identified, the outputs and outcomes were 
achieved jointly (i.e., with Rwandan partners and other DPs). An 
attempt to measure cost-effectiveness by relating GDC inputs to 
shared outputs and outcomes, therefore, is not pertinent. This 
also applies to the assessment of SBS performance and its flows 
into the overall sector budget. 
As far as the GDC contribution to SBS is concerned, the disburse-
ment procedure has proved to be efficient, given that the three 
tranches (2009, 2010, and 2011) were transferred on schedule. 
The procedure for transferring these funds to the health budget, 
however, was inefficient (cf. the respective paragraph under 
‘effectiveness’). There have been other similar instances of delays 
69  Funds from CDPF were used to cover financial gaps with regard to capacity development activities, scheduled in annual work plans, at the district and hospital levels. This was based on proposals made by 
districts and hospitals (Doc.53). 
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with regard to SBS funding, as experienced by Belgium and 
United Kingdom (INT EXP 20).
There has been apparent inefficiency in the use of CDPF funds 
(Doc.50), which were used – without adhering to strategic 
guidelines – for non-core and ad hoc activities, as well as their 
being under-used. In response to audit recommendations 
(Doc.50), CDPF now has been placed under the responsibility of 
SPIU in MoH. 
A common measure used to assess the efficiency of SBS or 
pooled funding modalities is the extent to which they have 
contributed to reduce transaction costs for recipient govern-
ments and DPs. The interviews have indicated that transaction 
costs were reduced for Rwandan officials in MoH (INT SWAp 13, 
14) – especially after the establishment of SPIU – but that they 
did not substantially decrease from the perspective of GDC staff 
(G INT GEN 2). In the case of CDPF, an increase of workload and 
coordination activities, especially for DPs, was observed.
In conclusion, there were deficiencies in terms of SBS and 
basket funding (CDPF). Transaction costs could be only partially 
reduced. 
Sustainability
The rationale for a review of the sustainability of GDC support 
to SWAp, SBS, and CDPF is not because Rwandan-German 
cooperation is ending as a result of its high-level ownership and 
sustainability in terms of GDC aid to the health sector, which are 
being achieved. It is because of the GoR’s commitment to the 
aid-effectiveness agenda. In accordance with Rwanda´s aid policy 
and Division of Labor, MINECOFIN’s view was that donor support 
should be equally distributed among EDPRS sectors. As the 
health sector has benefitted from substantial support from DPs 
in previous years, the priorities were set by the GoR in order to 
fill the gaps in other sectors. Support to productive sectors need-
ed to sustain economic growth which, in turn, would strengthen 
the health sector. MINECOFIN, therefore, was confident that the 
health sector would cope with the termination of GDC support 
(G INT SWAp 2).
Current and former MoH officials who were interviewed, see a 
major opportunity to sustain GDC support in SWAp, SBS, and 
CDPF, given that GoR – not a DP or GDC – owns SWAp. Because 
of GDC alignment to the priorities of GoR, officials anticipate 
that the strategies developed with GDC support will continue 
operating. The same interviewees, however, highlighted the fact 
that the hole left by German support to SBS and CDPF would 
need to be filled by domestic and external resources. At the same 
time, technical assistance – particularly in the areas of HF and 
health technology management – still would be needed in the 
short term (G INT GEN 3; G INT SWAp 1, 3). Regarding health 
technology management, MoH officials and DPs expect serious 
funding gaps to occur after the phase-out of GDC in terms of 
maintenance, repairs, and the procurement of spare parts (INT 
SWAP 3, 7, 10). The training of biomedical technicians, co-fi-
nanced by CDPF and Belgium, therefore, is highly welcome under 
the umbrella of the HRH program. To date, their number is still 
limited and technical assistance to develop systems operations 
between the district and the central levels remains critical (INT 
HRD 5; INT SWAP 7). 
At the district level, the main risk to continuing GDC support 
to SWAp relates to consolidation of performance. According to 
interviewees in the district administration, the structures and 
mechanisms to implement national strategies are in place, but 
the resources are lacking for capacity building and supervision 
of health facilities and staff. The mobilization of resources from 
other stakeholders at the district level was seen as a challenge 
(INT HRD 8; G INT GEN 8, 10, 11). 
In view of the high-level ownership by GoR and the functionality 
of SWAp structures and mechanisms established, the prospects for 
the sustainability of health program achievements in various areas 
can be rated as satisfactory. Despite this, there are indications 
that SWAp-dynamics have further lost momentum in the first 
half of 2013 (INT DP 1; INT EXP 20; INT SWAP 21). DP interviewees 
consider this to be because key DP staff members have left 
Rwanda. The HSWG, as one of the key forums for SWAP, appar-
ently does not succeed in organizing its work effectively. The fact 
that the JHSR is not taking place in April 2013 can also indicate 
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that the SWAp process has become less vital. It is also obvious 
that the US-funded HRH program is implemented primarily 
through project-based aid, in lieu of CDPF. There are indications 
that bilateral cooperation between GoR and the United States 
has taken the lead, to the detriment of the SWAp process.
As illustrated by the financial gap analysis HSSP III (GoR & 
MoH, 2012, p. 121), the challenge remains that the health sector 
still very much depends on external support. While the US 
Government has further strengthened its role as the major 
donor in the health sector, its funding is declining. With LuxDev 
having retreated from the health sector in 2013, and with DFID 
having phased out its support, only Belgium has announced its 
long-term commitment. As far as SBS is concerned, however, 
Belgium’s commitment only will cover the period 2011 – 14. 
There is some indication that MINECOFIN will respond to this 
challenge with a new Division of Labor policy (GoR & MINECO-
FIN, 2013), given that the new players, France and China, will 
provide support to the health sector for the actual EDPRS period 
(2013 – 18). There is a possibility that DPs joining the health sector 
will display a level of commitment which, hopefully, will contrib-
ute to revitalizing the SWAp dynamic.
3.3.2 Component 1: Health financing
Two health reforms, designed to overcome the under-utilization 
and low quality of services in Rwanda, have sparked special 
interest in the international development community (cf. Logie, 
Rowson, & Ndagije, 2008; Musango, Doetinchem, & Carrin, 2009; 
Saksena, Antunes, Xu, Musango, & Carrin, 2010): a country-wide 
CBHI (cf. Box 11) and a PBF of health providers (cf. Box 12). Both 
reforms originate from small-scale projects in the resource-poor, 
post-conflict environment that followed the 1994 genocide, and 
have been accompanied and shaped by German cooperation over 
a period of several years.
Health financing in the Rwandan health system
CBHI
When international emergency assistance was phased out, 
following the 1994 genocide, user fees for health services were 
reintroduced in Rwanda in 1996 (INT HF 32; cf. Soeters et al., 
2005). As a consequence, the use of health services dropped to 
0.25 consultations per capita per annum by 1999 (INT RP 1; cf. 
also Schneider, 2005). To reduce the catastrophic costs resulting 
from out-of-pocket payments for health services, GoR and some 
NGOs locally piloted three CBHI schemes in 1999 (cf. Binagwaho, 
Hartwig, Ingeri, & Makaka, 2012) (cf. Box 11). The key evolutionary 
stages of CBHI since then have been its scaling up, nationally, in 
2004, accompanied by a policy (MoH, 2004), the development of 
a legal framework, backed by law in 2007 (GoR, 2008a), and the 
issuance of a new policy in 2010 (MoH, 2010a).
Box 11. Community-based health insurance (CBHI) 
Health insurance, in general, can be defined as “a contract between the insured 
and the insurer to the effect that in the case of specified events (determined in 
the insurance contract) occurring, the insurer will pay compensation either to the 
insured person or to the health service provider” (WHO, n.d.). Rwanda’s current 
CBHI (mutuelles de santé)70 is based on a form of health insurance, referred to as 
social security, “whereby, in principle, society’s risks are pooled, with contributions 
by individuals usually dependent on their capacity to pay” (WHO, n.d.). 
In its current form, CBHI is organized to correspond with both 
administrative entities (sector, district, and national levels71) 
and care levels (health centers, district hospitals, and referral 
hospitals) (cf. MoH, 2012b). Premiums are collected from CBHI 
members (approximately 70 % of the CBHI budget) at health 
centers (sector level) and pooled with subsidies from GoR 
(approximately 13 %), DPs (approximately 9 %), and private 
employers (approximately 8 %) (all percentages for 2006, taken 
from GoR & MoH, 2008). These funds reimburse health centers 
for services delivered to CBHI members. The sector risk pool is 
reinsured by larger risk pools at the district and national levels. 
The pools at the sector level cover about 15,000 members each, 
and a district pool (30 in total) covers about 300,000 inhabitants 
70  For the sake of clarity, it should be noted that the use of “community-based“ could be somewhat misleading. Some scholars consider either non-governmental ownership of a scheme or voluntary enrolment 
of members as definitional preconditions to qualify as “community-based” (cf. Bennet, 2004; Ekman, 2004; Robyn, Sauerborn, & Bärnighausen, 2013). Although both aspects do not apply in the Rwandan 
context, following the scheme’s evolution, this report refers to the Rwandan insurance as CBHI, commonly and officially used in Rwanda. 
71  The current administration system of the Republic of Rwanda is structured (from the largest to the smallest) by provinces, districts (the main decentralized governance unit), sectors, cells, and villages  
(cf. MINALOC, 2011). 
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(cf. MoH, 2010b). The CBHI policy of 2010 (MoH, 2010a) replaced 
the capitation system (1,000 RWF per person72 per annum; a 
co-payment [ticket modérateur] of 200 RWF at the point of use 
(i.e., at a health facility) by a contribution system. This was based 
on socioeconomic stratification, ranging from full government 
substitution for the poorest up to 7,000 RWF, plus co-payments 
for the more wealthy. Membership in an insurance has been 
mandatory by law in Rwanda since 2007 (GoR, 2008a).
PBF
PBF started out as a geographically specific pilot between 2002 
and 2005 (MoH, 2008), and has been rolled out nationwide since 
2005 (cf. Basinga et al., 2011; Soeters et al., 2005) (cf. Box 12). 
While PBF encompasses all care levels, only the administrative 
model for district hospitals is presented here (cf. Rusa, Schneid-
man, Fritsche, & Musango, 2009) because Germany, as sole DP 
under the Division of Labor concept of GoR, has supported PBF 
in the district hospital of Ruhengeri.73 PBF budgets for hospitals 
are estimated, based on an annual value of approximately USD 
600 per bed. Each quarter, a team from a peer hospital (often 
comprising MoH and DP representatives) evaluates the hospital’s 
performance against a checklist of 51 indicators. The percentage 
of the prospective budget disbursed as an incentive is contingent 
on the degree of indicator achievement. Both the area (admin-
istration, quality assurance, or clinical activities) and quality 
of performance enter the calculation as weights. An invoice, 
approved by a district steering committee (under supervision 
of the Rwandan Ministry of Local Administration, Community 
Development and Social Affairs, MINALOC), is subsequently sent 
to the purchaser (MoH) to pay the performance fee (through 
MINECOFIN) to the district hospital which may decide on how to 
use these revenues.
Box 12. Performance-based financing (PBF) 
Performance-based financing – sometimes referred to as Pay for Performance, 
output-based aid, or Performance-Based Payment – can generally be defined 
as the “transfer of money or material goods conditional on taking a measurable 
action or achieving a predetermined performance target” (Eichler & Levine, 2009, 
p. 6). PBF in Rwanda (also known as approche contractuelle) aims to overcome 
under-utilization and poor coverage of health services (cf. Rusa et al., 2009). 
MoH introduced financial incentives for health service providers to improve their 
performance on a defined set of services, quantitatively and qualitatively, and their 
management of services and systems (MoH, 2009a). PBF thus tackles the supply 
side of the health system. 
Both CBHI and PBF should be considered as flagships among the 
Rwandan health reforms, pursued at a high pace and with strong 
political commitment. In absolute terms, the funds, transferred 
through PBF, totaled USD 5.7 million in 2006,74 peaking at USD 
11.8 million in 2007 (WHO, 2009b, p. 114). The 2006 National 
Health Accounts (GoR & MoH, 2008, p. 15) estimated that CBHI 
contributed about USD 15.3 million to total health expenditure. 
These figures highlight the centrality of both programs for Rwan-
dan HF, given a total public health expenditure of approximately 
USD 58 million in 2006 (cf. GoR & MoH, 2008, p. xvi).
The component of health financing in the Rwandan-German 
health program
Theory of change
The overall goal of the program’s HF component aimed to increase 
the responsiveness of the Rwandan health system, especially 
towards the poor (cf. program progress reports, 2008 – 2012). 
With regard to CBHI, the goal indicator was to increase the 
percentage of the population covered by insurance from 60 % 
in 2008 to 100 % in 2012 (cf. Annex E). The second target was to 
introduce PBF in at least 50 % of the district hospitals from 2008 
to 2010, which was replaced by the goal to develop adjusted PBF 
criteria for the newly designed structure of province hospitals in 
2012. 
72  Although the premiums under the capitation system had to be paid individually, membership in the insurance was family-based (cf. GoR, 2008a: Article 5; MoH, 2004, p. 7). 
73  On a policy level, however, Germany supported PBF per se. For PBF regarding CHWs, cf. MoH (2009b) and Mugeni, Ngabo, and Humuza (2011); for the application at health centers, cf. e.g., Meessen et al. 
(2006). 
74  Of these USD 5.7 million, 20 % was allocated to PBF in district hospitals (USD 1.15 million). The largest financial contributor was GoR with about 46 %, followed by Belgium (32 %) and United States (22 %). 
The World Bank contributed 13 % of the USD 2.96 million disbursed through PBF to health centers (GoR: 85 %; Belgium: 2 %). PBF for CHWs was solely paid by GoR (USD 1.61 million) (WHO, 2009b, p. 114). 
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The general ToC (cf. Annex D) for HF stipulated that technical 
and financial inputs to the central units for CBHI and PBF at 
MoH and the respective decentralized implementing entities on 
district and sector levels (multi-level approach) strengthen the 
capacities to manage and expand these schemes (output). The 
effective steering should lead to increasing financial accessibility 
(through CBHI) to sufficient high-quality health services (through 
PBF) and foster management capacities and additional revenues 
at the health facilities (both schemes), resulting in increased pro-
poor responsiveness of the health system (outcome). Ultimately, 
the population’s health status is, thereby, improved (impact). 
More precisely, the CBHI strand in the program’s ToC assumes 
that in the framework of a multi-level approach, policy and 
technical advice (inputs) to the MoH unit for CBHI lead to suffi-
ciently harmonized strategies and available funds. This proximal 
output enables CBHI units at MoH to effectively manage the 
insurance scheme, resulting in a higher pro-poor responsiveness 
of the Rwandan health system (outcome). This logic is paralleled 
at the district level: technical support (inputs) facilitates the 
management of CBHI by the respective authorities and staff in 
the program area (output), leading to the same outcome.
The PBF strand largely adheres to a similar logic: policy and tech-
nical advice (input) to the MoH unit for PBF lead to suitable PBF 
strategies. The implementation of these strategies at the level of 
health facilities leads to proper performance evaluations, which 
trigger a higher motivation of staff (output) and finally causes an 
improvement in the structural quality of health services, leading 
to a higher pro-poor responsiveness of the Rwandan health 
system (outcome). At the decentralized level, GDC was solely re-
sponsible for paying the incentives for Ruhengeri district hospital 
from 2007 until mid-2011, which led – adhering to the same logic 
– to an improvement of service quality at the hospital.75
Implementation
German cooperation has accompanied CBHI since its rollout in 
2005 as co-chair of the mutuelles working group with technical 
advice and workshops to coordinate donor activities (Doc.39). 
Major inputs by GDC to support the Health Financing Unit at 
MoH and its subordinate unit, the Cellule Technique d’Appui 
aux Mutuelles de Santé (CTAMS), in the last years comprise the 
piloting of management software at the district level (Doc.43), 
supporting MoH to elaborate a CBHI procedure manual, and 
train CBHI managers, accordingly, implementing a financing 
mechanism to balance the different CBHI district pools and to 
improve the data situation on CBHI by operationalizing HRTT 
(cf. Doc.28; MoH, 2012b). In addition, GDC organized different 
CBHI policy dialogues, conferences, and workshops, and already 
had advocated a contribution system, based on stratified CBHI 
premiums (INT EXP 16). In cooperation with MINALOC, GDC 
has since supported the Ubudehe76 assessment and database, 
which serves as the basis for such an income-based stratification 
since the capitation system was abolished in 2010 (MoH, 2010a). 
At the district and sector levels of the program area, GDC – 
mostly through national district technical advisors – has offered 
support to CBHI staff and members of the steering committees 
by offering training and assistance on issues, such as planning, 
management, finance, supervision, sensitizing, monitoring, and 
evaluation. This has facilitated the coordination between District 
Health Units, district hospitals, and JADF, thus strengthening the 
district health system (Doc.40; Doc.43; GIZ & KfW, 2012).
Although not explicitly embedded in the program’s log frame 
(cf. Doc.44; Doc.45), the so-called social funds (fonds d’équité), 
established by GDC in the program area in 2007, constituted 
a HF mechanism that closely related to CBHI. These funds 
subsidized costs related to medical treatment, at the hospital 
level, not covered by CBHI, such as transport, drugs, or food. In 
addition, the funds bore the CBHI premiums for patients who 
could not afford them. Eligible for these services were those 
deemed economically vulnerable by local staff (INT HF 33, 34). 
75  Most of the evidence presented here is based on accounts on the situation in Ruhengeri and, therefore, has the status of a case study not necessarily generalizable to PBF on other care levels or district 
hospitals. Interviews suggest that the complex PBF procedures slightly varied between district hospitals (INT EXP 20; INT HRD EH 8). 
76  Ubudehe is a participatory poverty assessment approach, which is applied first in the PRSP process (RGB, 2012). Presently, Ubudehe serves to identify beneficiaries of Rwanda’s social protection programs, 
such as Vision 2020 and CBHI (Ruberangeyo, Ayebare, & de Bex, 2011). The six ordinal Ubudehe categories comprise (cf. GoR, 2002): (1) those in abject poverty (umutindinyakujya), (2) the very poor 
(umutindi), (3) the poor (umukene), (4) the resourceful poor (umukene wifashije), (5) the food rich (umukungu), and (6) the money rich (umukire). CBHI premiums are stratified along these categories since 
the CBHI policy of 2010. 
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About 1,300 people benefited from social funds in the years 2008 
and 2009 before the CBHI policy reform of 2010 (Doc.27). 
At the decentralized level, GDC provided training to PBF data 
collectors and evaluators (Doc.40), as well as to district staff 
(Doc.28), and participated in the quarterly peer evaluations of 
hospitals. Furthermore, GDC was the only DP under the Division 
of Labor policy to sign and carry out a local subsidy contract to 
directly finance PBF in the district hospital of Ruhengeri. Some 
GDC members have, based on experiences from Ruhengeri, 
seriously questioned the relevance and effectiveness of PBF and 
have published critical accounts on it after they had left Rwanda 
(e.g. Kalk, 2008; Kalk, 2011; Kalk, Paul, & Grabosch, 2010). Diverg-
ing views between some (former) GDC staff members and GoR 
have thus, at times, burdened the otherwise constructive spirit 
of Rwandan-German cooperation (INT EXP 15, 20; INT SWAP 19). 
Between 2007 until mid-2011, GTZ / GIZ disbursed approximately 
EUR 500,000 as PBF incentives in Ruhengeri (DEval estimation, 
based on data provided by GIZ). At the central level, technical 
assistance for PBF was directed to the responsible MoH unit, 
the Cellule d’Appui à l’Approche Contractuelle. GDC participated 
in different policy dialogues and workshops on the development 
of PBF indicators, with linkage to quality management of health 
services (Doc.43). GTZ / GIZ also co-chaired the technical working 
group on HF under the SWAp and was highly appreciated by 
other members for its technical expertise and for the experiences 
shared from the districts in this forum (INT SWAP 8, 16, 19, 22; 
Doc.39; Doc.43).
Relevance
The Rwandan strategic priorities for HF specified in the 2009 
HF policy aim to “ensure that quality essential health services 
and particularly MDG-related interventions are financially 
accessible to the whole population in an equitable, efficient and 
sustainable manner under a results-based financing framework” 
(MoH, 2009c, p. 18). GoR incorporated CBHI and PBF into its first 
HSSP for the years 2005 to 2009 (GoR, 2005b), as well as in its 
successor for the period 2009 to 2012 (GoR & MoH, 2009). These 
strategic plans align to EDPRS (GoR, 2007) and Vision 2020 (GoR 
& MINECOFIN, 2000). 
International priority areas for BMZ are health systems 
strengthening through the implementation of solidarity-based 
HF mechanisms (BMZ, 2009e, p. 18) and the establishment and 
reform of social security systems (BMZ, 2009f, p. 17). The human-
rights-based health concept of BMZ (BMZ, 2009a) emphasizes 
four core elements, namely, (1) availability, (2) accessibility, (3) ac-
ceptability, and (4) quality. As CBHI and PBF (mainly) target the 
improving financial accessibility and service quality, respectively, 
CBHI and PBF conform to both Rwandan and German priorities. 
In addition, CBHI and PBF contribute especially to MDGs 1, 4, 
and 5, which BMZ and GoR are committed to achieve. Due to this 
high level of alignment to Rwandan and German priorities on 
the one hand, and HF to the larger Rwandan policy framework 
on the other, ownership among the partner organizations for, 
and relevance of, the HF objectives was high (INT HF 3, 4; G INT 
HF 1, 2).
The strong political will and high pace with which GoR pursued 
the implementation of CBHI and PBF has been so hasty at times 
that decentralized structures were overstrained (INT EXP 16; 
MoH, 2008). The design of the German program as a multi-level 
approach, ranging from policy advice at the central level to 
capacity development for decentralized structures, paired with 
financial contributions to the PBF system, has been a good choice 
to tackle this challenge. Accompanying both reforms on various 
levels has helped the German cooperation to share experiences 
from the districts at the central TWG level (Doc.43).
While German support to CBHI and PBF has been fully in line 
with Rwandan strategic priorities, there is some controversy 
about setting up and financing the social funds (INT HF 1). GDC 
representatives and the staff at hospitals benefiting from the so-
cial funds described them as important for financial management 
because providers faced high uncovered costs for treating the 
poorest (INT HF 6, 17, 21, 22, 33, 34; G INT HF 10, 16, 17). Govern-
ment interviewees and one other DP, however, did not share 
this perception and were rather dismissive (INT HF 2, 26; G INT 
GEN 13). The social funds have been relevant by alleviating the 
negative consequences for the poorest struggling to pay CBHI 
fees and, thus, have contributed to health equity (INT HF 33, 34; 
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INT HRD DW 1; INT InD DW 31; comparative case study; Doc.43), 
but have done so by creating new, non-aligned structures that 
are less endorsed under Rwandan aid policy (GoR, 2006).
Concluding, CBHI and PBF both align to high-level (Vision 2020, 
EDPRS) and sector (HSSP) objectives on the Rwandan side, as 
well as to BMZ priorities (human-rights-based health concept, 
health systems strengthening, and social security systems) on 
the German side. The design of the program as a multi-level 
approach (policy advice at MoH and support of district struc-
tures) was highly relevant to patch “weak spots” at the district 
level due to the high pace of implementation. GDC social funds 
were not relevant in their design by creating non-aligned, parallel 
structures, but targeted a highly relevant and complementary 
goal for CBHI to ensure health equity before the policy reform 
of 2010. The HF component was, thus, overall highly relevant, 
considering its goals and design.
Effectiveness
HF in Rwanda is broadly viewed as a success story (cf. Logie et al., 
2008). It is difficult, however, to attribute results to GDC due to 
confounding influences in a SWAp environment. In the following, 
the contributions of German support to reach the overall 
outcome for PBF and CBHI (increased pro-poor responsiveness 
of the Rwandan health system) are presented.
CBHI
According to a number of interviews, the inputs of GDC as co-
chair of TWG (HF) at the central level contributed to improved 
coordination, information sharing, and joint implementation of 
HF issues between MoH and DPs (INT HF 4, 22, 25, 27, 37; G INT 
HF 2, 10, 13, 16, 24; INT SWAP 8, 16, 19, 22). This lends plausibility 
to the fact that policy advice and technical support to the unit 
responsible for the community-based health insurance (CBHI) at 
MoH contributed to the provision and usage of harmonized strat-
egies and resources. Strengthening this argument is the fact that 
German moderation led to GFATM disbursements of about USD 
34 million, which has been crucial to reach CBHI coverage today 
and to subsidize the indigenous (INT HF 0, 13, 34; G INT HF 29; 
Kalk, Groos, Karasi, & Girrbach, 2010). Focus-group discussions 
and interviews at the district level have supported this notion. 
CBHI key informants self-assessed their capacities as sufficient 
to follow the MoH design and reported positive feedback from 
clients and community representatives in the CBHI steering 
committees on this matter (comparative case study). It should 
be mentioned, however, that the support for applying to GFATM 
was provided through the German BACKUP Initiative, a BMZ 
help desk (implemented by GIZ) created exclusively for countries 
seeking GFATM support. The grants, therefore, represent 
an example of successful technical advice towards effective 
fundraising rather than a monetary input to the program. The 
approval by the GFATM was exceptional because Rwanda was, 
at that time, one out of only three grantees for health systems 
strengthening (cf. Kalk, Groos, et al., 2010). 
The extent to which these contributions have led to a more 
effective management of CBHI by MoH could not be scrutinized 
in detail due to the difficulty of tracing decision-making process-
es ex post. The evidence regarding increased pro-poor respon-
siveness to the health system, however, suggests that antecedent 
outputs were predominantly generated as postulated by ToC. As 
of the end of 2011, the nationwide insurance covered 91 % of the 
population (MoH CBHI database; data provided by GIZ), rising 
from a coverage of 7 % in 2003 (MoH, 2010a, p. 6). The average 
utilization rate of health services was at approximately 0.83 
consultations per capita (MoH, 2011a, p. 53) compared to 0.25 in 
1999 (cf. Schneider, 2005). Several studies support these findings 
(Binagwaho et al., 2012; Lu et al., 2012; Saksena et al., 2010; 
Shimeles, 2010) and strongly support the assumptions underlying 
CBHI that pre-payments and risk pooling effectively reduce 
catastrophic costs from out-of-pocket payments and increase 
service utilization in Rwanda.
Focus-group discussions revealed a generally high satisfaction 
of end users with CBHI services and management, as well as 
the successful reduction of financial access barriers of visiting 
health centers and access to higher care levels (comparative case 
study). The hypothesized revenue generated at health facilities 
has been supported for the old (Schneider & Hanson, 2006) and 
current CBHI systems. Health professionals reported that the 
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increased financial autonomy of their facilities has led to better 
staff recruitment, training, and drug procurement, relative to 
the needs of their catchment area (comparative case study). 
The study found, however, that delays in CBHI reimbursements 
from higher-level pools, at times, have restricted this financial 
autonomy (comparative case study). 
The enrolment and utilization rates, however, are lower among 
the poorest. Binagwaho et al. (2012) state that these rates have 
not changed substantially between the 2005 and 2010 DHS 
rounds. There is, furthermore, consistent evidence that cata-
strophic health spending is higher and service utilization is lower 
among the poor (Lu et al., 2012; Shimeles, 2010).77 These findings 
about the limited equity of CBHI are supported by the compar-
ative case study: end users complained about misclassification 
into Ubudehe categories, leading to unaffordable CBHI premi-
ums and co-payments on the one hand, and possibly a decline of 
trust in the insurance scheme on the other (cf. Schneider, 2005). 
Respondents (independent of “German districts” or comparison 
districts) consistently complained about the affordability of 
CBHI due to the payment modalities. The three core problems 
mentioned were (1) the number of installments (one before a 
reform in July 2011, two afterwards), (2) the need to enroll the 
entire family, and (3) the need to wait one month after payment 
until health services can be claimed. Because these payment 
modalities are deliberately imposed by MoH policies to avoid 
high-risk CBHI pools through adverse selection (Binagwaho et 
al., 2012), a solution to balance the needs of both sides may be 
hard to establish. Further evidence on this problem stems from 
focus-group discussions with heads of health centers. They 
consistently reported that the financial autonomy of health 
facilities is restricted by the low capacity of those in Ubudehe 
category 3 to pay the 10 % co-payments and additional costs (e.g., 
food) at district hospitals and the delays of reimbursements from 
the central level78 (comparative case study; INT EXP 3, 16; INT 
HRD DW 3, 8).
The Rwandan-German program is fully aligned to the Rwandan 
goal for global health insurance coverage (i.e., 100 %), which 
has not yet been met (91 % at end of 2011). The evaluation team 
considers this as mere formal under-achievement, given the 
tremendous success of the overall CBHI developments since 
the national scale-up in 2005. In May 2012, the indicators were 
reset to 90 % (cf. Annex E) and HSSP, for the period 2012 until 
2018, does not target universal coverage either (cf. GoR & MoH, 
2012). Regarding health equity, the available evidence points to 
the conclusion that financial access barriers have been reduced: 
financial access has, since the policy reform of 2010, improved for 
the poorest (Ubudehe categories 1 and 2 are now fully subsi-
dized). But those in category 3 sometimes face hardship to cover 
out-of-pocket payments at the district hospitals (especially the 
10 % co-payment). This indicates that access barriers have been 
pushed to higher Ubudehe categories and care levels. 
Social funds
Several interviewees inferred that the limited equity of the 
CBHI approach until 2010 ex post, highlights the relevance and 
effectiveness of the social funds (cf. INT EXP 3; INT InD DW 
31). A key finding from the comparative case study is that the 
social funds have provided a visible value addition to supporting 
economically vulnerable people to access health services that has 
not been found in other districts. This complementarity to the 
(then) existing CBHI design (cf. Doc.43) especially underscores 
the significance of social funds to reach the component’s goal.
PBF
While it is documented that GDC actively participated in 
technical working groups (INT EXP 20; INT SWAP 8, 16, 19, 22), 
GDC cannot be counted among the lead donors regarding PBF. 
PBF guidelines for district hospitals and CHWs feature the role 
of certain DPs, with the exception of Germany (MoH, 2008, 
2009b). The biggest contributors are GoR, followed by BTC, 
World Bank, and US-financed NGOs (WHO, 2009b, pp. 114 – 115). 
The self-reported German purpose of PBF was to place stronger 
emphasis on assessing service quality with the PBF indicator 
77  The studies by Saksena et al. (2010) and Sekabaraga, Soucat, Diop, and Martin (2011) conclude the opposite, but they can be considered as methodologically weaker (cf. Binagwaho et al., 2012). 
78  The introduction of roaming in 2010 further aggravated this problem. Invoices from health centers for roaming patients are processed at the central level and, hence, further delay reimbursements due to 
higher administrative efforts. 
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system (INT EXP 20). Several interviews have suggested that 
CBHI received more emphasis than PBF from GDC in terms of HF 
(INT HF 1, 2, 3, 4). Regarding decentralized support to PBF, GDC 
contributed to the training of PBF evaluators and data managers, 
participated in peer reviews of hospitals (Doc.40; GIZ & KfW, 
2012), and disbursed approximately EUR 500,000 as performance 
incentives to Ruhengeri hospital between 2007 and 2011 (DEval 
estimation, based on data provided by GIZ). Ruhengeri hospital 
has made far-reaching administrative changes (Doc.9). While the 
PBF evaluation system was not well understood and accepted 
by hospital staff at the time of its introduction in 2008 (Doc.38), 
the comparative case study sheds light on the most recent 
perceptions. Focus group discussants at hospitals and district 
resource persons (including those of Ruhengeri) acknowledged 
the alignment of PBF to the district performance contract system 
(imihigo). The respondents questioned whether the indicator sys-
tem, in fact, validly measures what it is supposed to measure. The 
targets set by PBF indicators often were perceived as being too 
rigid and, at times, unattainable (cf. also INT HRD HM 15). Health 
staff, nevertheless, self-reported higher motivation for their work 
due to the PBF system (cf. also INT HRD HM 6; INT RP 15). These 
self-assessments do not, however, allow for determining whether 
this effect is attributable to the setting of incentives or whether 
it can be attributed to a general increase in remuneration (cf. also 
INT RP 13, 14).79
Two core assumptions underlie the PBF evaluation system: 
(1) low motivation of health professionals is the main impedi-
ment to high-quality services – as opposed to other resource 
constraints – which (2) can be overcome by incentives. The 
risks postulated in the literature are that financial incentives 
(by definition extrinsically motivating) may crowd out intrinsic 
motivation and lead to “gaming” (i.e., manipulating the system to 
achieve a desired outcome, for example, by skimping on quality) 
(cf., e.g. Gorter et al., 2013; Grittner, 2013; Oxman & Fretheim, 
2009). Evidence on the first assumption is mixed (INT HRD DW 
7; INT EXP 2, 18; INT InD 31; Paul, 2009) and, hence, inconclusive. 
Regarding the second assumption, the negative effects of PBF in 
Ruhengeri, such as crowding out and gaming, have been consist-
ently reported and researched (INT InD 31; INT EXP 5; Kalk, 2011; 
Kalk, Paul, et al., 2010; Paul, 2009) and they pose a threat to the 
improvement of the structural quality of health services – usually 
under-researched (cf. INT HF 24 and Ireland, Paul, & Dujardin, 
2011). While these experiences in Ruhengeri also have led GDC 
to more strongly focus its support on the HF component of CBHI 
(INT EXP 5, 16. 20), it is unclear if these effects prevail today. The 
nationwide PBF rollout has been conducted in a standardized 
manner, thus lending plausibility to the assumption that other 
district hospitals have faced similar problems.
Undoubtedly, it can be concluded from interviews, reports, 
and studies that PBF has induced positive changes: quality and 
quantity of services have increased (INT G10, 16, 22, 24, 25, 27; 
INT HF 3; Sherry, Bauhoff, & Mohanan, 2013); health staff self-re-
ported increased productivity and less absenteeism; and internal 
communication and supervision have improved (Kalk, Paul, et al., 
2010; comparative case study; Paul, 2009). According to the PBF 
indicator score, the overall performance of Ruhengeri hospital 
rose from 78 % in 2008 to 84 % in 2010 (data provided by GIZ). 
In addition to the improvement of the structural quality of 
health services, it is assumed that PBF has increased capacities 
to manage for results and autonomy at the provider level. Focus 
group discussions suggested that end users reported that they 
were treated with more respect at health facilities since the 
introduction of PBF (improved client satisfaction can be seen as 
indicator for service responsiveness; cf. Kruk & Freedman, 2008), 
and health professionals reported that due to improved supervi-
sion, management can tailor the facilities’ services more closely 
to client needs (comparative case study). The same key inter-
viewees voiced two major risks: (1) PBF may exacerbate inequities 
between health providers because the inflexible indicator system 
will favor well-capacitated over resource-poor facilities in the 
long run.80 (2) a majority of respondents considered their work 
79  Several reviews concluded that PBF (and results-based approaches in the health context, in general) are still not well researched (Fretheim, Witter, Lindahl, & Olsen, 2012; Gorter, Ir, & Meessen, 2013; 
Grittner, 2013; Oxman & Fretheim, 2009), making it impossible to scrutinize this link in ToC, based on evidence for other contexts. 
80  According to MoH, weak performance areas in one year determine the goals set for the next year and, hence, allow for some flexibility by taking into consideration the differences in available resources 
between hospitals. As this information became available during a discussion of the draft version of this report, it was unfortunately impossible to corroborate these strategic deliberations and their results 
empirically in this evaluation. 
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environment suffered from problems not tackled by PBF, such 
as high turnover rates and lack of equipment. The raised use of 
health services (through CBHI and PBF), especially, has markedly 
increased workload and the strain on hospital capacities, and as a 
result, other resource constraints may become the bottleneck to 
high-quality health services.
Assessing the effectiveness of the HF component against the 
formal component goal (“PBF introduced in at least 50 % of the 
District Hospitals”; replaced in 2010 by “develop adjusted PBF 
criteria for the newly designed structure of province hospitals”81) 
does not make sense. Both indicators were taken from the 
national Rwandan strategy and exclusively assess a status 
rather than the component’s performance (for a comprehensive 
overview of the program indicators, cf. Annex E).
Summing up, while 50 % of the district hospitals have, nation-
wide, implemented PBF and the national insurance coverage rate 
is beyond 90 %, the component’s goal indicators may allow to 
formally conclude that the program has been a success, but they 
are too coarse-grained to exhaustively represent the narrative 
on the component’s goals. The extent to which these goals were 
reached requires more elaboration. The upward tendency in 
CBHI coverage rates illustrates a highly positive development 
towards a responsive health system. The assessment of health 
equity, the second aspect of the component goal, shows that 
financial access barriers have been reduced for the poorest, 
but that catastrophic costs related to treatment and CBHI fees 
have been pushed to higher care and income levels. Before their 
phase-out in 2010, GDC social funds had helped to bolster these 
costs in the program area and, hence, had been an effective tool 
to increase financial accessibility and the utilization of services. 
The evidence confirms that PBF does increase service orientation 
and the outputs of health professionals, but it also suggests that 
negative motivational side-effects and resource constraints are 
real and may constrain overall effectiveness. 
Efficiency
Between 2008 and 2012, GDC provided a total financial input 
of EUR 2.24 million for HF, allocating EUR 0.74 million to MoH 
at the central level and EUR 1.50 million to partner districts 
(Doc.24). This was supplemented by staff inputs in the form of 
one international technical assistant and three national technical 
advisors covering the five program districts.82
Performance-based financing
Efficiency considerations are at the heart of PBF because this 
approach has been developed to overcome weaknesses in the 
input-output relationship of input-based financing approaches 
(cf. Paul, 2009). Systematic reviews by Gorter et al. (2013) and 
Oxman and Fretheim (2009) conclude, however, that efficiency is 
among the least researched aspects of PBF. The methodological 
challenge for assessing efficiency in the PBF framework is to put 
into relation all costs, including those for administration and 
verification of service provision (i.e. enforcing the contract; cf. 
Gorter et al., 2013), as well as the hidden costs due to gaming 
and the general changes in the management and performance 
environment.
The mid-term review of HSSP I (GoR, 2008b, p. 22) concluded 
that PBF imposed substantial costs in terms of financing (ap-
proximately USD 1 per person per annum, according to an MoH 
projection, even rising to USD 3), as well as the time needed 
for supervision, evaluation, and accounting. The data collection 
process for the audit and verification of health provider state-
ments, especially, appeared to be too centralized and, hence, 
inefficient (WHO, 2009b, p. 127). An estimate provided by Kalk 
(2011) of approximately 50 % for PBF’s overhead costs of PBF in 
areas with difficult geographic access seemed too high when it 
was compared to the latest figure available to the evaluation 
team – which dated back to 2007 – indicating a justifiable 
amount of 20 %. With regard to the district level, the delay for 
reimbursements to providers often totaled arrears of up to three 
months in 2007 (GoR, 2008b, p. 21). A resource person roughly 
estimated the time needed to fulfill all PBF indicators per staff 
81  The first indicator has been achieved; the second has not. The reason provided by GIZ is that delays in the development of a legal framework for provincial hospitals has made reviewing the indicators 
impossible (Doc.28). See also the annex on the program’s indicators, Annex E. 
82  In addition, there has been one CIM-integrated expert at the MoH SWAp Coordination Unit. This advisor, however, was not primarily related to HF. 
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member – based on an average work week – to be around three 
to four hours per staff member per diem in 2008, suggesting the 
need to raise the staff level by approximately 50 % to compensate 
for the increased workload (Doc.9). This non-generable example 
calculation illustrates some of the hidden costs of PBF. Costs for 
logistics and peer evaluators from other hospitals, MoH, or DPs 
are additional.
Even if the available evidence on the efficiency of the Rwandan 
PBF approach in district hospitals is scarce, the arguments 
presented raise the question whether such a resource-intense 
procedure as PBF is (yet) sufficiently efficient to overcome the 
problem of low human resources it was designed to address in 
the first place. Alternative approaches to increase the motivation 
of staff, such as generally increasing health professional salaries 
without tying them to performance should be scrutinized.
CBHI 
BMZ policy on social security (BMZ, 2009c) considers efficiency 
as one performance criterion for social security systems, such as 
CBHI (cf. also Robyn et al., 2013). One sub-dimension is targeting 
efficiency; that is, the extent to which those people who are 
contributing and, hence, foreseen to profit, actually profit from 
services. The high CBHI enrolment rates indicate a high target-
ing efficiency – especially given the fact that a review article 
found the average coverage rate of other insurance schemes in 
low-income countries to be around 10 % (Ekman, 2004, p. 253). 
One consistent finding of the comparative case study, however, 
lends support to the notion that misclassification of Ubudehe 
categories (which determine CBHI premiums and co-payments) 
is seen as a frequent problem by CBHI members and staff, 
indicating further untapped potential to increase the targeting 
efficiency of the Rwandan CBHI.
The second sub-dimension of efficiency for social security 
systems refers to transfer efficiency. If administration and transac-
tion costs are high, only a small percentage of the means pooled 
for risk protection actually reach designated recipients (low 
transfer efficiency).83 A review of HF in 2008 showed that the HF 
system is highly inefficient, due to its fragmented nature, and it 
cites the introduction of social health insurance in the Republic 
of Korea as an example that overall administrative costs can be 
reduced to less than 10 % (WHO, 2009b). Given the introduction 
of new policies and subsequent changes, the expenditures 
for CBHI running costs in Fiscal Year 2011 / 12 of 15.27 % (MoH, 
2012b) indicate that Rwanda is on its way to increase the transfer 
efficiency of CBHI. Interviews with resource persons at the 
district level, however, indicated that timely reimbursements 
are a challenge – especially for district hospitals. This results in 
the need to pre-finance running costs by hospital management, 
which may – according to one interview – amount to between 
RWF 1.5 and 2 million.
Summing up, systemic challenges for efficiency relate to the 
fragmentation of the Rwandan HF system and the – at times 
– long delay to reimburse district structures from the central 
level. Efficiency considerations for PBF can hardly be exhaustive 
due to a lack of specialized research quantifying costs for the 
resource-intense underlying processes (planning, verification, 
and accounting) and negative side-effects, such as gaming. The 
available figures point to sufficient efficiency when measured 
by the percentage for overhead costs (production efficiency). 
It is impossible to pursue discussions on allocation efficiency, 
as the viability of alternative approaches (general increase of 
salaries, non-monetary approaches) has not been ruled out. 
The high coverage rates of CBHI and the policy reform of 2010 
(both supported by German contributions) indicate that target 
efficiency is high and improvements regarding transfer efficiency 
are gaining ground.
Sustainability 
Regarding CBHI, the principle of risk pooling is a key to financial 
sustainability. The larger the group of insured, the better the risk 
pooling, and thus the lower the risk for the individual member 
(GTZ, 2005). From a policy perspective, the Rwandan system has 
various assets. The legal obligation to insure (GoR, 2008a) and 
83  Because the social funds constituted a mechanism outside the GoR-owned financing system, BMZ rationale does not apply to them. The social funds were judged as rather efficient, however, due to the 
results generated with small inputs (INT EXP 16). The funds necessary to subsidize treatment-related costs for about 1,300 people per annum were estimated at around EUR 40,000 (cf. Doc.27), indicating 
high production efficiency. 
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the high coverage of CBHI may promote risk pooling across all 
economic strata and, hence, limit adverse selection, leading to 
high risk pools. In addition, the new CBHI policy (MoH, 2010a) 
has laid the foundation to overcome regressive capitation 
towards more equity. 
From an empirical perspective, the financial sustainability of 
CBHI is still a challenge. The Rwandan insurance system is 
fragmented. About 91 % of the Rwandan population benefits from 
a health insurance; CBHI encompasses 85 %, while the balance 
falls to insurances for public servants and army members. While 
there are now mechanisms to cross-subsidize the national 
CBHI risk pool from these resources and external funds (MoH, 
2010b), the functionality of these mechanisms is not sufficient: 
the national pooling risk still amounted to a deficit of RWF 247 
million and a gap of RWF 306 million at the district level in Fiscal 
Year 2011 / 2012. The sector level, however, covered all expenses 
(provider bills, running costs, and the transfer of 45 % of collected 
premiums at the district level) (MoH, 2012b). Further problems, 
identified in the situational analysis from HSSP III (IHP+, 2012), 
are the lack of staff and management capacities at the Health 
Financing Unit at MoH and at the decentralized level, as well as 
the need for a system to horizontally balance inequities between 
poor and rich districts or sections. One might add that the newly 
introduced roaming could aggravate this problem. 
While households financed 70 % of CBHI in 2006 (donors: 13 %, 
government: 9 %, private firms: 8 %; GoR & MoH, 2008), the 
current share funded by premiums and co-payments totaled 
60 % of the CBHI funds for Fiscal Year 2011 / 2012 (government: 
21 %, GFATM: 11 %; other: 8 %) (MoH, 2012b). These unresolved 
issues and the continuing substantial share of investments by 
DPs and GoR (the GoR share also includes DP support as budget 
support) illustrate the need for continued, predictable external 
assistance to the Rwandan social security system (cf. IHP+, 2012) 
and demonstrate the current low financial sustainability of the 
CBHI system.
Regarding the equity funds set up by GDC in the program to sup-
port the poorest – omitted by the CBHI approach – sustainability 
has been low. Equity funds have not been introduced as self-sus-
taining structures, but were created with the primary purpose 
of mitigating equity problems. GDC, in any event, discussed an 
incremental hand-over strategy in 2010, at the district level with 
JADF, to implement income-generating activities for poor strata 
and assist districts to budget social funds into their strategic 
plans (Doc.27; cf. also B.3.7). The comparative case study, howev-
er, has shown that the Common Development Fund84 has partly 
taken over the operation of the equity funds, but that it does not 
have sufficient means to fill all previous gaps. 
A recent systematic review of PBF in the health sector has 
found that sustainability is – next to efficiency – one of the least 
researched aspects of results-based financing (Gorter et al., 2013; 
Oxman & Fretheim, 2009, came to a similar conclusion). This 
hampers the assessment of the financial sustainability of PBF, 
based on previous experiences.
The cessation of German support for the PBF scheme in Ruhen-
geri hospital in mid-2011 resulted in financial losses for hospital 
staff (INT EXP 20). Given the fact that PBF payments represent-
ed, on average, up to 45 % or more of their monthly salary (WHO, 
2009b, pp. 119 – 120) (and this external assistance was intended to 
fill the motivational gap for high-quality services), the sustain-
ability of the results achieved through PBF in Ruhengeri should 
be cautiously considered. Regarding the phase out of German 
support, hospital staff and the management have reported prob-
lems in keeping PBF operational and, in general, it has reduced 
the means to organize activities, such as equipment maintenance 
and staff recruiting – they did not, however, self-report to be 
suffering from reduced motivation or performance (comparative 
case study; INT RP 30).
Paradoxically, the largest risk for sustaining the effects of PBF 
might stem from the incredible success of another health sector 
reform. Due to the increased coverage and utilization of CBHI, 
health professionals are burdened with even higher workloads 
(comparative case study, cf. also Paul, 2009). The complex and re-
source-intense evaluation and verification process, furthermore, 
still needs external resources – 40 % of the PBF budget in Fiscal 
84  The Common Development Fund (CDF) is government owned (through MINALOC) and aims to support development at the decentralized level (MINALOC, 2008). 
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Year 2011 / 2012 (MoH, 2012a, p. 58). PBF related to HIV / AIDS and 
tuberculosis is, especially, highly funded from external resources 
(cf. IHP+, 2012). PBF may stabilize human resources and maxi-
mize efficiency, but it can neither fill the staffing gaps nor can it 
offer a solution to the inequality among facilities. 
In conclusion, the gathered evidence suggests that sustainability 
should be considered as the “weak spot” among the DAC criteria 
due to the high dependency of the Rwandan health sector on 
external funds, and it should be deemed yet to be low. Recent 
policy and legal reform (partly with GDC contributions), however, 
paired with a large share of household-generated funds, promise 
a positive trend towards the sustainability of CBHI in the long 
run. GDC social funds have proved rather unsustainable. Not 
designed to last as self-sustaining structures, their operation 
has been taken up by Rwandan structures, but it has left gaps. 
Given that German support to PBF at the district level has led to 
setbacks in maintenance and recruitment, the German contribu-
tion to PBF has been rather unsustainable.
3.3.3 Component 2: Sexual and reproductive health
Sexual and reproductive health in the Rwandan health system
High population density, strong population growth, and the 
incidence of HIV and STIs determine the Rwandan strategy of 
SRH and family planning. On the one hand, population growth 
can be considered as one of the main challenges in the course of 
economic, social, and environmental development with regard to 
the availability of arable land, natural resources, and food secu-
rity, since more than 80 % of the population rely on subsistence 
farming as their main source of income (Sommers & Uvin, 2011). 
On the other hand, family planning has been a sensitive topic 
in Rwanda after millions of Rwandans lost family members and 
friends in the course of the civil war and genocide (Muhoza et 
al., 2013; Schindler & Brück, 2011; Solo, 2008). Accordingly, family 
planning had not been a priority in the Rwandan health strategy 
before it became more relevant from 2000 to 2005, when an 
increase of the overall fertility rate from 5.8 to 6.1 was found in 
the DHSs (NISR & ORC Macro, 2006). At the same time, empha-
sis on HIV control strategies had risen, since prevalence rates 
had increased with the incidence of civil war and had remained 
at high levels until 2005, when HIV prevalence stabilized at 3 % of 
the overall population.
Today, the promotion and improvement of SRH has become a 
core strategic issue within the Rwandan health architecture. 
Reproductive health, family planning, and maternal and child 
health are related to the majority of essential targets in EDPRS, 
Vision 2020, and MDGs. Maternal health focuses on decreasing 
maternal morbidity and mortality. Family planning is another top 
priority in Rwanda in order to reach the ambitious target set for 
fertility reduction. Moreover, the SRH strategy includes areas, 
such as STIs, HIV / AIDS, and tuberculosis prevention and control. 
In this regard, SRH refers to some of the main challenges in the 
Rwandan health system and is highly relevant to improve social 
and economic development. 
The objectives and strategies of SRH in Rwanda were outlined 
by GoR in HSSP I, II, and III (GoR, 2005b; GoR & MoH, 2009, 
2012). Within the SWAp architecture, joint efforts in SRH aim 
to reduce the rate of morbidity, infant mortality, and maternal 
mortality by improving access to quality care of reproductive 
health and promoting equality and equity among women and 
men (GoR, 2005a). With regard to HIV and STIs, it aims to reduce 
transmission rates and mitigate the personal effects of HIV. Six 
priority areas for reproductive health were formulated in HSSP 
I, including (1) safe motherhood and infant health, (2) family 
planning, (3) prevention of and care for HIV and STIs, (4) adoles-
cent reproductive health, (5) prevention of and care as a result 
of sexual violence, (6) social change for the empowerment of 
women (GoR, 2005b). The multi-sectoral approach, proposed in 
HSSP I, included the integration of the six priority areas, efficient 
monitoring and evaluation systems, gender equality and human 
rights, and a reinforcement of the entire health system for an 
improved delivery of treatment for people living with HIV. HSSP 
II put further emphasis on SRH, including family planning and 
material and child health as top priorities (GoR & MoH, 2009). 
These priorities are also highlighted in the Rwandan EDPRS, 
which claims to target population growth, infant mortality, and 
family planning through the improvement of the quality of health 
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care and education outreach, particularly for girls (GoR & MoH, 
2007; MINECOFIN, 2011a). 
The component of sexual and reproductive health in the 
Rwandan-German health program
Theory of change
The SRH priority areas outlined in HSSP I and presented above 
became the main intervention strands of the Rwandan-German 
cooperation under the umbrella of the SRH component (Annex 
D). The overall component objective was to contribute to the 
improvement of all aspects of SRH and family planning (impact) 
(Doc.45). SRH interventions thereby focused explicitly on the 
impact indicators of the overall program, including the total 
fertility rate, HIV / AIDS prevalence rate, and infant mortality rate 
(cf. Annex E). 
At the national level, GDC focused on the support of national 
guidelines and strategies, especially with regard to fertility, 
HIV / AIDS, and mother and child health (inputs), in order to 
contribute to the overall component objective. The interventions 
aimed to support the implementation process (outputs) towards 
the improvement of coordination and organization of curative 
and preventive SRH services (outcome) (cf. Annex D). 
At the decentralized level, GDC focused on the technical and 
financial support of district health facilities and community 
health systems strengthening with regard to fertility, HIV / AIDS, 
and mother and child health, as well as tuberculosis, malaria, 
and tropical diseases (inputs). Moreover, strategies on the 
prevention of and the response to gender-based violence were 
supported. Another prominent intervention strand in terms 
of SRH was support to the national program of contraceptive 
social marketing through the private sector. In the later phase of 
cooperation, special emphasis was placed on adolescent SRH. All 
SRH interventions at the district level focused on the provision of 
services in public health facilities and throughout communities 
(output) in order to increase service utilization (outcome) (Annex 
D). Since 2004, the main component indicators at the outcome 
level were the overall contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR), 
user rates of male condoms, especially among youth, as well as 
knowledge of target groups on SRH and HIV / AIDS (Annex E). 
Implementation
Between 2004 and 2012, GDC contributed to SRH at the national 
and decentralized levels. At the national level, technical support 
to strategies and national plans was provided through TWGs with 
regard to family planning, adolescent SRH, and gender-based 
violence. In all three working groups, GDC sometimes held 
the position of co-chairs. Moreover, GDC contributed actively 
to the Country Coordinating Mechanism. In addition to the 
interventions in the program’s ToC, joint proposals to GFATM for 
different grants for HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria were support-
ed. Between 2004 and 2012, 19 proposals were developed, mainly 
through support of the BACKUP Initiative, a project funded by 
BMZ (Doc.21). The German contribution to the GFATM and the 
BACKUP Initiative, however, is beyond the scope of this evalua-
tion and is, therefore, not part of the following analysis. 
At the decentralized level, GDC continued its long-lasting sup-
port to various levels of the Rwandan health district, including 
activities at referral hospitals, district hospitals, health centers, 
and communities. The main approach concentrated on the 
training of health personnel, with emphasis on service delivery 
through DED / GIZ development workers and an integrated 
expert from CIM, who worked on relevant SRH topics, such as 
neonatal services and mother and child health. In the areas of 
adolescent SRH and gender based violence, GDC provided sup-
port to the multi-sectoral efforts through DED / GIZ development 
workers in Musanze, Huye, Nyaruguru, and Gisagara. In 2011, the 
advisors were replaced by national technical assistants, support-
ed by German short-term consultants until the phase-out. The 
technical assistants worked with youth centers, peer educators, 
and the private sector. 
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Box 13. Community health workers (CHWs) 
The concept of CHWs is to render basic health services to the community. CHWs 
are indigenous members of the community where they work. In most countries, 
CHWs are selected by the communities with clearly defined roles and responsi-
bilities. CHWs are supported by the health system, but are not necessarily part of 
its organization, and have a shorter period of training than professional workers 
(Lehmann & Sanders, 2007). In Rwanda, CHWs are meant to close the gap between 
the demand of the communities for health services and the limited capacities 
of the Rwandan HRH (Mugeni et al., 2011). Today, Rwanda has more than 45,000 
village-based CHWs who also provide SRH and family planning services (MoH, 
2012c).
With support from GDC, family planning services were extended 
to the health center and community level. Permanent staff was 
employed by health centers and activities were coordinated 
with the Rwandan strategy relating to CHWs (cf. Box 13). GDC 
supported CHWs in order to establish linkages and complemen-
tarities between GDC funding areas, such as adolescent sexual 
reproductive health and gender-based violence, and Rwandan 
strategies at the community level. Some CHWs also provide 
family planning services, including the provision of contracep-
tives (IHP+, 2011). 
Box 14. Peer educators
Peer educators are part of the community-based health system. The concept of 
peer education is to establish community-based distribution networks of basic 
health care and youth-friendly services in SRH. In Rwanda, young educators are 
selected by local health centers and trained in SRH and communication methods. 
Teams of always one female and one male educator are formed and supervised by 
the health centers in order to bring information about SRH services to peers in the 
community. Peer education therefore, uses participatory methods, such as sport 
events and theaters. 
GDC also supported the national concept of peer educators (cf. 
Box 14), a strategy that raised considerable attention with regard 
to service provision at the community level (Doc.43). In total, 
more than 1600 peer educators were trained in the GDC target 
districts (GIZ & KfW, 2012). For this, the GIZ training manual on 
adolescent SRH was used as a national reference document. In 
this regard, peer educators complemented the strategy for social 
marketing, which involves the provision of services, such as the 
distribution of contraceptives through the private sector at local 
shops, kiosks, and health centers. 
Box 15. Social marketing
Social marketing in health is the application of marketing strategies to promote 
public health and behavior change. The approach uses commercial marketing 
techniques to promote public goods, such as reproductive health and related 
behavior (e.g., prevention of pregnancies or STIs). With regard to pharmaceuticals, 
social marketing over-brands generic products in order to match cultural values 
and aesthetic standards of the local target population. Subsidizing products, such 
as contraceptives, is used to meet the ability to pay among low-income popula-
tions, thus bridging the gap between free-of-charge drugs in public sectors and 
commercial pharmaceutical prices. Social marketing uses commercial and NGO 
distribution channels as an alternative source to public sector service provision. 
Depending on the product, this can be circuitous for pharmaceuticals (hormonal 
products) or trade channels for fast-moving consumer goods (condoms). Besides 
promoting its branded products through diverse media, social marketing also ap-
plies state-of-the-art communication methods to influence consumers’ knowledge, 
attitudes, and behavior through “generic communication”. 
One of the most prominent strategies in the component of 
SRH was support of private sector social marketing (cf. Box 15) 
through the international NGO, Population Services Internation-
al (Rwanda). In Phases II and III (1996 – 2012), social marketing 
was supported through the financial cooperation of KfW with 
an overall investment of EUR 14.4 million, of which 43 % (EUR 
6.25 million) was spent in the SWAp period. Since the late 1990s, 
there has been a shift from social marketing, with emphasis 
on HIV prevention, to a wider approach at the nexus of PHC 
and HIV / AIDS. Financial support was provided to subsidize 
contraceptive methods, create and market contraceptive brands, 
establish and expand the private sector distribution network, 
conduct promotional activities, carry out consumer studies, train 
health personal, and cover overhead costs. The GDC approach to 
social marketing aimed to improve the access to contraceptives 
through modern marketing methods, in order to change the 
attitudes and behavior of the Rwandan population.
As SRH covers some core aspects of the Rwandan health system, 
including vertical programs, such as HIV control, various other 
actors are contributing to this component, including relevant 
support to national plans (Joint United Nations Program on 
HIV / AIDS (UNAIDS), USAID), social marketing (GFATM), and 
adolescent SRH (United Nations Fund for Population Activities 
(UNFPA), Family Health International) between 2004 and 2012 
(INT SRH 26, 27, 28, 30, 32, G INT SRH 4, 23). 
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Relevance 
High population density, together with high fertility rates and a 
still critical level of infant and maternal mortality, underpinned a 
high overall relevance of interventions regarding SRH and family 
planning at the time of program development. The component 
of SRH, thus, was set up as a comprehensive strategy aligned to 
Rwandan and German sector strategies on general health- and 
human-rights-based principles (BMZ, 2009a, 2013; GoR, 2005a; 
GoR & MINECOFIN, 2000). 
Together with DPs, GDC contributed to the national strategy 
on family planning, including guidelines on how to integrate it 
into general health care services and how to create linkages of 
partnerships among public and private health care providers (G 
INT SRH 3, G INT SRH 1, INT SRH 26, G INT SRH 31). Finally, a 
National Policy on Family Planning (2006 – 10) was developed 
and implemented. In the course of this process, family planning 
become a key priority in the Rwandan health strategy and has 
maintained its relevance, as highlighted in the latest Family 
Planning Strategic Plan 2012 – 16 (MoH, 2012c). During the imple-
mentation process, GDC contributed visibly to the integration of 
family planning at the community level through youth centers, 
peer educators, schools, and universities (Westhoff, 2013). While 
it had still been a neglected topic in the national Poverty Reduc-
tion Strategy, it became a prominent element in its follow-up 
strategy (EDPRS), raising awareness between family planning and 
the incidence of poverty, as well as linkages between it and the 
HIV / AIDS response. 
At the same time, HIV control became an important strategy, in 
accordance with Rwandan and German health priorities (BMZ, 
2009a, 2012c; Doc.45; GoR, 2005a). At the national level, GDC 
contribution focused on the support of TWGs, through which 
three National Strategic Plans on HIV / AIDS have been devel-
oped between 2001 and 2012 (G INT SRH 3, G INT SRH 1, INT 
SRH 26, G INT SRH 31). The contribution to the national plans 
was also supported by other relevant strategies, such as the AIDS 
Poverty Impact Reviews, which had been conducted throughout 
all sectors in 2007 and had led to intensive consultation and 
the full integration of HIV / AIDS strategies to EDPRS and Vision 
2020. The priority setting in the course of EDPRS also led to the 
integration of the former SRH vertical programs, family planning, 
and HIV prevention, which constituted the main pillars of the 
SRH component within the joint health program. Between these 
pillars, there has been a general priority shift from GDC strate-
gies from HIV prevention towards SRH and, in particular, family 
planning due to promising epidemiological data, new forms of 
treatment (e.g., ART), and the availability of funds from relevant 
vertical HIV / AIDS programs. 
With regard to the high percentage of young people in Rwanda 
and the importance of this population segment for socioeco-
nomic and demographic development, adolescents have become 
an important target group in terms of SRH. At the policy level, 
GDC contributed to Rwanda’s first National Policy and a National 
Strategic Plan for Adolescent Sexual and Reproductive Health 
and Rights (2011 – 2015). GDC, therefore, supported MoH in 
co-chairing the 2010-established TWG on adolescent SRH, which 
involved the challenging task of coordinating various ministries, 
including those of health, youth, family promotion, and gender. 
The policy and plan were agreed by all TWG partners (G INT SRH 
1, 7, 10, 14, 18, 21, 23, 26), with GDC providing technical support 
and awareness-raising. In addition, GDC helped produce a 
national adolescent SRH training manual for health care provid-
ers, as well as supported national technical assistants and PSI at 
the decentralized level. The adolescent SRH strategy is of high 
relevance from a health and human rights perspective, since it in-
cludes a number of gender-sensitive and age-specific targets. The 
contribution is also significant as conflicting positions (e.g., the 
Catholic Church and traditional leaders) were taken into account. 
National media campaigns highlighted the strong commitment 
of GoR to adolescent SRH strategies (Westhoff, 2013). 
Another area challenging the health status of the Rwandan 
population, socioeconomic development, and human-rights’ 
norms is gender-based violence, which increased dramatically 
in the course of the post-conflict phase and is still a threatening 
issue today (IHP+, 2011). As a consequence, it became a promi-
nent topic in a multi-sectoral working group, supported by GDC. 
Gender-based violence is a cross-cutting issue also concerning 
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other ministries, such as the Ministries of Education, Youth and 
Sports, Family and Gender, Interior, and Justice. Even though 
gender-based violence has not been investigated in detail within 
the consolidation phase of this evaluation, it can be stated that 
a multi-sectoral policy on gender-based violence was released in 
2011 to which GDC contributed through awareness-raising and 
information at the decentralized and central levels. The 2011 Mid-
Term Review, however, has revealed that gender-based violence 
is still not a priority intervention at the decentralized level (IHP+, 
2011).
To achieve the objectives formulated in SRH, the policy frame-
work of HSSPs I and II highlights the role of access to quality 
health products, such as modern contraceptives. While the 
utilization of services has remarkably increased over the last 
decade, studies still point to an unmet demand by people who 
have limited access to quality health care services (Solo, 2008). 
In the GDC’s initial programs on HIV prevention and social 
marketing, the target groups were the sexually active. Special 
emphasis was placed on most-at-risk groups, such as truckers, 
the armed forces, and commercial sex workers. During the course 
of “PHC and HIV / AIDS Control I and II”, the focus had also been 
on the rural population and women at a reproductive age before 
focusing more on adolescents. 
In order to increase the coverage of service provision and to 
reduce disparities with regard to access to health services, GDC 
supported the public and private sector strategies. The current 
Strategic Plan on Family Planning (2012 – 16) underpins the 
relevance of this strategy, highlighting the objective to further 
improve family planning service delivery systems within the 
public and private sectors (MoH, 2012c). MoH, therefore, intends 
to increase private sector involvement, in order to increase the 
use of and the access to family planning services as a sustainable 
funding alternative to the significantly increasing costs of 
contraceptives. While it was envisaged that 60 % of all contracep-
tives be provided by the private sector by 2015, the rate for 2012 
it is estimated to be below 5 %, pointing to enormous challenges 
for private sector development in the next years (MoH, 2012c). 
The latest Strategic Plan on Family Planning approves a 
comprehensive private sector strategy for social marketing and 
an analysis of contraceptive coverage for the mutelles and private 
health insurance. 
To conclude, GDC support to SRH has reflected the priorities 
of and was fully aligned with the objectives set by the Rwandan 
and German Governments in terms of general health and human 
rights-based principles. The strong alignment of GDC support 
to national priorities and the consideration of the prevalent 
country characteristics led to a high acceptance of the priorities 
and interventions of GDC by partner organizations and target 
groups. Its multi-level approach and focus on both the public and 
private sectors were appropriate to reach the respective target 
groups and achieve established objectives. However, technical 
and financial support to the private sector fell short with regard 
to the provision of contraception and information services in a 
sector environment where MoH still needed to play a crucial role. 
Further strengthening of the private sector would have met the 
priorities of the GoR and helped to reduce the costs to the public 
sector.
Effectiveness
The overall effectiveness of GDC contribution to SRH relies on 
joint efforts on national and decentralized levels. At the national 
level, GDC support to TWGs contributed to the development 
and implementation of key policies and plans supporting the 
effectiveness of activities relating to health districts (G INT 
SRH 3, G INT SRH 1, INT SRH 26, G INT SRH 31). Topics such as 
adolescent SRH and gender-based violence were included in the 
agenda, with a raising of awareness at the decentralized level (S 
EH 21). 
At the decentralized level, GDC contributed to health service 
delivery by significantly improving (1) antenatal care, (2) 
clinic-based deliveries and post-natal care, (3) HIV testing 
and counseling (including voluntary counseling and testing), 
(4) coverage of antiretroviral treatment, and (5) treatment of 
tuberculosis (Abbott & Rwirahira, 2012; GoR & MoH, 2011a; IHP+, 
2011; NISR, MoH, & ICF International, 2012). Other health areas 
which were supported and had improved during this period were 
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(6) linkages between tuberculosis and HIV prevention programs 
and (7) malaria prevalence control (IHP+, 2011; NISR, MoH, & ICF 
Macro, 2009). A substantial extension of health services delivery, 
in general, was repeatedly mentioned by the respondents of 
the comparative case study across all investigated care levels. 
Applying a comparative perspective among districts detected 
no significant differences between the “German districts” and 
comparison districts. Moreover, remaining shortcomings could 
be detected in the intensity and coverage of the service provi-
sion. Although 98 % of women now use antenatal care services, 
only one third attends four counseling sessions, as recommended 
by WHO (NISR et al., 2012). User rates for postnatal care are 
promising, but the difference between rural and urban areas 
remains striking (NISR et al., 2012). HIV testing, a component 
indicator between 2004 – 07, has significantly increased through 
GDC support towards voluntary counseling, testing, and the use 
of Personal Interest Tests (GoR & MoH, 2011a). 
Since 2004, GDC followed an integrated approach in terms of 
tuberculosis and HIV control, which became relevant during 
the course of its engagement in the Country Coordinating 
Mechanism. It was GDC initiative which led to the concept of 
the first tuberculosis control project to be successfully submitted 
to GFATM, with a budget of USD 11 million. GDC’s involvement 
in linking the HIV and tuberculosis programs contributed to a 
high rate of 97 % of suspected tuberculosis cases being tested for 
HIV; 84 % of HIV-positive persons, eligible for treatment, were 
covered by antiretroviral treatment in 2010 (IHP+, 2011). With 
regard to family planning, geographic access to basic services 
has improved in the last five years (comparative case study), 
permanent staff responsible for family planning are employed at 
the district health facilities, and the number of qualified nurses 
has increased (GoR & MoH, 2006a, 2011a, 2011c). 
The GDC approach to social marketing focused on cooperation 
with the private sector to extend coverage of distribution net-
works through commercial wholesaler and retail points through-
out Rwanda. One indicator, relevant to assess the effectiveness 
of social marketing, was the market share of products distributed 
by the private and public sectors. Market share, therefore, is 
used as a proxy to the coverage of social marketing through the 
private sector. In 2010, the public and private actors had an equal 
market share of 50 % in the provision of male condoms (NISR 
et al., 2012). At the same time, however, the majority of women 
(90 %) obtained modern contraceptives from public institutions 
(Westhoff, 2013). The latter is partially explained by the fact that 
Rwandan women prefer injections for family planning, which 
still can be obtained through public health centers. This implies 
a substantial role of the private sector with regard to male 
condoms, but a very limited overall role, as commented by MoH 
(MoH, 2012c). The current Family Planning Strategic Plan now 
sets a priority on continuing to increase the market share of the 
private sector, in order to develop a sustainable family planning 
program that can focus on the overall population, especially in 
rural communities and including the most at-risk groups that are 
often not reached (MoH, 2012c). Truck drivers and prostitutes 
are less likely to be reached through CHWs, peer educators, and 
public health facilities and, therefore, rely more heavily on retail-
ers. The strengthening of private sector social marketing is also 
relevant, as the costs for contraceptives are expected to increase, 
calling for more sustainable commercial marketing channels. 
Service utilization, nevertheless, consistently has increased 
due to the efforts of GDC. Joint efforts of MoH and DPs led to 
an increase in (1) the modern contraceptive prevalence rate, (2) 
condom usage, (3) knowledge on family planning and HIV / AIDS, 
especially among youth, and (4) changed attitudes, (e.g., 
decreased number of wanted children) (Doc.28; GoR & MoH, 
2010b, 2011a; NISR et al., 2012). 
In order to investigate the success of a family planning program 
and its effectiveness on fertility, the level of the current use of 
contraceptive methods is a key indicator. Between 2005 and 
2010, the component indicator of the modern contraceptive 
prevalence rate85 among married women (15 – 49 years) increased 
significantly from 10 % (NISR & ORC Macro, 2006) to 45 % (NISR 
et al., 2012). In addition, 6 % of women in this age category used 
traditional contraceptive methods, an overall contraceptive 
85  In line with DHS definition, modern contraception includes female sterilization, male sterilization, pill, IUD, injections, implants, male condom, female condom, diaphragm foam or jelly, lactational 
amenorrhea method, and emergency contraception (NISR et al., 2012). 
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prevalence rate of 52 % (NISR et al., 2012). In this age cohort, 
injections were the preferred contraceptive method (26 %), 
followed by the pill (7 %), and implants (6 %). The use of male 
condoms by men attributed to only 1.8 %. This very low share 
can be explained by the limited importance of condoms for the 
prevention of STIs among married couples and is hardly compa-
rable to the group of unmarried couples. In 2010, the component 
indicator of the condom usage rate among youth (15 – 24 years) 
at last sexual intercourse was met and reached 42 % for females 
and 66 % for males, a significant increase compared to 25 % for fe-
males and 39 % for males in 2005 (NISR et al., 2012; NISR & ORC 
Macro, 2006). In this time period, the uptake of male condoms 
for this target group was largely driven by social marketing 
campaigns and innovative distribution channels, such as condom 
dispensing machines in the health districts (INT EXP 6).
Coverage of service utilization, however, is still not universal and 
there is further unmet demand for the various modern contra-
ceptives, including male condoms (Abbott & Rwirahira, 2012). In 
addition, the latest DHS round recorded high regional differences 
in terms of access and usage of modern contraceptives (NISR et 
al., 2012). One significant barrier is the access to health facilities 
in Rwanda’s hilly terrain where population is dispersed. Limited 
access to contraceptives and information was also detected for 
the GDC target group of adolescents (Binagwaho, 2009). This 
still holds in 2013, as confirmed by the results of the comparative 
case study. For the overall population, the incidence of poverty 
is the main access constraint, as shown by Sommers (2012), 
which poses considerable challenges to low-income groups, such 
as truck drivers and prostitutes (both high-risk target groups 
for GDC with regard to HIV prevention). The use of condoms 
increases with education and in urban areas (NISR et al., 2012). 
This was confirmed by a secondary 2010 DHS data analysis, 
which detected a positive and significant correlation between 
education and the adoption of modern contraceptives, implying a 
mixed scenario with regard to health equity. The unmet demand 
for family planning among married women, nevertheless, has 
declined significantly from 38 % to 19 % between 2005 and 2010 
(NISR et al., 2012).
Besides service utilization, the GDC approach to social marketing 
has placed strong emphasis on information campaigns. These 
provide information on family planning and on the prevention 
of STIs and HIV. While knowledge of modern contraception with 
regard to family planning is nearly universal in Rwanda today, 
knowledge of HIV / AIDS varies more strongly according to back-
ground characteristics. The 2010 DHS revealed that only 56 % of 
women and 52 % of men age 15 – 49 had comprehensive knowl-
edge86 on HIV / AIDS (NISR et al., 2012). This share has varied 
little since the 2005 DHS survey, which found comparable rates 
(NISR & ORC Macro, 2006). In spite of the impressive success 
of the national social marketing program in extending access 
to contraceptives, the effectiveness of information campaigns 
on STIs and HIV / AIDS has been found rather limited, especially 
in relation to rural communities in remote areas (comparative 
case study). Youth, especially, are inadequately aware of public 
information campaigns, but have knowledge from their peers on 
where to get contraceptives in their communities. This finding 
has been confirmed by a secondary data analysis of the 2010 
DHS, which demonstrated the limited effectiveness of media 
with regard to knowledge, and stronger relevance of peer groups. 
Limited effects of radio, television, and newspaper campaigns 
were also found by Muhoza et al. (2013). The current policy on 
family planning, therefore, proposes a fundamental shift in the 
distribution philosophy to make better use of existing networks 
of CHWs and peer educators and intensify the provision of 
contraceptives and information at the community level (MoH, 
2012c).
Finally, a secondary data analysis of the 2010 DHS found social 
marketing to have an equitable effect on middle and upper 
wealth categories, as no significant differences in the use of 
modern contraceptives exist among the top four wealth quintiles. 
The lowest quintile, however, had significantly lower adoption 
rates, implying that access to services for the poor was limited 
due availability or price. These findings support the health 
care utilization challenges, identified by Abbott and Rwirahira 
(2012) and the National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda (2012), 
including (1) rural-urban disparities with regard to access, usage, 
86  People are considered to have comprehensive knowledge about HIV / AIDS when “they know that both condom use and limiting sex partners to one uninfected person are HIV and AIDS prevention methods, 
they are aware that a healthy-looking person can have HIV, and they reject the two most common local misconceptions, HIV transmission by mosquito bite and by sharing food” (NISR et al., 2012, p. 181). 
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and knowledge, (2) socioeconomic differences, especially by 
wealth and education, and (3) a relatively high unmet need for 
family planning, especially for the unmarried. 
To conclude, the main objectives and targets for SRH have been 
achieved. GDC, therefore, has contributed effectively to health 
service delivery through both technical and financial assistance. 
Relevant programs have been supported and linkages between 
different actors (public and private) and intervention areas 
(e.g., HIV prevention and tuberculosis) were established. At the 
national level, TWGs have been functional and have provided 
policies and plans appropriate to achieve the objectives set at 
national and decentralized levels. GDC has contributed effective-
ly through agenda setting and technical inputs (e.g., adolescent 
SRH). The financial and technical contribution of GDC to social 
marketing has been effective in order to reach the established 
targets and objectives. Not all topics addressed by the TWG, 
however, have reached decentralized levels to an adequate 
extent (e.g., gender-based violence prevention). While most 
outcome indicators have been reached, geographic and socioec-
onomic differences remain with regard to access to quality health 
services. Moreover, the role of the private sector with regard to 
the provision of contraceptives is very limited, which weakens 
the potential for the joint effectiveness of the public and private 
sectors. 
Efficiency
Within the consolidation phase of this evaluation, no rigorous 
efficiency analysis could be conducted for the interventions 
in the SRH component, given the thematic priorities set by 
the stakeholders involved and the data at hand. The following 
paragraphs, therefore, only provide some general findings which 
could be used as a starting point for further investigation.
The SRH strategy was fully integrated into national frameworks, 
preventing parallel structures and excessive costs to the extent 
possible. GDC efforts of harmonization and alignment were 
recognized by the national authorities and other DPs. In the 
context of SWAp, government systems were used and supported, 
which is likely to have reduced overall transaction costs. 
In combined efforts with all DPs, most of the program’s perfor-
mance indicators were achieved on time; achievements often 
exceeded established targets. The GDC multi-level approach 
of working at the ministry and all care levels contributed to 
well-adapted interventions and feedback loops between national 
and decentralized levels. 
At the community level, GDC contribution focused on coor-
dination, training, and strategic support to the capacities of 
and interaction between health centers, secondary health 
posts, CHWs and peer educators. The underlying strategy was 
to provide effective health care services at limited cost to a 
low-income population and under the limited capacities of public 
district health facilities. The comparative case study found that 
this approach contributed significantly to service provision at 
the community level. Between 2008 and 2010, 11 development 
workers were involved, who later handed over their activities to 
national technical assistants. Besides support to the public sec-
tor, avenues within the private sector were taken, providing EUR 
3.25 million from KfW for contraceptives and medical equipment 
between 2008 and 2012. 
Sustainability
At the national level, important policies and plans were approved 
and are now being implemented. Continued policy dialogue 
is guaranteed through TWGs embedded in SWAp. Technical 
assistance has contributed to the operation of TWGs and has 
largely been taken over by partner institutions (INT SRH 17, 19, 
12). Moreover, HSSP III recognizes SRH as a key component in 
future Rwandan health strategies, underlining strong political 
support by the Ministry (GoR & MoH, 2012). This political and 
strategic scenario is, therefore, significantly important to enable 
the continuation of the development of SRH in the Rwandan 
health system. Future effectiveness will depend on the ownership 
of MoH and DPs to continue the dynamics created through 
the long-term contributions of GDC in this area. While overall 
ownership of MoH can be considered as high, the processes will 
require the continuous momentum of all partners through TWGs. 
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At the decentralized level, the total number of qualified staff 
working in family planning, gender-based violence, and ado-
lescent SRH was continuously increased in all health facilities 
(cf. comparative case study). This enabled health facilities 
to continuously extend service provision and access to care. 
Rural-urban differences remain, nevertheless, including technical 
performance of staff and modern equipment, and not all neces-
sary health care services are provided equally across the country 
(IHP+, 2011). 
DED / GIZ development workers have supported the health 
district facilities with a number of long-term staff in relevant 
SRH areas, such as neonatal hospital services and maternal and 
child health. Even though development workers have contributed 
to the education of health professionals through the provision 
of training at the respective care levels, daily routine and 
workload drove some development workers into a gap-bridging 
role and prevented the development of health professionals to 
some extent. In addition, overall staff fluctuation implicated 
the sustainability of capacity development. Limited technical 
performance of health professionals also was found in the HSSP 
II Mid-Term Review (IHP+, 2011). In order to continue the training 
of health professionals in future, GDC managed to transfer the 
activities previously implemented by development workers to 
Rwandan national technical assistants. The national assistants 
continued to provide support with regard to adolescent SRH, 
gender-based violence, and HIV / AIDS, working together with 
youth centers, peer educators, and the private sector in social 
marketing. However, at the end of the data collection stage of 
the evaluation, it remained unclear whether or not the national 
technical assistants had been absorbed into the Rwandan health 
sector and whether or not they remained in their positions, 
which is doubtful given the high staff turnover rates in the 
Rwandan health system. 
The GDC strategy for social marketing was carried out through 
the private sector over the entire period. In early 2012, the 
international NGO, Population Services International, transferred 
some responsibilities and activities relating to social marketing 
to the national NGO, Society for Family Health. Even though the 
transfer of responsibilities to the Society for Family Health was 
not directly supported by GDC, due to the timing at the end of 
Rwandan-German cooperation in health, it can be perceived as a 
relevant milestone towards the sustainability of family planning 
and social marketing in Rwanda (INT EXP 10). Previously, the 
involvement of national stakeholders had been low (Solo, 2008); 
thus, the Society for Family Health will complement and continue 
the approach established by PSI. Although both organizations 
receive additional funding from GFATM and the President’s 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, short-term financial gaps may 
occur as a result of the cessation of financial support to social 
marketing by KfW – a challenge to the future strategies of the 
young national NGO Society for Family Health. Potential gaps 
have been recognized by MoH, which has committed to engage 
more strongly in social marketing, subsequent to GDC support 
(Doc.28). Concrete financial commitment from MoH, however, 
could not be confirmed at the time of the data collection (INT 
EXP 15); it can, nevertheless, be seen as an enhancing factor for 
social marketing in Rwanda (INT EXP 10). No clear Division of 
Labor between the public and private sectors has been proposed, 
however, which would have been instrumental to the sustainable 
development of the private sector and commercial social market-
ing strategies in Rwanda, outlined in the latest Family Planning 
Strategic Plan (MoH, 2012c).
To conclude, there is high potential for the sustainable achieve-
ments of SRH due to the recognition that it is a key priority 
in the future health sector strategy of Rwanda. The technical 
performance of health professionals, however, is still limited and 
there are considerable geographic and socioeconomic differences 
with regard to access and the use of health services, which pose 
considerable challenge to this sustainability. 
3.3.4 Component 3: Human resources development
Human resources development in the Rwandan health system
Human resources are a core element of all health systems and 
are essential to guarantee the availability and quality of health 
services. WHO recommends that for African countries to meet 
the health-related MDGs, the population should be covered by 
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a minimum of 0.2 medical doctors and 2.3 nurses and midwives 
per 1,000 people (AHWO, 2009). The 2006 World Health Report 
identifies 57 countries facing a critical health workforce shortage, 
among them Rwanda, because of weak strategies and regulatory 
frameworks, poor quality of pre- and in-service training, low 
salaries of health staff, together with difficult living conditions 
and internal and external migration (AHWO, 2009; WHO, 2006). 
In 2005, Rwanda had not yet recovered from the enormous loss 
of qualified health professionals, who had either been killed 
during the genocide or had fled the country. Building on HSSP I 
(2005 – 2009) and the first HRH Strategic Plan (2006 – 2010), 
HSSP II (2009 – 2012) set more emphasis on improving the 
quality of trained professionals and their distribution throughout 
the country (GoR & MoH, 2009). GoR embarked on promoting 
and supporting pre-service education; strengthening the 
capacity of training institutions; scaling up the number of CHWs; 
regulating and decentralizing wages through personnel transfers 
to the districts and health facilities; and developing incentives 
for improved work outputs through the PBF-system. In addition, 
between 2005 and 2012, in-service training of health profession-
als was considerably expanded and developed by several training 
institutions in the country, including the Faculty of Medicine at 
the National University of Rwanda, Kigali Health Institute, and 
the School of Public Health.87
The Faculty of Medicine at the National University of Rwanda88 
was established in 1963 and reopened in 1997 after the genocide, 
with the mandate to provide medical education programs for all 
medical and allied professions in Rwanda. The number of enrolled 
students has increased from 239 in 1997 to 545 in 2004 and has, 
more or less since, kept the same level. Graduates of the six-year 
degree program must undertake one year of internship before 
registering as general practitioners.
The Faculty of Medicine of the National University of Rwanda 
and its supervision fall under the responsibility of the Ministry 
of Education. The primary role of MoH was to define the human 
resources needs (Bail & Kantengwa, 2006). In reality, the respec-
tive roles and responsibilities of both Ministries in this area have 
not been always clear. The internship program was originally 
initiated by MoH in 2003. While the program first included four 
hospitals,89 it was later extended to other hospitals. The imple-
mentation of the internship program faced several difficulties, as 
stated by interviewed interns, former partners, and development 
workers (INT RP 12, 23; INT HRD DW 5). It was obviously quite a 
contentious issue: “We (the MoH) wanted them (the interns) to be 
in the hospitals all the time; they wanted money” (INT 30).
Tensions eventuated between MoH and the Ministry of Edu-
cation (INT RP 12; INT RP 23). Management of the internship 
program was soon transferred to the Ministry of Education 
until 2010. In 2010, the internship program was restructured by 
ministerial decree and it again fell under MoH. Since the restruc-
ture, medical students study for six years and, after graduating, 
undertake a year of clinical internship. The interns work and 
are trained in 18 selected district hospitals that are considered 
appropriate by MoH. 
The School of Public Health was established in 2000 in Butare 
and then was transferred to Kigali in 2005. It provides training to 
national and regional health professionals in support of national 
and regional health plans and conducts applied research. A large 
number of health professionals working for MoH, mainly at the 
central and district levels, have benefited from these programs. 
The HSSP II Mid-Term Review in 2011 revealed that substantial 
efforts had been made by GoR to improve coverage for the 
health workforce. While the national targets set for the overall 
ratio of doctors and nurses to the population had been met and 
surpassed, a severe shortage of qualified midwives persisted. 
Despite impressive improvements, Rwanda still has fallen short 
of the standards recommended by WHO for African countries 
(i.e., a minimum of 1 medical doctor per 5,000 population and 2.3 
nurses and midwives per 1,000 population (AHWO, 2009).
87  Regarding the development of medical education in Rwanda, cf. (AHWO (2009); Bail and Kantengwa (2006); GoR and MoH (2011c)). 
88  For the National University of Rwanda, Faculty of Medicine, please refer to: www.sph.nur.ac.rw. 
89  University Hospital Centers of Kigali and Butare, Kanombe Military Hospital, King Faysal Hospital, and Ruhengeri Hospital. 
71 Rwandan-German cooperation in the Health Sector  |  B.
Table 9. Evolution of health workforce density between 2005 and 2011
2005 2008 2011
Doctor / population ratio 1 / 50,000 1 / 33,000 1 / 17,240
Nurse / population ratio 1 / 3,900 1 / 1,700 1 / 1,294
Midwife / population ratio Not available 1 / 100,000 1 / 66,749
Source: IHP+ (2011).
In response to these challenges, a new HRH Strategic Plan 
(2011 – 2016) was developed in 2011 that set a strong focus on 
increasing the quantity of skilled nurses, midwives, and specialist 
physicians and on improving the quality of pre-service and 
post-graduate training (GoR & MoH, 2011c). This plan is currently 
being implemented with substantial financial support from the 
US Government and the technical support of several US univer-
sities to the above-mentioned Rwandan training institutions (G 
INT GEN 4; INT HRD 21). 
In 2012, a ministerial order was issued to determine the 
modalities for the posting of medical staff in the health sector. 
According to this decree, medical doctors are now assigned by 
MoH to district hospitals. District hospitals can now recruit 
medical doctors and pay them from the hospital or DP budget, 
but they are required to submit a request for non-objection to 
the Minister (Art. 2 and Art. 4 of the ministerial order; Official 
Gazette 25 of 18.06.2012). 
The component of human resources development in the 
Rwandan-German health program
Theory of change
In 2007, the first joint program proposal of German implement-
ing organizations was submitted to BMZ. The objective of the 
HRD development component was defined as “Increasingly 
well trained health professionals are available for the Rwandan 
population”. While HRD is composed of three sub-components: 
(1) medical education, (2) hospital management, and (3) health 
technology management, four indicators were formulated and 
adapted between 2007 and 2012.90 Three of these indicators were 
related to the sub-component, Medical Education. 
The intension, outlined in the joint health program’s framework, 
was to enhance the capacities of MoH to enable it to manage 
(coordinate and organize) human resources and the competen-
cies of health service providers – through technical and financial 
assistance – to enable qualitative services to patients. As a result, 
increasingly well trained health professionals are now available 
(output). This adds to the improved quality management of 
health facilities, maintenance of equipment, and the provision of 
medical services (outputs) to the health system, focusing on the 
needs and priorities of the Rwandan population, in particular, the 
poor (outcome). The health status of the population, ultimately, 
has improved (impact).
Implementation
Between 2000 and 2012, 19 development workers provided as-
sistance to medical education in several specialities and training 
fields at the National University of Rwanda medical faculty, the 
University Teaching Hospital in Butare, and the district hospital 
of Ruhengeri. Their main scope of work was the practical training 
of interns and doctors, including clinical practice. Virtually all 
those development workers interviewed emphasized that it was 
not possible or that it proved very difficult to prioritize their main 
activities, given that practical training went hand in hand with 
clinical practice.
At the district level, hospital management had been an integral 
part of the PHC projects implemented by GTZ and DED since 
the beginning of the 1980s. Support to MoH began in 2004. In 
collaboration with BTC, GTZ / GIZ supported the development of 
a training manual on hospital management. At the decentralized 
level, GTZ / GIZ financed short-term courses and workshops on 
90  An overview of indicators and their adjustment in the course of program implementation is documented in Annex E. 
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management issues. GTZ / GIZ technical advisors also gave advice 
to district hospitals on how to develop strategic and operational 
plans, based on national guidelines. 
Between 2005 and 2012, InWEnt financed the 12-month training 
of 17 Rwandans in the international leadership program (ILT) on 
hospital management at the University of Neu-Ulm in Germany. 
This was in addition to backstopping and training the trainers 
on their return to Rwanda (Doc.55). Between 2003 and 2005, 
InWEnt supported the School of Public Health to develop a 
training manual for district health managers. Cooperation with 
the School of Public Health continued until 2008 and a prototype 
for a district health management course was developed (InWEnt 
project reports; INT HRD 20).
InWEnt also organized various regional training workshops and 
several electronic learning courses, in which more than 100 
Rwandan health professionals participated. These included a 
variety of topics, ranging from health management and HF to 
HIV and AIDS and human rights and health (Doc.55). 
Systematic activities in the sub-component of health technology 
management began in 2007 / 2008. Mainly through SANIPLAN, a 
German consulting firm sub-contracted by GTZ / GIZ, GDC pro-
vided technical assistance at the central and district levels. At the 
central level, a TWG on geographic access and health technology 
management was established in 2009. GDC contributed to the 
development of national policy, relating to engineering and main-
tenance, and to standards for health facilities infrastructure and 
equipment. In addition, GDC developed an in-service training 
program for district hospital technicians on maintenance repair, 
and provided repair tools and equipment to the maintenance 
units in the district hospitals (Doc.22). 
KfW supported the HRD component by financing the purchase 
of medical equipment for Butare’s University Teaching Hospital 
in Butare, Ruhengeri’s hospital, and 25 health centers in the five 
districts of Huye, Gisagara, Nyaruguru, Musanze and Gicumbi.91 
HRD was very active, with many DPs involved. Partnerships 
between international NGOs, international universities, and 
Rwandan medical training institutions were also forged (Viankan-
dondera, 2012). Most DPs were involved in medical education, 
some in hospital management, and very few in health technology 
management and maintenance.
Relevance
In view of the continuing severe shortage of health professionals 
at all levels and the need to invest in the development of a 
qualified health workforce and the operation of support systems, 
GDC interventions in the HRD component were highly relevant 
to the program objective. In the absence of a qualified workforce, 
health providers, and facilities, it would have been difficult to 
offer services and respond to the needs of poor population 
groups (INT EXP 1, 3). 
In accordance with its PRSP and EDPRS, GoR placed strong focus 
on all HSSPs on HRD in the health sector, in order to achieve the 
health-related MDGs, specifically by prioritizing the expansion 
of medical education and by strengthening of training institution 
capacities. These priorities evolved between 2006 and 2012 – 
from investment in general medical and nursing education to 
bridging specific gaps (medical specialists, midwives), but formal 
medical education continues to be a high priority (INT GEN 13; 
GoR & MoH, 2006a, 2011c). 
Hospital management should be viewed in the context of health 
systems strengthening and decentralization, which were also 
among the priorities of GoR as of 2005. In comparison, health 
technology management and maintenance had received far less 
attention until 2009, when the development of a maintenance 
framework for medical equipment was included in HSSP II (GoR 
& MoH, 2009). The draft HSSP III (2012 – 2018) gives significantly 
more importance to health technology management by defining 
health infrastructure development, including maintenance, as a 
core element of the health support system (GoR & MoH, 2012, 
p. 66). 
91  This intervention included medical, laboratory, educational, and other equipment for a total of EUR 400,000 (Doc.47). A limited amount of medical equipment was also provided by GTZ and DED. 
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Likewise, BMZ considers HRD (including the training of health 
professionals) and regulatory policy and legal frameworks to be a 
high priority, as stated in its health sector strategy (BMZ, 2009d). 
In this context, a limited posting of German health workers was 
considered helpful in preventing the continuing chronic shortfall 
of trained health workers in some regions (BMZ, 2009d, p. 18). 
In accordance with its human rights-based approach to health, 
BMZ also considers quality care, respect for confidentiality, and 
non-discriminatory treatment as important aspects of profes-
sional health training (BMZ, 2009a).
Formal medical education continues to be a high priority on the 
MoH agenda, but priorities between 2006 and 2012 have moved 
from focusing on training general practitioners to training spe-
cialists (INT GEN 13; GoR & MoH, 2006a, 2011c). This is evident in 
the last HRH Strategic Plan (2011 – 2016). 
The ILT program in hospital management has been in line with 
GoR priorities to strengthen health systems by improving 
management of health facilities. HSSP 1 (2005 – 09) aimed to 
“increase the number of those trained in management skills and 
public health” (GoR, 2005b). 
According to ILT alumni, ILT training was relevant to sector needs 
and their own training requirements. From the perspective of 
most alumni, hospitals in Rwanda – since 2000 – were managed 
in a “traditional” way by doctors with no background in hospital 
management. “The hospitals were – and still are – mainly managed 
by doctors who do not have any hospital management skills. They 
manage hospitals in a traditional way” (INT 31). Alumni referred 
to severe gaps in strategic and operational planning, human 
resources, services organization, patient flow, finance, and drugs 
management. The ILT was significantly appreciated by MoH 
partners (INT RP 33; INT GEN 13) and, from the perspectives of 
managers of InWEnt and GTZ, it was adequate (INT EXP 4; INT 
RP 34). The hospital management segment of the course was 
developed to fit the needs in the African health systems context 
(INT HRD HM 1). 
With regard to medical education, nearly all interviewed devel-
opment workers acknowledged the importance of individual 
knowledge transfer to develop the capacity of Rwandan medical 
students and doctors. They emphasized the importance of practi-
cal training for interns. Similarly, interviewed Rwandan partners, 
former interns, and doctors who were trained by development 
workers, acknowledged the importance of individual knowledge 
transfer.
Overall, Rwandan interviewees appreciated the experience, 
clinical knowledge, and the ability of development workers to 
adapt to a resource-challenged setting. Not all of their expec-
tations, however, have been met, since not all development 
workers fit the required profile. It has not been easy for DED 
to recruit candidates with significant background experience, 
communication skills, adaptability to a resource-challenged 
situation, and willingness to work for much lower remuneration 
than in Germany (INT HRD DW 2; INT EXP 5, 11).
GDC partners at the central and district levels appreciated the 
training development they received on maintenance and health 
technology management, and considered them to be highly 
relevant to their needs, especially since very few other stakehold-
ers were engaged in this area (INT HRD 5, 9, 11; G INT HRD 14). 
The equipment financed by KfW was also considered adequate 
and useful, although some concerns with regard to their mainte-
nance and the availability of spare parts were expressed (G INT 
HRD 14, Comparative Case Study). This had been, apparently, a 
wide-spread challenge experienced not only by GDC, but also by 
other DPs, since maintenance clauses had not been included in 
contracts between MoH and supply companies. MoH has since 
recognized the problem and intends to include these clauses in 
the future (INT HRD 5).
At the onset of the MDGs in 2000, maternal and child mortality 
rates – in comparison with other countries in East and Central 
Africa – were very high in Rwanda (cf. chapter B.3.1). The decision 
to support medical specializations, such as pediatrics and 
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gynecology, and build the capacities of Rwandan physicians to 
treat the most common diseases and health conditions was an 
appropriate response towards fulfilling the needs of the Rwandan 
people, especially women and children. 
In summary, medical education and hospital management have 
reflected the priorities of the Rwandan and German Govern-
ments. GDC partners at the central and district levels also have 
confirmed the relevance of these as HRD efforts to strengthen 
the health sector. There is conclusive evidence that the capacity 
development interventions with regard to medical education 
and hospital management have responded to the needs of the 
beneficiary groups (health professionals and hospital managers). 
Effectiveness
The following paragraphs provide information on the final status 
of the indicators (cf. also Annex E) relating to the achievement 
of the component objective (“Increasingly well-trained health 
professionals are available for the Rwandan population”) in the 
context of support to HRD (Doc.28; GoR & MoH, 2011a, 2011c).
“The number of interns increased from 80 in 2010 to 110 at the end 
of 2012” 92 (Doc.26). The number of students entering the faculty 
of medicine was 53 in 2005 and 107 in 2012, with a peak of 135 in 
2008. 
In 2010, 99 students graduated from the faculty of medicine 
after their internship year. In 2012, 79 students (63 males and 16 
females) completed their internship year. GDC contributed to 
the training of 438 interns between 2005 and 2012, and between 
2004 and 2010, 600 general physicians graduated from the 
National University of Rwanda faculty of medicine. This means 
that approximately more than two thirds of all graduates were 
trained by DED development workers.93
“98 % of the medical doctors who graduated from the internship 
program by the end of 2011 are deployed in public health facilities 
until December 2012 at the latest.” In 2011, there were 470 
Rwandan generalist practitioners, of which 80 % were working 
in district hospitals. No comprehensive information on the 
professional career of interns after graduation is yet available.94 
GDC has provided limited input to the policies of HRD through 
the TWG on human resources.
“The number of local medical specialists increased to 135 in 2012 and 
at least each Provincial hospital gets one specialist until the end of 
2012” (Doc.26). By the end of June 2012, there was 15,540 staff in 
public health facilities in Rwanda, including 132 specialist doctors, 
of which 80 % worked in the four referral hospitals.95 GDC has 
supported the training of 52 junior doctors between 2005 and 
2011.
“100 % of health personnel in the 5 supported Districts participate 
in continuing job education at least once a year” 96 (Doc.26). In the 
districts supported by GDC, 100 % of the health workforce has 
received in-service training in family planning, material and child 
health, gender-based violence, CBHI, or PBF. GDC has contrib-
uted to training through various development interventions 
(technical assistance, workshops, and local subsidies for training, 
conducted by districts).
Hospital management
In June 2013, 10 of the 17 ILT alumni were still working in the 
public health sector in Rwanda. Nine alumni had been promoted 
to better positions, but for 7 of them, it was only possible after 
completing further studies. This was due to the fact that the 
ILT certificate was not recognized in Rwanda as a postgraduate 
degree. The Neu-Ulm University of applied sciences took the 
initiative to provide an opportunity to nine ILT alumni from 
Rwanda to complete their studies97 at Mzumbe University in 
92  The indicator is not specific, as it is not clear whether it relates to enrolment or to graduation. 
93  GDC certainly contributed significantly to increase the availability of well-trained medical doctors in Rwanda. The period interns spent with DED / GIZ doctors, however, was short (three months) in 
comparison to the length of the medical studies (six years). In quantitative terms, therefore, DED support was – over the whole period – one contribution among many others. GDC contribution, however, 
was particular in the sense that no other DP systematically supported the internship program over a longer period. 
94  Interviews conducted with former interns in June 2013 provided the following scenario: of 12 interviewees, 10 were stationed after their internship to a district hospital. Most of them remained in this position 
for at least two years. Two of the interns did not continue with clinical practice, but began work in public health or research. 
95  Up-to-date information on the number of specialists working in provincial hospitals is not available. 
96  This indicator is not appropriate to assess the outcome of capacity development interventions supported by GDC, as it only covers the number of staff participating in training development interventions. 
97  They were given the opportunity to obtain the MBA in two months instead of two years, as their ILT credits were taken into consideration. 
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Tanzania. ILT alumni were able to transfer, in different ways, the 
acquired skills and knowledge, depending on their workplace.98 
All alumni interviewed stated that the knowledge and skills that 
they acquired did apply to various areas within hospital man-
agement,99 and that they were able to transfer this knowledge 
within their working environment through individual knowledge 
transfer projects that were built into the ILT course program. 
The knowledge transfer projects in the workplace improved many 
areas of hospital management, which improved the quality of 
care in several hospitals. Interviewees added, however, that there 
were barriers to the delivery of improved hospital management 
and healthcare: staff members, at times, were opposed to 
change and continued operating as usual; resistance continued 
as a result of personal vested interests within the old system 
(INT HRD HM 4, 10, 11, 13); there was little motivation to accept 
change, given the lack of understanding of its importance; and 
some projects could not be implemented due to the lack of 
equipment (INT HRD HM 5, 7, 13). The positive effects that were 
identified, therefore, were achieved at an individual level, while 
at an organizational level, it very much depended on the alumni’s 
working environment and the acceptance by their colleagues and 
superiors. 
In 2007, on the initiative of the Minister, MoH created a new 
in-house task force on hospital management, which included 
four ILT alumni. Its main role was to support administrative staff 
in Rwandan district hospitals to improve hospital management. 
With each member being assigned to one of the four regions in 
the country, they carried out capacity building activities (e.g., 
strategic planning and quality management) (INT HRD HM 3, 
2, 12; INT RP 33) and, with GIZ assistance, together produced a 
training manual on hospital management. This was then used for 
short-term hospital management courses in all districts. Despite 
the manual being in use as it was developed, it took longer than 
expected to produce a final version.100 Other ILT alumni, working 
in hospitals, stated that the members of the task force played an 
important role in the training of district health staff and that they 
appreciated their endeavors, although they acknowledged that 
many gaps remain (INT HRD HM 7, 8, 10, 13). GDC and DP manag-
ers also appreciated the efforts of the task force and sometimes 
collaborated with them. Reference was made by managers to 
the fact that the team’s work, at times, created serious conflict 
within the Decentralization and Clinical Services Departments 
and personal conflict between those in charge of them. Task 
force members sometimes were overloaded by ad hoc activities 
(INT EXP 5; INT RP 34; INT SWAP 6). As of June 2013, they are still 
part of the team. Responsibility for the task force within MoH 
eventually changed 101 and the team is currently accountable to 
hospital accreditation (INT HRD HM 2, 12, 33).
Medical education
Interviews conducted with former Rwandan interns give qualita-
tive evidence that the training provided by development workers 
has resulted in the transfer of knowledge and skills, which in turn, 
has contributed to improved quality of care within their most 
recent workplace. With the exception of two interviewees, all (10) 
expressed positive effects. The skills that were most reported 
were the ability to diagnose and treat patients accordingly. Apart 
from clinical expertise, interviewees repeatedly reported that the 
training had increased their motivation, sense of responsibility, 
and ability to take charge of patient care. Resident doctors also 
mentioned that they had learned how to apply new clinical and 
surgical practices. 
From the perspective of the Rwandan doctors and interns, 
trained by DED / GIZ development workers, various challenges 
limit their effectiveness as general physicians (INT RP 11; 14; 15; 
23; 25; 27; 30): (1) poor working conditions in the district hospitals 
offered to Rwandan doctors, (2) lack of qualified medical doctors 
in district hospitals, together with a high turnover rate, (3) low 
salaries of Rwandan doctors, leading to lack of motivation and 
98  Directly after the training, 15 of the 17 ILT alumni occupied various positions relating to hospital management in the public health sector: 11 worked in hospitals in various operational positions, such as 
administrator, procurement officer, internal auditor, or monitoring and evaluation officer. Four alumni worked as hospital managers in the MoH task force. 
99  Financial management, operational and strategic plans development, human resources management, quality management, material and drugs management, procurement, and data management. 
100  This was due to the fact that the top management in MoH wanted to include new priorities, such as patient-oriented quality management. The training manual was approved by the General Senior 
Management Meeting of MoH in May 2013. It still requires the signature of the Minster to become effective as an official training document. 
101  After two years (2007 – 09) under the responsibility of the Department of Clinical Services, the Decentralization Department assumed responsibility for the task force from 2009 to 2013. The task force is 
now, once more, under the responsibility of the Clinical Services Department. 
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professional commitment, and (4) poor equipment and lack of 
maintenance. 
Of seven development workers interviewed, six provided positive 
feedback on the overall effectiveness of their work, while one was 
negative. All mentioned that the training of medical students and 
interns was effective. Their perception of the key skills that they 
could transfer concurs with that of the Rwandan interviewees 
who were, however, more critical with regard to the skills transfer 
to resident doctors and Rwandan colleagues. 
The counterparts of the development workers often were not 
available, either because there was no one in the position or 
because they spent part of their working hours as practitioners 
in private clinics (INT HRD DW 3, 6, 8, 9). Development workers, 
thus, were sometimes placed into a gap-filling role. Interviews 
with GDC managers and yearly reports have confirmed this 
challenge (INT EXP 5, 11; INT HRD DW 8; INT RP 34; yearly reports 
of DED health coordinators). Interviewees often attributed this 
issue to weak staff management within hospitals and MoH, as 
well as the difficult working conditions experienced by Rwandan 
medical doctors (INT HRD DW 3, 6, 8, 9, 2). Some also referred 
to a lack of responsibility or sense of medical ethics among 
Rwandan health professionals (INT HRD DW 2, 7, 8; INT EXP 11):
“Development workers brought with them their medical ethos 
to Rwanda. Sometimes, they were frustrated, because Rwandan 
doctors did not show the same ethos and commitment. But one also 
has to consider the working conditions of Rwandan doctors. Even 
in Germany, doctors do not live from idealism.” (INT HRD DW 2); 
“Many Rwandan physicians still lack empathy, the self-understand-
ing that because one is a doctor, one has to take care of the patients. 
Responsibility and ethics hardly exist (INT HRD DW 8).”
Development workers reported that the flow of patients 
increased during their presence. Once patients became aware of 
the services (e.g., treatment of complicated gynecological condi-
tions, premature births, epilepsy) that were provided in hospitals, 
they travelled great distances to access them. Likewise, the 
number of surgical interventions at Butare’s University Teaching 
Hospital increased with the presence of German development 
workers (cf. interviews and reports of development workers). 
Interviews and program documents also provide evidence of the 
contribution made by development workers to the development 
and provision of new services (e.g., neonatology in Ruhengeri and 
neurological services in Butare), which is a positive unintended 
output. 
The implementation of the internship program was faced with 
several difficulties due to the conflicting expectations of medical 
students and MoH. The initiative, nevertheless, was put into 
practice and the training of interns took place from 2004 in not 
only Butare and Ruhengeri, where the development workers 
were located, but also in three hospitals in Kigali. Reviews of the 
medical instruction and feedback from interviews conducted 
during the evaluation mission, reveal that at the national level, 
management, supervision, and monitoring mechanisms for the 
internship program had remained weak over the period (Adamc-
zick, 2011; Bail & Kantengwa, 2006). 
Many development workers created teaching material or gave 
inputs to the curriculum. The inputs, however, were not system-
atically embedded in the national curriculum (Adamczick, 2011). 
During the last phase of the joint program, in particular, several 
of the workers provided inputs to national medical treatment 
guidelines or protocols; for example, on the treatment of fistula 
and neurological conditions (INT HRD 22, 18; reports of develop-
ment workers). 
It can be concluded that the objective of the HRD component 
in the joint Rwandan-German health program was achieved: 
“Increasingly well trained health professionals are available for the 
Rwandan population.” DED / GIZ support and the ILT program in 
hospital management helped to increase the number of Rwandan 
health professionals, strengthened their skills and knowledge, 
and improved the quality of care in Rwandan hospitals. 
Interviews with former interns and doctors, who were trained 
by development workers, have confirmed that the skills they 
acquired assisted them in diagnosing diseases and treating 
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patients. Apart from clinical knowledge and skills, the training 
increased their motivation, sense of responsibility, and ability to 
take charge of their patients. These skills were a very important 
asset for the graduate doctors. Despite some challenges, they 
could apply them in a district hospital setting, benefitting the 
Rwandan population, particularly women and children. The chal-
lenges related to poor working conditions in district hospitals 
to where Rwandan doctors were assigned, including the lack of 
qualified medical doctors, a high turnover rate, poor equipment, 
and weak maintenance. These factors persisted for some years 
throughout the country, impacting the motivation of Rwandan 
doctors to remain in district hospitals. The gap-filling role of 
DED / GIZ development workers, therefore, should be seen – in 
the first instance – as a system-imminent challenge and not as a 
direct unintended effect of GDC support. 
On their return to Rwanda, ILT alumni were able to improve 
various aspects of hospital management within their workplace. 
The evaluation indicates that many of their transfer activities 
contributed to the positive effects on the quality of care. In their 
efforts, however, alumni were faced with a number of challenges, 
including resistance by staff to innovation and a continuing lack 
of autonomy by hospitals with regard to human resources man-
agement. Scaling-up was achieved through the establishment of 
the task force and the country-wide training of hospital admin-
istrators. The continuing high turnover rate of administrative 
staff, nevertheless, limited the effectiveness of these short-term, 
in-service training activities. The creation of the training manual 
on hospital management, which involved the members of the 
task force, took a long time and its validation is pending.
Efficiency
Hospital management
The efficiency of the ILT course program on hospital manage-
ment was assessed following a comparative approach of the 
cost of the ILT program for each participant against the cost 
of similar training courses on hospital management. It was not 
possible, unfortunately, to gain access to the relevant data on 
the course offered by the School of Public Health. A comparison, 
nevertheless, was made against the cost for the two-year Master 
of Business Administration (MBA) course in healthcare manage-
ment, offered by Mzumbe University in Tanzania.102
Total ILT direct expenditures amounted to EUR 5.65 million with 
a large portion of the budget spent on the training in Germany. 
Costs during the second phase amounted to EUR 4.23 million 
and represented 75 % of total ILT direct costs. The direct outlays 
during the first phase for the selection of participants and the 
German course in Africa represented 16 % of total ILT direct ex-
penditure. The third phase, consisting of the transfer of projects 
in the respective countries of ILT participants, accounted for 9 % 
of total ILT direct expenditure. Together with administrative fees, 
the total amount for all ILTs (ILT 1–ILT 6) increased to EUR 9.74 
million. For 124 ILT participants during the second phase, the 
average total amount per participant was estimated at EUR 78.56 
thousand. 
Based on the average cost of African participants, the total 
expenditure for 17 participants from Rwanda amounted to EUR 
1.34 million. The average fee per participant for the two-year 
MBA course in healthcare management, offered by the Mzumbe 
University in Tanzania, is estimated at EUR 12,000 (INT HRD HM 
1) and, thus, is significantly lower than the cost of the program 
in Germany. The content of the MBA course was developed by 
applying the experience gained from the ILT program and offer-
ing a Master’s degree, which the ILT program did not. Assuming 
that an MBA in healthcare management could have been offered 
in Rwanda at similar cost, the opportunity costs would also have 
been reduced. Participants, however, would not have benefitted 
from the experience gained in German hospitals. 
With regard to the time invested in the training activity, the 
interviewed ILT alumni were quite critical. They felt that the time 
spent to learn German was too long and that the level acquired 
was insufficient to enable them to study or understand their 
colleagues during vocational training. Moreover, there would be 
no subsequent opportunity to use the language. If the ILT course 
had been conducted in English, the costs could substantially have 
102  This comparison is valid, despite the differences between the ILT and MBA courses: ILT intends to enable participants to design projects for knowledge transfer, which are not a part of the curriculum of the 
MBA course. The MBA course, nevertheless, provides a degree, which the ILT does not. 
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been reduced. Another independent evaluation came to a similar 
conclusion (Doc.46). 
Medical education
For this evaluation, the DEval team has refrained from conduct-
ing a cost-benefit analysis of DED support to the training of 
interns and junior doctors. Overall, development workers have 
calculated that the relationship between the effort invested in 
their work compared to the benefits has been appropriate (cf. 
survey results and interviews). Most development workers stated 
that their jobs were very demanding and at times exhausting, 
but that in retrospect, they feel that it had been worth it. Their 
assessment related to the work environment, the availability of 
counterparts, and their own expectations. With regard to those 
former interns who were interviewed, several explicitly expressed 
that the length of time the medical studies took to complete was 
not adequately reflected in the salaries they received following 
graduation (INT RP 13; 14; 23; 36).
Sustainability
GDC support has had a long-term positive effect on the mindset 
of medical students trained by development workers. There is 
sufficient evidence that – apart from clinical knowledge and 
skills – the training has increased motivation, a sense of respon-
sibility, and the ability to take charge of patients. In the absence 
of comprehensive quantitative information, the brain drain (i.e., 
migration of skilled health professionals to other countries) in 
Rwanda is not a challenge – 15 of the 17 alumni have remained in 
the country.
Although turnover of staff has been a challenge, the services 
that have been developed over the years, with DED support from 
development workers, are still in operation; this is particularly 
apparent in the Ruhengeri hospital. Maintenance of equipment 
has been, over the same period, a serious strain and it continues 
to threat the sustainability of services in all hospitals (compara-
tive case study).
The continuation of internship training has proved to be a 
long-lasting positive and systems-building effect of GDC support. 
Despite the reform of 2010, however, organizational challenges 
remain, particularly with regard to the capacity of district 
hospitals to provide adequate training conditions and intern 
supervision. The sustainability of the medical health care course 
also will depend on the capacity of those Rwandan institutions 
that are involved to address and resolve current management 
challenges. In addition, the potential of ILT alumni – be it at the 
task force or district level – to contribute their experiences to the 
training course is, largely, still untapped.
A potential boost towards sustainability would be the political 
will of GoR to continue investing in HRH and the use of external 
resources to achieve this objective. GoR now places a priority on 
the training of specialist physicians. Questions remain regarding 
the subsequent long-term engagement of these specialists in 
public and district hospitals. Interviews held with former interns 
and doctors, who were trained by development workers, indicate 
that the country’s internal skills drain (i.e., migration of physi-
cians to the private sector or to administration positions) may 
very well constitute a serious challenge. For many of those inter-
viewed, the ideal workplace in the future is neither in a district 
nor in a public hospital. Rwandan district hospitals, therefore, will 
most likely continue to be dependent on a revolving workforce of 
well-trained generalist practitioners if working conditions in the 
public health sector do not substantially improve. The continu-
ation of a practice-oriented internship program, therefore, will 
play an important role in the training of generalist practitioners. 
3.4
Impact
The overall program objective was the improvement of the health 
status of the Rwandan population. Three component objectives 
were set in order to contribute to this overall goal. The compo-
nent of health financing aimed to increase the access to services 
in a financially sustainable manner. The component of sexual 
and reproductive health focused on targets set for reproductive 
health and family planning. Human resources development 
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provided support to service provision and the qualification of 
health personnel. While the GDC contributions to the single 
component objectives have increased effectiveness at the output 
and outcome levels, the combined efforts of the three compo-
nents constitute the overall program impact (Annex D). 
In accordance with the proposed analytical framework, relevant 
impact indicators refer to the health status of the Rwandan 
population, including changes in terms of mortality and morbidi-
ty, health inequity, risk protection, and fertility (cf. chapter A.2.1). 
The central unit of investigation, therefore, remains at the popu-
lation level. To assess the achievement of program objectives, the 
analysis has focused on the changes relating to client-centered 
strategic objectives, as outlined in HSSP II, including (1) family 
planning, mother and child health, and reproductive health; (2) 
health promotion and prevention of disease; and (3) treatment 
and control of disease (GoR & MoH, 2009). In alignment with 
Rwandan priorities and in accordance with the GDC approach 
to health systems strengthening, three main program indicators 
have been drawn from EDPRS, in line with the above-mentioned 
strategic objectives of HSSP II, which include total fertility rate, 
infant mortality, and HIV prevalence. All components effectively 
have contributed to the improvement of these broader devel-
opment goals, in line with the single component objectives that 
were monitored by component-specific output and outcome indi-
cators, introduced in Chapters B.3.3.1 – 3.3.4 (cf. also Annex E). 
The complexity of the SWAp environment has posed substantial 
strain on the impact assessment. By applying a contribution 
analysis, plausibility links could be established on the basis of 
the program’s intervention logic. The analysis also considered 
confounding factors and alternative explanations to the extent 
possible. It, however, focused on the plausible links to relevant 
impacts and excluded the assessment of the strength of the 
effects in relation to other partners involved.
Family planning, mother and child health, and reproductive 
health 
The main GDC-supported family-oriented services include family 
planning, mother and child health, and reproductive health. 
Intervention has relied primarily on preventive and promotional 
activities, as well as the management of neonatal and childhood 
illnesses. The aim of this intervention strand is to empower the 
community through information, education, and other strategies 
and to provide access to basic health care services.
Within the SWAp period, Rwanda has made impressive pro-
gress with regard to family planning and SRH. Since 2005, the 
program indicator of the total fertility rate decreased from 6.1 
to 4.6 children per woman in 2010 (NISR et al., 2012; NISR & 
ORC Macro, 2006). The use of World Bank data has allowed 
for a regional comparison, which demonstrates that Rwanda 
has reduced its fertility rate at a much faster pace than other 
countries in the East African Community (Figure 10). This decline 
is undoubtedly related to the rapid increase in married women’s 
uptake of modern contraception, to which GDC has contributed, 
as outlined in Chapter B.3.3.3. Rural-urban disparities remain, 
however, with rural women having higher fertility rates than their 
urban counterparts. With regard to family planning, support to 
social marketing through the private sector has been the most 
important strategy at the community level. In addition, GDC has 
assisted the public sector to increase the technical capacities and 
human resources of health centers, CHWs, and peer educators 
and to expand the linkages to the activities of the private 
sector. Results from a secondary 2010 DHS data analysis also 
have highlighted the influence of some social determinants of 
health, including education, economic development, and modern 
lifestyle.
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In spite of the noteworthy success, regional, socioeconomic, and 
age-specific differences remain. First, the total fertility rate is 
higher in rural areas compared to the rates in more urban areas. 
Second, the total fertility rate remains higher for the less educated 
and low-income categories (NISR et al., 2012). Third, teenage 
fertility declined at a slower rate and young motherhood remains 
more common in rural areas. Investigating the nexus between fer-
tility and modern contraceptives has revealed that the urban poor 
and the rural population reflect the highest fertility, the lowest 
contraceptive prevalence rate, and the greatest unmet needs for 
family planning (NISR et al., 2012). While trends indicate an overall 
improvement of the total fertility rate, health inequity is still 
prevalent. Although the GDC focus on the rural population and 
adolescents could have been expected to reduce inequity, an exact 
calculation of the effect cannot be made with the data available. 
It does appear that some efforts in this area achieved less impact. 
The comparative case study found that while young people have 
access to modern contraceptives, the relevance of information 
campaigns on family planning continues to be rather limited, 
especially in rural areas. As information campaigns were a central 
element of the social marketing strategy, this result is somewhat 
surprising. The evaluation also found that youth and unmarried 
women are still under-served in terms of access to modern family 
planning, also noted in the German-supported districts.
GDC support to maternal and child health has contributed to 
a decrease in maternal mortality rates, with Rwanda making 
considerable progress in achieving the MDG target rate of 1,300 
per 100,000 live births in 1990 to 325 in 2015 (Abbott & Rwirahira, 
2012). By 2010, the maternal mortality rate was 487 (NISR et al., 
2012). Figure 11 highlights that Rwanda has reduced, within the 
last decades, its maternal mortality rate at an extremely fast pace 
in comparison to other countries in the region. The main reason 
for this has been due to the increasing number of women giving 
birth in health care facilities attended by qualified healthcare 
professionals. GDC has provided assistance to district health 
facilities and HRD, in particular, through technical and financial 
support. The improved quality and quantity of services has 
been confirmed by findings derived from the comparative case 
study in the four districts. For further improvements in maternal 
mortality, an increase in the number of facility-based deliveries 
will be required, women will need to be encouraged to attend 
antenatal care on a regular basis, and obstetric care will need to 
be extended.
Figure 10: Total fertility rate (births per woman)
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Figure 9: Disbursements by implementing agency (1980- 2012) (in millions of current USD)
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In addition, the under-five child mortality ratio has been reduced 
from 103 per 1,000 live births in 2008 to 76 per 1,000 live births 
in 2010 (NISR et al., 2012; NISR et al., 2009). Within the same 
period, the program indicator of the infant mortality ratio has 
decreased from 62 per 1,000 to 50 per 1,000 live births, much 
faster than the Sub-Saharan average (cf. Figure 12). In terms of 
child health, Binagwaho et al. (2012) found that CBHI coverage 
has led to long-term improvements (measured by stunting and 
mortality). They acknowledge, however, that their results cannot 
solely explain the drops between DHS 2005 and 2010. They 
furthermore conclude that more effort will be necessary to cut 
stunting prevalence down to the MDG target of 24.5 %. 
Figure 12: Infant mortality rate (per 1, 00 live births)
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Figure 11: Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births)
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Figure 12: Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)
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In the broader context of fertility and mother and child health, 
chronic malnutrition is a relevant factor. In Rwanda malnutrition 
has been reduced from 51 % in 2005 to 44 % of children under five 
in 2010 (GoR & MoH, 2011a). The nutritional status of the Rwan-
dan population is relevant beyond health and is critical for social 
and economic development, as outlined in Vision 2020. Stunting 
and malnutrition, nevertheless, are still endemic for a consid-
erable share of Rwandan women and their children (NISR et al., 
2012). Most strikingly, differences among socioeconomic strata 
are prevalent, given that stunted children are found to be least 
common among wealthier families (NISR et al., 2012). Strategies 
on mother and child health, therefore, should be improved and 
complemented by interventions towards the nutritional status of 
the population.
Health promotion and prevention of disease
With regard to health promotion and disease prevention, GDC 
has focused on population-oriented services. Service provision 
includes periodic outreach to communities and scheduled 
services at health facilities. 
Considerable efforts in health promotion and the prevention 
of disease have been made in relation to HIV prevention. The 
approach of GDC to health systems strengthening has been 
complemented by the activities of other important DPs (e.g., 
large vertical programs on HIV prevention, implemented by the 
US Government and multilateral agencies, funded by GFATM; 
and the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief). GFATM 
also includes financial contributions from Germany, as one of 
its largest donors. The two programs have delivered substantial 
funds, especially for interventions, such as voluntary counseling 
and testing and antiretroviral treatment. 
Since 2000, the Rwandan HIV prevalence has decreased from 
an estimated 4.7 % (World Bank, 2014) to the DHS estimates of 
3.0 % in 2005 and 2.8 % in 2010 (NISR et al., 2012). Due to limited 
data sources for Rwanda in the late 1990s, some studies have 
pointed to extremely high national HIV rates of more than 10 % 
in approximately 2000 (UNAIDS & WHO, 2000), which have later 
been recalculated and adjusted. Despite a limited comparability 
of the 2000 estimated average and the DHS-based rate for 
2005, a remarkable downturn of overall HIV prevalence in this 
period has been demonstrated by the data sources that were 
available. Today, Rwanda has one of the lowest HIV prevalence 
rates in Sub-Saharan Africa. A regional comparison shows a 
moderate HIV prevalence rate for Rwanda, as illustrated in Figure 
13. Women are, in general, more likely to be HIV positive, with 
3.7 % against 2.2 % for men in 2010 (NISR et al., 2012). Due to the 
response of the national strategy on HIV and the high coverage 
of antiretroviral treatment, in particular, Rwanda has managed 
to reduce the number of new HIV infections between 2001 and 
2012 by an estimated 55 % and AIDS deaths by a remarkable 75 % 
(UNAIDS, 2013). 
Although these factors have stabilized the incidence of HIV on 
the overall population, it has stopped declining and remains 
extremely high in groups that are most at risk (G INT SRH 6, 28, 
30). Voluntary counselling and testing have found that more 
than 50 % of commercial sex workers were HIV positive in 2010 
(Rwanda Biomedical Center, 2012). The GDC strategy has had 
limited effect on the high risk. Moreover, an unintended side 
effect of social marketing has been identified by the comparative 
case study in the four districts under study, which was that young 
adults felt that sex was safe with the use of condoms, leading 
to increased levels of prostitution among the young who are 
severely impacted by poverty. Should this trend be perceived as 
an increase in promiscuity and not as an incidence found in the 
randomly selected communities for discussion, it could pose an 
additional challenge to the information and education campaigns 
at the community level. 
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Treatment and control of disease
GDC efforts in the treatment and control of disease encompass 
all types of curative care that is needed by health care profes-
sionals. While some development workers have provided services 
directly to the population, the main approach focuses on HRD 
through training and education. Different interventions have 
been implemented in various healthcare facilities.
In order to assess the impact of treatment and control of disease, 
information is needed on the state of morbidity and mortality. 
In Rwanda, malaria remains a main threat to these; it is the 
main cause of death for children under five years of age and the 
second main cause for adults, followed by HIV / AIDS (GoR & 
MoH, 2009). Data from the National Malaria Control Program 
show that malaria incidence declined by 70 % between 2005 and 
2010 (NISR et al., 2012). From 2008 to 2010, malaria prevalence 
decreased from 2.6 % to 1.4 % for children under five and from 
1.4 % to 0.7 % for women aged 15 – 49 (NISR et al., 2012). In 2010, 
malaria was still one of the main causes of outpatient visits 
to district hospitals, health centers, and CHWs (MoH, 2012d). 
Within the last few years, GDC has contributed to providing ser-
vices through technical and financial support to health facilities, 
medical education, and hospital management. 
Besides malaria and HIV / AIDS, tuberculosis and tropical diseases 
are relevant threats to the health status of the Rwandan popula-
tion, which can best be addressed through integrated strategies. 
On this basis, GDC health systems strengthening has focused 
on integrating tuberculosis and HIV, as well as their co-man-
agement. Figure 14 demonstrates a significant decrease, since 
1995, in the incidence of tuberculosis in Rwanda. In 2011, 98 % of 
all registered tuberculosis patients were tested for HIV (MoH, 
2012d). The overall HIV prevalence of tuberculosis patients was 
at 28 %. These figures illustrate that the majority of interventions 
at the national and decentralized levels have been successful, 
as have Rwanda’s tuberculosis / HIV policy, HIV counseling and 
testing, prevention of mother-to-child transmission, delivery of 
care and treatment of tuberculosis, and universal antiretroviral 
treatment coverage. 
Figure 13: Prevalence of HIV (% of population ages 15- 49)
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Figure 14: Incidence of tuberculosis (per 100,000 population)
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One intervention which has brought considerable attention to 
improving the treatment and control of disease has been PBF. 
In 2011, RWF 12 billion was contributed to PBF activities (MoH, 
2012d). HIV-related initiatives, alone, accounted for 32 % of this 
total. An assessment of its effectiveness has provided evidence 
that the performance system has contributed to an increase in 
the quality and quantity of health care services. There is a risk, 
however, of undesirable side-effects that cannot be ignored 
(cf. chapter B.3.3.2). There is insufficient composite evidence to 
assess the link from the outcome level of PBF to its impact level. 
A study, based on the 2005 and the 2007 / 2008 DHS rounds by 
Sherry et al. (2013), supports the increase in service provision, 
but failed to detect the effects on health outcomes postulated to 
be associated with these services. While these findings place in 
doubt the outcome-impact link of the PBF ToC, it is impossible to 
rule out all confounding influences. In addition, the results reflect 
the situation two years previously, when PBF had not yet gained 
full momentum, and they were, thus, not considered as conclu-
sive evidence. Skiles, Curtis, Basinga, and Angeles (2013) analyzed 
the same data sets and found that PBF triggers increased service 
use across all wealth quintiles, refuting the notion that PBF 
increases inequity, but not confirming that the PBF design is 
pro-poor. In conclusion, PBF does neither undermine nor support 
the efforts for equitable access via CBHI. 
To conclude, Rwanda has experienced an impressive improve-
ment in the health status of the population within the last 
decade. Nearly all national health indicators have improved 
substantially, which provides a very positive scenario of the 
current performance of the health sector and brings Rwanda on 
track to achieve most health-related MDGs prior to 2015. Most 
of the relevant indicators have improved at a much faster pace 
than the sub-Saharan average and its neighboring countries. 
Together with its partners, GDC support to the health sector has 
contributed to this development to a considerable extent. While 
the GDC approach of health systems strengthening has been 
an essential element within the Rwandan health architecture, 
however, a significant part of this impressive progress has 
depended, to a large extent, on the financial efforts of some 
relevant vertical programs with regard to malaria, tuberculosis, 
and HIV / AIDS prevention. Moreover, the evaluation has found 
a mixed synopsis with regard to GDC contribution to reduce 
health disparities in the health status of the population. On 
the one hand, its multi-level approach has been highly effective 
with regard to improving overall coverage and access to health 
services through the support of flagship programs, such as CBHI 
and PBF. Complementary interventions, such as social funds, 
have accompanied these larger programs in the transition period 
towards more poverty-oriented strategies. On the other hand, its 
Figure 14: Incidence of tuberculosis (per 100,000 population)
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focus on some specific target groups and remote areas has not 
been sufficient to reduce socioeconomic, age-, gender-specific, 
and rural-urban disparities in the health status of the Rwandans. 
3.5
Coherence, Complementarity and Coordination
GDC contributions to achieve coherence, complementarity, 
coordination, and harmonization between DPs in the context 
of the SWAp and joint financing mechanisms
The program was well aligned to the HSSP and worked through 
the structures and mechanisms of the SWAp (cf. chapter B.3.3.1). 
GDC contributed continuously to the DP group and the HSWG 
as main forums for donor coordination. The same has applied 
to those TWGs that GDC focused its efforts on (cf. Chapter 
B.3.3.1). GDC has placed special attention on the development 
and strengthening of SWAp (e.g., through supporting the 
development of the SWAp-manual and its roadmap and through 
the initiation of the SWAp task force in 2012). GDC also has 
directly supported the SWAp coordination unit in MoH with the 
assistance of an integrated expert (2011 – 2013).
GDC has been proactive in promoting the idea of a SWAp 
not only in its entirety, but also on the level of the different 
components. GTZ / GIZ has co-chaired the TWG on HF in SWAp 
and was highly appreciated by other members for its technical 
expertise and the experiences shared from the districts in the 
forum (INT SWAP 8, 16, 19, 22; Doc.39; Doc.43). Regarding SRH, 
GDC has focused its contributions on TWG in relation to family 
planning and adolescent SRH. The TWG on human resources was 
considered weak by DPs and GDC managers. Dialogue, strategy 
development, and technical advice mainly took place outside 
the formal SWAp structure. The HRH strategic plan was formally 
discussed in TWG, but the main inputs and decisions were made 
outside the structure (INT EXP 5; G INT GEN 4; INT SWAP 6; INT 
HRD 21).
Regarding SBS, GDC has placed special effort into harmonizing 
the contributions by Belgium, United Kingdom, and GDC. The 
SBS, provided by Belgium and Germany, was jointly designed and 
had included pre-requisites for disbursement, performance trig-
gers, and benchmarks (Doc.48). The United Kingdom designed its 
SBS separately, excluding specific pre-requisites as conditionality 
for disbursement (DFID, 2008; G INT GEN 4) and it released 
funds before the pre-requisites for the SBS, provided by Germany 
and Belgium, had been fulfilled (INT SWAp 4; G INT SWAp 16; 
INT EXP 6, 10, 16). This lack of coherence and harmonization had 
negative implications on the ability of the SBS donor group to 
speak with one voice. 
GDC has placed special effort in establishing CDPF, given that 
it proved to be more cumbersome than had been expected to 
reach a joint understanding of how to support capacity devel-
opment most effectively and how to agree on joint procedures. 
While some DPs viewed the support to CDPF as an entry 
point for policy dialogue in the sector and for strengthening 
capacity development and strategy formulation, others saw it 
as a financing mechanism (INT SWAp 4, 7, 8). At one point, the 
GDC considered intervening at the level of MoH to secure the 
continuation of CDPF, since Belgium and the United Kingdom 
were about to retreat due to the apparently substantial transac-
tion costs (INT EXP 15, 20). GDC also pushed, together with other 
CDPF partners, for more transparency and efficiency, as reflected 
in the response and recommendations they presented to MoH 
subsequent to the publication of the external audit report.
The quality of donor coordination has always had to rely on key 
representatives of the participating DPs to add enthusiasm and 
commitment. GDC, through its health sector coordinators, has 
played an important role in this context, but donor coordination 
was much weakened when GDC discontinued its contributions 
during the course of 2013 (INT DP 1; INT EXP 20). Despite the 
strong ownership of MINECOFIN and MoH, the SWAp process 
lost momentum (see chapter B.3.3.1), which resulted in JHSR not 
taking place in April 2013 and HSWG not succeeding in organ-
izing its work in an effective and dynamic manner, among other 
factors (INT DP 1; INT EXP 20; INT SWAP 21). With a reduced 
number of DPs in the health sector and an even more dominating 
role by the US Government, this could indicate that bilateral 
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cooperation between GoR and the US Government has taken the 
lead to the detriment of the SWAp process.
Coherence, complementarity, coordination, and harmoniza-
tion within GDC
There is sufficient evidence to conclude that synergies between 
technical and financial cooperation have been realized. Coordina-
tion and cooperation mechanisms have been developed between 
both organizations and are functioning well. They have instru-
mentally tackled the unexpected challenges, (e.g., after it became 
apparent, in late 2011, that disbursed SBS funds had not been 
transferred to the health budget (cf. Chapter B.3.3.1)). Although 
GDC health sector coordinators had technical cooperation 
background, they were successful in meeting the requirements 
from technical and financial cooperation.
DED health coordinators 103 were assigned various tasks, but they 
did not have steering or staff management responsibility and 
were dissatisfied with the unclear mandate. At the same time, 
they felt pressured by the fairly critical perception of their role 
by development workers. None of the interviewed development 
workers had considered DED health coordinators to have been 
an important factor in their work; some, in fact, considered their 
role as counterproductive (INT HRD DW 6, 8). This perception 
was not only in parallel to the unclear mandate of coordinators, 
but also to the fact that they were not medical doctors.104
Cooperation between DED and GTZ became more profound 
through the step-by-step process of program development (cf. 
Chapter B.1.1 and B.2.1). Interviews and reports on the part of 
development workers have produced evidence of formal coordi-
nation mechanisms, including internal team meetings and shared 
planning sessions having increased over the course of the period. 
Similarly, development workers became increasingly involved 
in activities at the national level, such as in the development of 
treatment guidelines and protocols. Program development also 
was – from the perspective of development workers and GDC 
program managers – a difficult integration process. Some of the 
development workers having been interviewed emphasized that 
although personal communication with GIZ program managers 
was positive, the organizational and hierarchical structures, at 
times, made cooperation difficult (INT HRD DW 1, 9). 
“Personally I had a very good relationship with the GIZ program 
manager. But formal cooperation with GTZ was often painful and 
obstructive. We had to beg for money for each and every instrument 
we needed. One should have given us more freedom to handle”  
(INT HRD DW 9).
Development workers had understood that they, themselves 
were to act on their own initiative – as was perceived by others 
– and were not always willing to take on a subordinate role for 
the common good of the program (INT HRD DW 1, 6, 8, 9, 10). 
Furthermore, the development workers in the role of medical 
doctors were confronted with life and death, on a daily basis, 
and had to struggle with difficult working conditions in hospitals. 
Some felt that their own initiatives and commitment were not 
sufficiently valued, neither by DED nor by GTZ management, and 
that the structures of both organizations were not adequately 
flexible (INT EXP 5; INT HRD DW 6, 8, 9). From the perspective 
of GDC program managers, development workers did not have 
a common corporate identity, and, therefore, they were unable 
to critically reflect on their own role in the program (INT SWAP 
9). Under these circumstances, it was hard to establish a shared 
understanding of what capacity development meant in the 
context of the Rwandan-German health program. 
During the course of the program’s development, DED and GTZ 
signed a cooperation agreement to enhance the coordination 
and communication process. Those communication processes 
and the decision-making by the GTZ program management, how-
ever, were sometimes perceived as non-transparent by DED staff 
(INT EXP 5, 11). This experience has been assessed as a learning 
opportunity to improve the transparency in communications 
between both organizations (INT EXP 11). 
103  DED health coordinators were responsible for introducing development workers to their workplace, coordinating their work, ensuring the overall quality of DED contributions, establishing linkages with 
Rwandan partners and the GTZ / GIZ program management, and appraising new projects. 
104  Medical doctors, used to the hierarchy that exists in German hospitals, found it difficult to accept and recognize the authority and competence of public health specialists. 
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The merging in 2011 of GTZ, DED, and InWEnt 105 into what 
became GIZ has made the integration process more challenging. 
This was more apparent when a number of development workers 
resigned because of their dissatisfaction with the transition 
process (INT HRD EH 2).
A cooperation agreement to clarify roles, responsibilities, and 
procedures between InWEnt and GTZ was put into effect.106 By 
and large, collaboration between both organizations has been 
smooth, but In terms of hospital management, opportunities for 
coordination and synergy were not grasped. Beyond the involve-
ment of GTZ in proposing ILT course candidates and supporting 
task force members, there was little substantial relationship 
between the ILT program and the country-based activities of 
GTZ in hospital management, given that GTZ was hardly aware 
of the knowledge transfer projects implemented by alumni (INT 
EXP 4, 5; INT RP 34). This was primarily due to the fact that GTZ 
only supported five specific districts from where alumni were 
absent. More substantial documentation of these projects by ILT 
alumni, with the support of InWEnt, could have been provided for 
knowledge sharing and an exchange of lessons learned.
In 2005, a platform between all German governmental agencies 
and NGOs involved in the health sector was established as 
the German Country Team Health. In addition to the bilateral 
development agencies, this new team included the partnership 
(Jumelage) of the German Federal State of Rheinland-Pfalz and 
Rwanda and NGOs, such as Misereor and Christoffel-Blindenmis-
sion. Assessing the effectiveness of the German Country Health 
Team from a 3C-model perspective would have gone beyond the 
scope of this evaluation. 
3.6
Assessing the theory of change
This section includes the assessment of ToC that reflects the 
intervention logic of the Rwandan-German health program 
between 2007 and 2012. The fact that “assessment” differs from 
“verification” should be emphasized. While the latter refers 
to the results of implementing ToC (cf. Chapter B 3.3.1 – 3.3.4), 
the former relates to the initial ToC. Assessing ToC, however, 
includes an (eventual) shift of priorities during the course of the 
implementation process. 
The overall ToC and the intervention logic for each component 
are discussed in Chapter B. 3.3.1 – 3.3.4. and are presented in 
detail in Annex D. ToC, therefore, relies on the joint program 
proposal of KfW, GTZ, DED, and InWEnt . First, the evaluation 
team reconstructed the ToC, based on the program’s intervention 
logic. The intervention logic was then adjusted to the analytical 
framework outlined in Chapter A.2.1. Feedback was gathered 
from former program staff and ToC was adjusted accordingly 
without the verification of stakeholders. The underlying ToC, 
therefore, relies exclusively on the 2007 program proposal. In 
2010, some minor adjustments to the program’s intervention 
logic were made, which are considered in the following analysis. 
In order to assess ToC of the Rwandan-German health program, 
the evaluation team has used the criteria suggested by Connell 
and Kubisch (1998, p. 3): 
1. “It [the ToC] should be plausible. Do evidence and common sense 
suggest that the activities, if implemented, will lead to desired 
outcomes? 
2. It should be doable. Will the economic, technical, political, 
institutional, and human resources be available to carry out the 
initiative? 
3. It should be testable. Is the ToC specific and complete enough for 
an evaluator to track its progress in credible and useful ways?” 
105  There are different perceptions on the nature of this merger because it was encouraged by BMZ and because it concerned three organizations differing considerably in terms of size, mandate, and culture. 
106  To be borne in mind is the fact that InWEnt was not decentrally structured as were DED and GTZ, which certainly was not conducive to a smooth coordination process at the country level. 
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Plausibility
By and large, the evaluation team considers ToC to be plausible. 
However, the following features lack plausibility: 
 • Regarding SWAp support, it is not convincing how outcome 
5.4.a (“Ownership and public financial management of MoH 
are improved”) contributes to the achievement of outcome 
B (“The health system responds better to the needs and 
priorities of the Rwandan population, especially the poor”). 
There are missing links which should be made more explicit
 • Regarding the HF component, it is not plausible how output 
3.3 (“facilities are appropriately evaluated and motivated by 
PBF system”) leads to outcome 3.4 (“the structural quality of 
health services is improved”). As elaborated in Chapter B.3.3.2, 
the current evidence base does not lead to the conclusion that 
improvements in the quality of services are strictly attribut-
able to external incentives under PBF. ToC, therefore, should 
represent more explicitly how performance assessments are 
supposed to trigger motivational mechanisms and behavior 
change.
 • Concerning the SRH component, it is not convincing how 
output 4.3.b (“The private sector provides workplace programs 
for members and their families”) contributes to achieve 
outcome 4.4 (“Target groups benefit from reproductive health 
and family planning services”). There are missing links that 
should be made more explicit.
 • In relation to the HRD component, it is not plausible how 
output 6.1 (“Provision of medical equipment to district 
hospital”) leads to output 5.4 (“Improved medical services 
are provided by district hospitals”). The provision of medical 
equipment can lead to improved medical services only if their 
use and maintenance has been improved.
Doability 
By and large, there are sufficient indications that resources were 
available to carry out the respective activities. The program 
logic, however, is presented in such a way that implementation 
arrangements are not always evident. It should also be noted 
that the decision of GDC to put social funds at the disposal of 
the health facilities in the five districts it supported indicates 
that the intended change regarding improved access to health 
services through CBHI was not doable to the extent intended. 
Testability 
In order to allow for ToC to be testable for the purpose of this 
evaluation, the evaluation team has adjusted it according to its 
analytical framework (cf. Chapter A.2.1). Despite this important 
step, there remains considerable paucity in terms of testability 
due to the program having applied national indicators (HSSP) 
instead of program-specific indicators. This is pertinent from an 
alignment perspective, but unsatisfactory from an evaluation 
standpoint. This has already been highlighted by the project 
progress review, conducted in 2010, which drew attention to this 
“well-known difficulty for programmes that are completely integrat-
ed into the partner planning as it is the case for this programme, 
and as it is desired according to the Paris Declaration. ‘Lower the 
flag’ is the principle, which means not only the specific German 
contribution counts, but also the harmonized and aligned contribu-
tion of all DP and their different modes of delivery.” (Doc.45). It is 
against this background that the evaluation team has opted for 
a contribution analysis (cf. Chapter A.2.2), in order to assess the 
GDC contribution in the context of the health SWAp. Despite 
the use of the contribution analysis, however, the restrictions in 
terms of testability of ToC could not be overcome (cf. A 2.2 for 
more details).
Program implementation and adjustment of the theory of 
change 
Priorities have shifted during project implementation, partly 
leading to the adjustment of ToC. Some elements of ToC have 
not been implemented as intended. 
Decentralization of SWAp was not reflected in the initial 2007 
ToC. In the implementation process, it has become more and 
more apparent that SWAp structures and mechanisms need to be 
decentralized in order to create ownership among health-related 
stakeholders at the district level (cf. Chapter B 3.3.1). From 2010 
onwards, therefore, the program has placed more emphasis on 
supporting SWAp-decentralization. This shift of priorities, howev-
er, was not made explicit through an adjustment to ToC. This was 
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the case for adolescent sexual reproductive health, which drew 
more attention from 2010 onwards on young adults as a target 
group for the package of SRH-related services. 
The decision of GDC to place the social funds at the disposal of 
the health facilities in the five districts, supported by GDC, was 
taken during the implementation process. It reflects that the 
equity issue still deserves special attention, despite the improved 
CBHI-coverage, since the new CBHI policy that replaced the 
capitation system with a contribution system, based on socioec-
onomic stratification (cf. chapter B 3.3.2), was only implemented 
from 2010 onwards.
Activities relating to the technical and logistical advice of 
district hospitals to provide water, electricity, and biogas (HRD 
component; processes 5.1) apparently have not been implement-
ed. There is no evidence for the reasons. The same applies to 
workplace programs (SRH component; output 4.2.b and 4.3.b).
3.7
Phase-out of Rwandan-German cooperation in the 
health sector
In 2010, GoR proposed a policy on the Division of Labor in line 
with the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The policy 
aims to improve aid effectiveness by reducing transactioncosts 
and the fragmentation of the donor landscape, and by focusing 
on alignment to national priorities and comparative advantages 
of DPs (GoR & MINECOFIN, 2010). In accordance with this 
Division of Labor policy, DPs are to concentrate on no more than 
three sectors. Concrete plans have been developed for each 
sector and for the DPs by GoR.
For Rwandan-German cooperation, the changed Division of La-
bor has implied an exit from two sectors (justice and health) and 
a concentration on three sectors: vocational education, private 
sector development, youth, and decentralization and governance 
(GoR & MINECOFIN, 2010). The decision was affirmed by the 
2011 bilateral government consultation between Rwanda and 
Germany (Doc.20). To ensure alignment with national strategies, 
a transition period of two years was defined. The exit strategy 
translated into a roadmap, developed by GDC and MoH, to en-
sure an effective and sustainable handover to partner institutions 
and other DPs (Doc.20). As a final step of the phase-out process, 
the Rwandan and the German Governments agreed to conduct 
an independent evaluation of Rwandan-German cooperation in 
the health sector over the period of 30 years (with focus on the 
period of 2004 – 12), to be carried out by DEval. A joint closing 
event was conducted in December 2012.
The implementation of the exit strategy began in the first half 
of 2011, when GDC began scaling down support in some areas. 
A gradual approach was applied over the transition period. 
Following a joint review of all implementing agencies of GDC in 
2010, milestones were proposed for each component, including 
the gradual end of support in core intervention areas, such as 
social marketing and medical education (Doc.29). Other health 
sector DPs received regular information on the progress of 
implementing the exit strategy and the main intervention areas 
that were affected (Doc.20). The initial schedule to coordinate 
the handover process until the end of 2011, however, was met 
neither by the Rwandan nor the German Government due to 
other priorities and time constraints at MoH (Doc.20). During 
this time, some counterparts felt inadequately informed, leading 
to misunderstandings over the background of the Division of 
Labor and its implications at central and decentralized levels (G 
INT GEN 4; INT SWAp 6; INT SWAp 18). 
Although MoH assumed responsibility to lead the handover pro-
cess, its support was limited (Doc.28). Accordingly, the specifica-
tion and formulation of handover options were not finalized until 
April 2012, when GDC formulated an urgent request to MoH to 
ensure donor coordination. This resulted in intensive consultations 
between all DPs and Rwandan partners at the national and district 
levels. In this process, SWAp structures and procedures facilitated 
consultation, coordination, and mutual agreement among GDC, 
MoH, and DPs. The joint roadmap was only finalized at a planning 
workshop in May 2012, during which all DPs presented their plan-
ning for subsequent years (Doc.20). With respect to GDC, financial 
cooperation was supposed to end by August 2012 and technical 
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cooperation at the end of 2012 (Doc.20). Remaining gaps and 
needs for actions were discussed in the context of DP meetings 
and TWGs in order to avoid risks regarding the sustainability of 
contributions from GDC technical and financial cooperation at the 
central and decentralized levels (Doc.20). 
In view of the strong ownership of GoR and the firm establish-
ment of SWAp structures and mechanisms, the chances for the 
health program’s sustainability in various areas are quite high. 
The national health sector strategy is fully embedded in the 
overarching Rwandan policy framework, such as Vision 2020 and 
EDPRS, important milestones have been reached, and Rwanda 
is on track to achieve most of the health-related development 
goals. Moreover, the GDC approach to health systems strength-
ening has contributed to improve the Rwandan health archi-
tecture, including the joint decentralization efforts. In light of 
these achievements, GoR is confident that the health sector will 
manage to cope following the end of GDC support (G INT SWAp 
2). Two interviewees, however, clearly stated that considering the 
length of experience and quality of support provided by GDC to 
the health sector, the German Government should not have been 
asked to retreat (INT RP 1, 8). These views converge with those 
of health service providers who were interviewed in June / July 
2013 in two of the districts that were supported by GDC. They 
regretted the retreat of GDC from the health sector and under-
pinned their arguments by drawing attention to the gaps in the 
provision of funds and services, which cannot be filled after the 
GDC phase-out (comparative case study). In this sense, target 
districts are now facing challenges, such as high staff turnover, 
difficulty in recruiting qualified health professionals, and reduced 
capacity to sustain PBF in key district facilities.
In order to attain sustainability in the main former intervention 
areas of GDC, there are several challenges to be faced. The persis-
tent dependence of the Rwandan health sector on external support 
can be considered as the main challenge. Other issues relate to the 
continuation of services and support mechanisms which, so far, 
had been assured through contributions from GDC. As all these 
issues have been discussed in detail in Chapters B. 3.3.1 – 3.3.4, 
there is no need, in this chapter, to further elaborate on them. 
To conclude, while a transition period of over two years was 
scheduled, for some interventions the phasing-out period has 
been rather short and, as the transition proceeded hand in hand 
with the ongoing program cycle, it posed high challenges to the 
process. Despite the process having been initiated by GoR, its 
support to the coordination with other DPs and decentralized 
levels was limited and, to a great extent, was left to GDC. GDC 
focus on the support of Rwandan strategies and approaches, in 
line with SWAp, has strengthened the probability that services in 
the main intervention areas can be sustained after the phase-out. 
Considering the strong ownership of GoR on the one hand and 
the SWAp dynamics having lost momentum on the other, the 
chance for the sustainability of the health program in various are-
as is moderate to high. This view also reflects the strong reliance 
of the health sector on external funding. 
3.8 
Successful and less successful aid modalities and 
instruments
This section deals, primarily, with the aid modalities and in-
struments during Phase III of Rwandan-German cooperation in 
the health sector. However, a highlight on those that prevailed 
during Phases I and II will put into perspective the changes to the 
ones emphasized by GDC.
The types, importance, and combination of modalities and 
instruments changed considerably during the three phases of 
Rwandan-German cooperation in the health sector. It should be 
taken into consideration, however, that their spectrum had also 
changed considerably, having become broader.
During Phase I, technical and personal cooperation were combined 
(DED). GTZ provided a financial contribution to a project entirely 
implemented by DED, as it had done in similar projects in Benin 
and Burkina Faso. This move enhanced cooperation between DED 
and GTZ and has, thus, become a favorable condition for program 
development since Phase II. GTZ also implemented a family plan-
ning project in close collaboration with KfW, whereby technical and 
financial cooperation were closely linked from project inception. 
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Since there was no multi-level approach to guide GDC con-
tributions and the fact that DED development workers had to 
provide support to hospitals and health centers in seven different 
prefectures, it was not until the beginning of Phase II when 
GDC contributions targeted only two prefectures (Butare and 
Byumba). It was not until 2003, however, that GDC assigned an 
international long-term expert and combined advisory assistance 
at the national level with support to implementation at the 
district level. 
During Phase II, financial cooperation was more important, when 
a country-wide program on contraceptive social marketing was 
implemented by PSI and financed by KfW. At the same time, 
and with health becoming a key priority in 2002, GDC began to 
take on a more program-based approach. The strengthening of 
cooperation between the organizations within GDC led to a joint 
program. As of 2005, GDC support has been aligned to national 
health planning activities in the context of SWAp, with a particu-
lar focus on poverty-oriented health systems development. 
Regarding Phase III, SWAp, as an aid approach, was a determining 
pre-condition for the successful combination of aid modalities 
and instruments that were supported by GDC. Structures and 
mechanisms were established to coordinate and harmonize 
the contribution of different DPs in the health sector. GoR took 
ownership of the process from an early stage, with MINECOFIN 
taking the lead to align interventions in the health sector with 
Rwandan development priorities. This is reflected in HSSP, serv-
ing as a strategic framework for the development of the health 
sector, and under EDPRS as the overall development framework. 
SWAp served as a forum to improve donor coordination. HSWG, 
together with the various TWGs, provided relevant forums for 
concept and strategy development and for learning from ongoing 
implementation experiences. 
To explore fully the effectiveness of SWAp in the alignment 
and harmonization of resources of the various stakeholders at 
all levels, decentralization was especially important. Creating 
respective structures and mechanisms at the district level 
began only in 2010. Their dynamics, however, have not yet been 
developed and strengthened in a way to become self-sustaining. 
Challenges exist with the coordination and harmonization 
with other ministries in terms of SWAp; examples relate to the 
Ministry of Education in terms of medical education and to the 
Ministry of Local Government in tems of decentralization. 
GDC has played a major role in the process of the SWAp design 
and in establishing and strengthening the different structures 
and mechanisms. GDC, therefore, has contributed by having 
recognized the value addition of SWAp to aid effectiveness, 
in accordance with the priorities of the Rwandan and German 
Governments and the Paris Declaration.
GDC has underlined the importance of SWAp by engaging in 
joint financing modalities. SBS can be considered as somewhat 
successful in terms of channeling funds directly to the national 
budget, with a special emphasis on allocating a greater propor-
tion of public funds to district health systems strengthening. SBS 
could have been more successful had all contributing donors 
(i.e. Belgium, United Kingdom, and GDC) harmonized their 
procedures towards a joint agreement with GoR. The leverage 
effect of SBS could have been higher had a more substantial 
percentage of donor funds been channeled through it. A more 
efficient procedure for the flow of funds within the government 
system also could have contributed to making this aid modality 
more successful. 
GDC contributions have benefited from the combination of 
various aid modalities through SWAp. While GDC has not been 
one of the major donors in the health sector, according to aid 
volume (cf. Chapter A.3.2), it has realized an increased leverage 
effect by combining them. GDC has deliberately focused on 
health systems strengthening as being complementary to vertical 
programs, favored by other DPs. GDC, thus, has contributed to 
redress the balance between vertical and horizontal programs in 
the health sector.
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Basket funding through CDPF was another aid modality that 
came into play. Its application, so far, is considered as having 
been less successful, given that the process to establish it with a 
joint understanding of how to most effectively support capacity 
development and having joint procedures, proved to be more 
cumbersome than had been anticipated. The lack of strategic 
orientation in the first phase of CDPF resulted in funds being 
dispersed for the emergency funding of capacity development 
activities rather than for strategic objectives. Transaction costs, 
perceived as significantly high, led to the near retreat of Belgium 
and the United Kingdom from participating in CDPF. A strategic 
intervention from GDC was crucial for CDPF to enable its 
survival at a difficult period.
During the second stage of CDPF, the HRH strategic plan 
provided adequate direction for the use of funds. Since imple-
mentation of activities is still under way, it would be premature 
to assess how successful this aid modality has been. Its scope, 
nevertheless, remains fairly limited, given that the new US 
Government-funded HRH program has not been integrated into 
CDPF.
GDC has successfully combined various instruments, such as 
technical (GIZ) and financial (KfW) cooperation, advisory services 
from development workers (DED / GIZ), integrated experts (CIM), 
and human capacity development (DSE / InWEnt / GIZ). This 
demonstrates that GDC has combined project-based aid with 
joint financing modalities under a SWAp umbrella.
Technical cooperation has successfully followed the multi-level 
approach; that is, combining advisory support at national 
and district levels. The same has applied to capacity building. 
GDC has thus been able to transfer its experiences from im-
plementation at the district level into its concept and strategy 
development at the national level, with TWGs playing a major 
role. Technical cooperation has comprised advisory services by 
development workers (DED / GIZ) and long-term experts, with 
the former focusing on the district level and the latter focusing 
on the national level. GIZ has also seconded national staff as 
technical advisors to the five districts, supported by GDC. Special 
emphasis is placed on the role of health sector coordinators 
who have played a crucial role in successfully combining various 
instruments and in transferring their experiences from the 
program’s implementation into sector and policy dialogue. 
There is sufficient evidence of the synergy effects from com-
bining various instruments, illustrated by the HRD and SRH 
components. Advisory support at the national level has contrib-
uted to the development of national human resources strategies, 
including hospital management. The training of specialists 
was supported in the context of a regional human capacity 
development program, leading to the establishment of a task 
force in MoH. Technical advisors were involved at various levels 
to support the task force members to effectively transfer their 
skills and knowledge (e.g., through train-the-trainers workshops) 
on hospital management. Regarding medical education, the work 
of development workers (DED / GIZ) was supported through 
financial cooperation to provide the necessary equipment to 
teaching hospitals. 
With regard to the SRH component, advisory support was 
provided for policy development, as was financial cooperation 
to contraceptive social marketing. The implementing agency, 
PSI, was supported by a development worker (DED / GIZ), and 
development workers (DED / GIZ) also promoted adolescent SRH 
through advisory services and capacity building at the district 
level. With regard to SWAp and joint financing modalities, the 
“integrated expert” (CIM) instrument was effectively used to 
strengthen the SWAp coordination unit within MoH.
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1. Conclusions
This section presents the main conclusions that derive from the 
results of this evaluation. First, concluding remarks include the 
entire program period of GDC. Second, specific conclusions that 
have emanated from the SWAp period and the three compo-
nents, in particular, are also presented.
The conclusions contain ratings of three levels (i.e., “low”, 
“moderate”, and “high”). Instead of following a scoring system 
with quantifiable descriptions for each level, the ratings have 
been gained from the mainly qualitative analysis presented in 
Part B of this report.
Evolution and adapting to changing contexts
Several instruments and aid modalities have emerged during 
the course of GDC’s 30 years in the health sector of Rwanda. 
Throughout this period, there has been a trend from fragmented 
and decentralized service delivery towards program-based health 
systems strengthening.
During Phase I, technical cooperation was combined with per-
sonal cooperation (DED). This matched similar projects in Benin 
and Burkina Faso, where GTZ had provided financial contribution 
to a project entirely implemented by DED. Cooperation between 
DED and GTZ, thus, was enhanced and was a favorable condition 
for program development during Phase II. GTZ also jointly 
implemented a family planning project with KfW, which led to 
close coordination of technical and financial cooperation from 
its inception. There was no multi-level approach to guide GDC 
contributions during that period, and emphasis was placed on 
providing support at the decentralized level. 
With regard to adapting to the changing context, GDC inter-
ventions essentially did not alter during Phase I, although the 
political, economic, and social trends would have suggested the 
need to adjust to the growing ethnic, social, and political tension. 
Individual staff, however, adapted project activities accordingly 
as a means to safeguard their relevance and effectiveness. While 
there had been voices within GDC and internationally calling for 
attention to the sharpening political conflict, GDC misjudged the 
situation and only reacted at the outbreak of violence in April 
1994 by evacuating its German project staff.
While there have been some elements of continuity in GDC assis-
tance during Phase II, the rechanneling of support, in accordance 
with the changing context following the genocide is considered 
a dominant characteristic. GDC then began to concentrate its 
support more intensively on two specific préfectures, but it was 
only in 2003 that GDC started to combine advisory assistance 
at the national level with support to implementation in the 
districts. With health becoming a key sector for GDC in Rwanda 
in 2002 and program development beginning at the same time, 
GDC consequently evolved to pursue a more program-based 
approach. 
The intensification of cooperation between the different organ-
izations within GDC led to the design of a joint program. Since 
2005, GDC support was aligned to the national health planning 
process in the context of SWAp, with a particular focus on 
poverty-oriented health systems development. With a long-term 
commitment to support the health sector in Rwanda, affirmed 
in 2002, GDC was in a position to begin scaling up innovative 
initiatives that were fed into national policy development (e.g., 
CBHI). 
The overall financial contribution of GDC over the 30 years 
has been rather modest, compared to its contribution to other 
sectors in Rwanda and to that of other donors in the health 
sector. For most of this period, GDC has focused on technical 
and personal advisory assistance and project-based financial 
cooperation. It was only in the last phase of cooperation that the 
financial volume was significantly increased, with the introduc-
tion of joint financing modalities. In response to the aid effective-
ness agenda, GDC has engaged in SBS and pooled funding, while 
other DPs still hesitate to take this step. 
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Sector-wide approach, sector budget support, and capacity 
development pooled fund
It can be concluded that GDC support to SWAp and joint financ-
ing modalities have reflected, to a large extent, the priorities 
of the German and Rwandan Governments. Emphasis has been 
placed on technical and financial cooperation. GDC support, in 
terms of technical assistance, has reflected the priorities of the 
German Government to a larger extent, since GoR has given 
clear preference to budget support and pooled funding.
The aid modalities, supported by GDC, have been appropriate to 
reach the objectives set by Rwandan and German partners. SWAp 
structures and mechanisms at the national level have been oper-
ating effectively at varying degrees with relation to the various 
TWGs. GDC efforts in making these structures and mechanisms 
functional has been highly effective. The SWAp structures and 
mechanisms at the decentralized level, however, are not yet 
sufficiently running. Support in this respect could have been 
more effective, with a later phase-out of Rwandan-German 
cooperation in the health sector.
The potential of SBS as an aid modality could not be fully applied 
due to a limited leverage effect and the lack of coherence among 
contributing DPs. So far, basket funding (CDPF) has contributed 
– to a moderate extent – to strengthening institutional capacities 
in the health sector, given that the funds have been spent in an 
ad hoc manner during the first phase of CDPF. The effectiveness 
of GDC support in making CDPF operational and in strength-
ening its strategic direction can be rated as high. There were 
deficiencies with regard to ‘efficiency’ as far as SBS and basket 
funding (CDPF) was concerned. Transaction costs could only 
partly be reduced.
In spite of the high ownership by GoR, the dynamic of SWAp has 
lost momentum. The same applies to the scope and prospects of 
joint financing modalities (SBS and basket funding) in a situation 
where the health sector is still very much dependent on external 
support.
Health financing 
The program’s HF component supported two health reforms 
that can be considered as flagships among Rwanda’s sector 
policies: (1) the challenging endeavor to introduce a country-wide 
community-based health insurance (CBHI) in a low-income 
country and (2) the establishment of a far-reaching system of PBF 
(PBF), which seeks to incentivize health professionals to improve 
their services through reimbursements. The goals and design 
of the program’s HF component were, overall, highly relevant 
when measured by the high degree of alignment to Rwandan and 
German priorities.
Given the impressive trend of increasing coverage rates of the 
CBHI scheme in Rwanda (currently about 90 % of the Rwandan 
population is covered), the effectiveness of GDC efforts regard-
ing CBHI is rated as high. Efforts directed at the improved health 
equity of CBHI are rated as moderate to high as the barriers to 
access to finance have been pushed to higher care levels and 
to the economically less vulnerable. The evidence gathered 
confirms that PBF does increase service orientation and the 
outputs of health professionals, but it also suggests that negative 
motivational side effects and resource constraints are real. The 
effectiveness of support to PBF is, thus, rated as moderate. Sum-
marizing these effectiveness appraisals for single HF mechanisms 
provides an overall effectiveness of the component as moderate 
to high.
Conclusions on the efficiency of the HF component are limited 
due to the low availability of items of evidence. Whereas this 
constraint especially applies to PBF, there are indications of 
improving efficiency for CBHI. Challenges for the Rwandan HF 
system constitute the high extent of fragmentation between 
different mechanisms, such as CBHI and PBF, and the long delays 
to reimburse district structures, yielding an overall moderate 
efficiency of the component.
The financial sustainability of CBHI and PBF can be considered as 
low due to the high dependency on foreign support. While recent 
policy and legal reforms – partly with GDC contributions – paired 
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by a large share of household-generated funds are promising for 
prolonging the positive effects of CBHI in the long run, ending 
the support to PBF has resulted in financial gaps for the district 
hospitals under direct support by GDC. The gathered evidence, 
therefore, suggests that the sustainability of GDC contributions 
has been low. 
Sexual and reproductive health
GDC support to SRH was highly aligned to the objectives and 
priorities set by the Rwandan and German Governments with 
regard to global health- and human rights-based principles. The 
strong alignment of GDC support to national priorities and the 
consideration of the prevalent country characteristics have led to 
a high acceptance of the priorities and interventions of GDC by 
partner organizations and beneficiaries. 
In terms of SRH, the GDC multi-level approach at the national 
and decentralized levels was accompanied by a comprehensive 
support strategy that focused on the public and private sectors. 
While the public sector contribution successfully strengthened 
SRH at the policy level and increased the coverage of profes-
sional SRH services throughout the health districts, support to 
the private sector was bound to social marketing, an approach 
that contributed to the increase of (1) SRH-related knowledge 
and (2) and the use of contraceptives throughout the Rwandan 
population. 
At the national level, GDC support to the public sector has 
contributed to the accentuation of SRH-related topics in TWGs 
through which relevant policies and plans were provided. GDC 
has contributed effectively through agenda setting and technical 
inputs in specific intervention areas, such as adolescent SRH. 
This strategy has provided an important backbone to interven-
tions at the decentralized level. However, not all topics that were 
addressed, policy-wise, were adequately addressed and imple-
mented in time at the decentralized level (e.g., gender-based 
violence). 
At the decentralized level, public health centers and secondary 
health posts have been successfully supported to increase the 
number of health care professionals with expertise in SRH. 
The support to community-based concepts, such as CHWs 
and peer educators, has been relevant and effective to reach 
the respective beneficiaries through a suitable strategy to link 
communities to higher-level services in the health centers and 
district hospitals. Moreover, the combination of information 
campaigns with commercial marketing techniques for contra-
ceptives through private sector social marketing has appeared 
to effectively contribute to awareness raising and attitude and 
behavior change. In addition, potential synergies between public 
and private sector support were created at the community level, 
most notably through linking private sector social marketing 
and community-based concepts of CHWs and peer educators. 
Linkages were also created with regard to disease prevention 
(e.g., HIV / AIDS prevention and tuberculosis).
While the overall GDC strategy to SRH was deemed suitable to 
reach the respective target groups and objectives set, technical 
and financial support to the private sector fell short of sufficient-
ly strengthening its role with regard to information services on 
the one hand and the provision of contraception on the other 
in a sector environment where MoH still needs to play a crucial 
role. This is underlined by the continuing limited market share 
for contraceptives, provided through commercial marketing 
techniques, and the limited coverage of SRH-related information 
campaigns in remote areas. Moreover, socioeconomic differences 
remain with regard to knowledge and service utilization. Further 
strengthening of the private sector would meet the priorities 
of GoR and help to reduce the costs for the public sector in the 
future. 
To conclude, the overall effectiveness of GDC support to SRH can 
be rated as moderate to high. This also holds true with regard to 
the sustainability of the remarkable achievements. On the one 
hand, SRH is recognized as a key priority in the future of health 
sector strategy in Rwanda; on the other hand, it faces persistent 
future challenges due to the continuing limited technical capaci-
ties of health professionals and the considerable disparities with 
regard to service utilization throughout the population. 
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Human resources development
The GDC interventions in the HRD component have been 
highly relevant for the component and program objective. The 
component has contributed to the national strategy on human 
resources in health, meeting the priorities of the Rwandan and 
German Governments and the needs of the Rwandan population. 
GDC has contributed in a highly effective manner to increase the 
number of Rwandan health professionals and to enhance their 
skills and knowledge. GDC support also has had a long-term 
positive effect on the mindset of medical students, trained by 
development workers, and of ILT alumni. Despite the many 
barriers, they were able to apply their knowledge in their working 
environment and have contributed to improved quality of care in 
Rwandan hospitals.
The continuation of the internship program is a long-lasting 
positive and systems-building effect of GDC support, despite 
the organizational challenges it still faces. Scaling-up efforts 
have been achieved with the establishment of the hospital 
management task force and the country-wide training of hospital 
administrators.
The efficiency of the ILT intervention was relatively low. The high 
absolute costs of the ILT course in Germany were also a result 
of the relatively intensive German language course. The costs 
could have been substantially reduced had the ILT course been 
conducted in English, especially since the new language skills 
were considered insufficient and of low relevance by training 
participants. 
The strong political will of GoR to continue to invest in HRH can 
be seen as a positive precondition for sustaining the achieve-
ments that have resulted from GDC support to HRD. However, 
maintenance of equipment at health facilities over the years has 
been a serious challenge and is a persistent risk to the sustain-
ability of services in all hospitals. Similarly, the motivation of 
Rwandan doctors to remain in the public health sector, particu-
larly at the district level, for a long period of time is quite low. 
Impact
In the last decade, Rwandans have experienced a remarkable im-
provement in their health status and the country is now on track 
to meet most of the health-related MDGs prior to 2015. GDC, 
therefore, has contributed to positive changes with regard to 
mortality and morbidity, risk protection, and fertility reduction. 
Nearly all national health indicators have improved substantially, 
making Rwanda one of the top performers in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
GDC support to the health sector has contributed to this 
development to a moderately high extent. On the one hand, 
GDC has clearly contributed to the improvement of the health 
status of Rwandans through various interventions in all three 
components. The multi-level approach of GDC at the national 
and decentralized levels has proved highly effective with regard 
to the improvement of overall coverage and access to health 
services, particularly through CBHI and HRD. Complementary 
interventions in the districts supported by GDC, such as social 
funds, have accompanied CBHI in the transition period towards 
a more poverty-oriented health insurance system. On the other 
hand, the evaluation finds a mixed scenario with regard to the 
effectiveness of GDC in reducing health disparities in the health 
status of the Rwandan population. GDC’s resulting effort to 
focus on some specific target groups and remote areas has been 
only moderate and, hence, insufficient to reduce socioeconomic, 
age-specific, and rural-urban disparities in health status. Gender 
differences remain and strategies, such as gender-based violence, 
have been only moderately effective at the decentralized level to 
date. 
Moreover, while the GDC approach to health systems strength-
ening has been an essential element within the Rwandan health 
architecture, a significant part of the impressive progress has 
depended on the large financial efforts of some relevant vertical 
programs relating to malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV / AIDS 
prevention. 
Coordination, coherence, complementarity, harmonization
There is sufficient evidence to suggest that synergies between 
technical and financial cooperation have been actualized. 
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Coordination and cooperation mechanisms between both organi-
zations have worked well. Program development has contributed 
to improved coordination and harmonization between DED 
and GTZ, but sometimes did prove to be a difficult integration 
process.
Phase out process
In accordance with the Rwandan policy on the Division of 
Labor, Germany ceased its support at the end of 2012. Even 
though a transition period of two years has been scheduled, for 
some handover processes this time frame was rather short. As 
this occurred within an ongoing program cycle, it posed high 
challenges to the organization of the exit strategy. Additional 
time resources, in accordance with the overall program cycle, 
would have been useful and should have been negotiated. 
Even though the process was initiated by GoR, support to 
coordination with other DPs and decentralized levels was limited 
and, to a great extent, left to GDC. It can be concluded that GDC 
support could have been more effective and sustainable through 
a prolonged phasing-out period. 
Considering the strong ownership of GoR on the one hand 
and SWAp dynamics having lost momentum on the other, the 
chances for sustainability of the health program in various areas 
are moderate to high. The GDC focus on the support of Rwandan 
strategies and approaches, in line with SWAp, strengthen the 
probability of services in the main intervention areas being 
sustained after the phasing-out period. This appreciation also 
reflects the strong reliance of the health sector on external 
funding. Key DPs have reduced or will reduce their contributions 
and not all gaps resulting from the phase out of GDC have been 
fully closed by national institutions, especially at the decentral-
ized level. With the new Division of Labor policy, however, new 
DPs have recently started their support to the health sector.
Successful and less successful aid modalities and instruments
GDC has played a prominent role in the design of SWAp and 
in establishing and strengthening the various structures and 
mechanisms. GDC has, therefore, contributed to the realization 
of value addition of SWAp to bring forward aid effectiveness, 
in accordance with the priorities of the Rwandan and German 
Governments and with the Paris Declaration.
Combining various aid modalities through SWAp has proved 
highly beneficial for GDC contributions to the design and 
implementation of the joint health program. While GDC has 
not been one of the major donors in the health sector in terms 
of aid volume, it has achieved an increased leverage effect by 
combining them.
GDC has deliberately focused on health systems strengthening 
(i.e., a horizontal approach for improving the coverage and 
quality of health services) as being complementary to vertical 
programs. Vertical programs, especially funded by the US 
Government and GFATM, had become more and more important 
in terms of aid volume flowing into the health sector. GDC thus 
contributed to redress the balance between vertical and horizon-
tal programs. 
GDC has successfully combined different instruments, such as 
technical (GIZ) and financial (KfW) cooperation, advisory services 
from development workers (DED / GIZ), integrated experts 
(CIM), and human capacity development (InWEnt / GIZ). There 
is sufficient evidence of synergy effects from the combination of 
these instruments.
2. Recommendations
The following recommendations are derived from the conclu-
sions drawn in the previous chapter. They have been formulated 
against the background of GDC in the health sector having 
phased out. Some, therefore, are addressed to the MoH in 
Rwanda with the aim of sustaining the contributions of GDC to 
health sector development. 
Other recommendations are specifically addressed to GDC (i.e., 
BMZ, GIZ and KfW). Putting them into perspective, one needs 
to bear in mind that they only reflect the learning experiences 
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from Rwandan-German cooperation in the health sector. They 
cannot claim general transferability or applicability. They should, 
therefore, serve as input for the design, implementation, and 
phase out of program-based approaches, especially in relation 
to the health sector, in partner countries with similar conditions 
to those prevailing in Rwanda. Key characteristics in this respect 
should be strong government ownership and commitment 
for health sector development; an enabling environment for 
socioeconomic development for decent coverage and access to 
health services; and favorable conditions for decentralized health 
systems strengthening. 
Recommendations relating to aid modalities and instruments 
that have been applied in the context of Rwandan-German 
cooperation in the health sector can be relevant to other sectors. 
What needs to be borne in mind, however, is that configurations 
of stakeholders vary considerably from one sector to another.
Those recommendations addressed to GDC are, as much as 
possible, specific to implications for policy development and 
formulation or for program implementation. The former will be 
addressed to BMZ, while the latter will be directed to GIZ and / or 
KfW. 
Sector-wide approach, sector budget support, and capacity 
development pooled fund
MoH 
1. The results of the evaluation clearly support further improve-
ment in the overall health status of the Rwandan population, 
requiring the continuation and intensification of poverty-, 
gender-, and age-specific interventions in order to tackle 
inequality and inequity in the course of the current HSSP.
BMZ
2. The evaluation has pointed out that there has been a high 
leverage effect through the combination of various aid 
modalities and instruments in the context of SWAp in the 
health sector. A diversified portfolio of aid modalities and 
instruments, therefore, has the potential to increase overall 
effectiveness in the implementation of program-based 
approaches. This needs to go hand in hand with sound policy 
dialogue. 
3. To increase the effectiveness of SWAp, not only in the health 
sector, more emphasis should be placed on improving co-
herence among DPs, especially with regard to joint financing 
modalities. In addition, an agreement on the alignment 
with common procedures has the potential to considerably 
improve the leverage effect of policy dialogue 
4. The evaluation has drawn attention to the challenges relating 
to a situation where the major DPs in the sector are not the 
ones in a leading role in SWAp. Future strategies, therefore, 
should focus more strongly on how to increase the leverage 
effect through policy dialogue as a means to strengthen the 
commitment of key DPs to aligning interventions with SWAp. 
This will certainly require effort from the various DPs in the 
lead with regard to SWAp, but GDC should explore possibili-
ties to act as broker, which would include using its position in 
multilateral institutions (e.g., World Bank) to this end.
5. The evaluation has revealed that joint financing of particular 
intervention areas through basket funding has improved 
capacity development in the context of the health-SWAp in 
Rwanda. For future strategies to establish basket funds in 
relation to program-based approaches in the health sector 
and beyond, more emphasis should be placed on strategic 
orientation and joint management as a means to increase 
the effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of developing 
and strengthening capacities in the respective sector. This 
requires technical assistance to be available at program 
inception. 
6. More emphasis should be placed on the decentralization of 
SWAP from program inception, given that core institutional 
reforms are initiated to allow local actors to participate in the 
decentralization process. The decentralization process should 
be supported by capacity building at central and decentral-
ized levels, ideally through pooled funding. While successful 
support depends critically on the involvement of a number 
of stakeholders beyond the health sector, the multi-level 
approach of GDC can provide a sound basis to support the 
process of decentralization.
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GIZ and KfW
7. It is recommended that decentralization of SWAp mecha-
nisms and structures be strengthened at an early stage of 
the (health) program, provided core institutional reforms 
have been initiated. The decentralization process should be 
supported by capacity building at the central and decentral-
ized levels, ideally through pooled funding. While successful 
support critically depends on the involvement of different 
stakeholders beyond the health sector, the multi-level 
approach of GDC can provide a sound basis to support the 
process of decentralization.
Health financing
MoH
8. 8Rwandan subscribers to CBHI and those responsible for 
collecting the premiums at health centers have reported that 
they perceive the payment modalities of CBHI premiums 
(e.g., (1) the number of installments, (2) the need to enroll 
the entire family, and (3) the need to wait one month after 
payment before health services can be claimed) to be 
restrictive. While these modalities have been deliberately 
chosen to demotivate adverse selection, the evaluation team 
recommends consideration to lower these restrictions to 
ensure an equitable and consistently high CBHI coverage.
9. To provide an in-depth analysis of the potential of PBF (PBF) 
in Rwanda, the aspects of effectiveness and efficiency merit 
further rigorous and methodological research, especially with 
regard to (1) ruling out alternative explanations, such as a 
motivational increase by raising health professionals’ salaries 
without performance evaluation and (2) appraising the 
cost-effectiveness of the burdensome workload.
10. Health professionals have voiced concern that PBF might 
exacerbate inequities between health providers, given that 
well-capacitated facilities will expand their head start over 
resource-poor facilities in the long run by achieving higher 
PBF returns. In addition, most of those interviewed claimed 
that their work environment suffered from problems not 
tackled by PBF (e.g., high turnover rates and lack of equip-
ment). To avoid demotivation and / or manipulation of the 
system by falsifying achievement due to unrealistic goals and 
indicators, PBF in Rwanda should intensify capacity develop-
ment in the facilities and improvements in the physical work 
environment. 
11. Both CBHI and PBF have sought to increase the financial 
autonomy of health facilities at the sector or district level 
through reimbursements from the central level. Long delays 
of transactions, however, often have forced health facilities 
into pre-financing and endangering the possibility of au-
tonomy. The evaluation team, therefore, recommends that 
the speeding up of reimbursements to decentralized levels 
should be tackled.
12. End users and health professionals frequently have reported 
the miscategorization of CBHI members into Ubudehe 
categories. Ubudehe is a participatory poverty assessment to 
classify the population regarding its economic vulnerability. 
Because this classification determines eligibility for different 
governmental social services (among them CBHI membership 
fees), miscategorization can force the economically vulnera-
ble into catastrophic health expenditures. At the same time, 
CBHI revenues are lost due to those falsely paying less than 
required. While the Ubudehe classification is under the aegis 
of the Ministry of Local Government, MoH should advocate 
a more stringent application of the classification system to 
safeguard the trust of CBHI subscribers in the equity of the 
insurance scheme.
BMZ
13. The overall evidence of effects specifically attributable to 
PBF, their sustainability, and the efficiency of PBF is shaky. 
Related to the research requisites recommended to MoH 
for Rwanda, BMZ should support rigorous methodological 
studies on these aspects in other contexts to critically assess 
the potential of this approach and broaden the international 
knowledge base.
14. The existence of a nationwide participatory poverty mapping 
in Rwanda, stemming from the PRSP process and resulting in 
the Ubudehe categories, has facilitated the transition from a 
capitation to an income-stratified premium system for CBHI 
members. Similar categorization systems in other countries 
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should be incorporated, when designing or supporting 
equity-oriented social security systems.
GIZ
15. The Rwandan case highlights that social funds guarding 
insurance schemes can temporarily increase equity. In a 
period of policy transition from a capitation to a less regres-
sive contribution system, such an approach especially could 
be applied elsewhere in order to alleviate catastrophic costs 
for health services affecting the economically vulnerable.
16. The Rwandan case, furthermore, underscores that PBF inter-
ventions should not be detached from their context. Human 
motivation is complex and not solely influenced by financial 
incentives. To foster intrinsic motivation, PBF as an institu-
tional agreement should not only pay off in terms of money, 
but also in terms of praise and appreciation. It is, therefore, 
recommended that future PBF interventions are combined 
more intrinsically with capacity development for supervision 
and managerial staff and, at best, with interventions improv-
ing the physical work environment. Otherwise the goals and 
indicators set will be perceived as out of reach and may lead 
to demotivation or false reporting of goal achievements.
Sexual and reproductive health
MoH
17. The evaluation has provided evidence that the Rwan-
dan-German cooperation has significantly contributed to the 
improvement of awareness and related behavior with regard 
to SRH and family planning in Rwanda. The achievements can 
be assigned to both public and private sector interventions 
and to their interactions. The evaluation, nevertheless, has 
found an ongoing limited role of the private sector with 
regard to the provision of contraceptives and information 
services. While this is against the priorities of GoR, outlined 
in the latest Family Planning Strategic Plan, and it increases 
the burden of rising costs for the public health system, it 
is critical to further support the private sector in order to 
increase its market share for contraceptives and to strength-
en its overall role in the Rwandan health system. Synergies 
could be enhanced through potential linkages with the public 
health system at the community level (i.e., CHWs and peer 
educators) and commercial marketing techniques from the 
private sector. At the policy level, a clarification of roles and 
responsibilities between private and public actors could en-
hance coherence and planning capabilities, which is relevant 
for further donor engagement in private sector support.
18. In spite of the remarkable enhancement of the population’s 
awareness on family planning and HIV / AIDS through large-
scale social marketing campaigns, the exposure to knowledge 
is still not universal and relies on various socioeconomic 
background characteristics. It is, therefore, recommended 
that future campaigns should focus more explicitly on specific 
and disadvantaged target groups, especially in remote areas. 
Accordingly, synergies between large-scale information cam-
paigns and more specific approaches through the concepts of 
CHWs and peer educators at the community level should be 
enhanced. 
GIZ and KfW
19. In Rwanda, GDC support was effectively provided to the 
public and private sectors, especially at the decentralized 
level where synergies between private-sector-driven social 
marketing and community-based concepts have been 
created. However, in light of the ongoing limited role of the 
private sector with regard to the provision of contraceptives 
and information, it is recommended that for future social 
marketing strategies under similar conditions, GDC should 
place special emphasis on providing advice to clarify the roles 
and responsibilities between the public and the private sector 
in order to encourage the potential of commercial marketing 
techniques and to reduce rising costs for the public health 
system. At the same time, synergies between the private and 
public sectors should be enhanced (e.g., through improving 
the linkages) between private sector distribution networks 
and community-based concepts, such as CHWs and peer 
educators.
20. In Rwanda, large-scale information campaigns were support-
ed and led to a remarkable improvement of knowledge and 
awareness on adolescent SRH, but they have failed to reach 
more disadvantaged target groups in more remote areas. 
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In comparable country contexts, where the peer group is 
the central unit of knowledge transfer, community-oriented 
concepts, such as peer-educators, should receive further 
attention. In order to increase overall effectiveness, it is 
recommended that more specific interventions should 
focus on key persons within a community to strengthen the 
multiplier effect of knowledge transfer. Large information 
campaigns, therefore, should be accompanied by intra-com-
munity knowledge transfer at inception. This could also lead 
to potential synergy effects between the private and public 
sectors at the community level.
Human resources development
MoH
21. The exit of GDC from the health sector has left a gap in the 
provision of support to the internship program. It is recom-
mended that, together with DPs, this gap be bridged in order 
to focus on strengthening the capacities of the district hospi-
tals to train and supervise the interns properly, especially as 
more district hospitals have been accredited for the medical 
education of interns in Rwanda. This also requires the joint 
efforts of MoH and the Ministry of Education to improve the 
steering and monitoring of the national internship program. 
22. The potential of ILT alumni experiences in hospital manage-
ment should be applied to the medical health care course, 
implemented in cooperation between the School of Public 
Health and Yale University.
BMZ
23. In view of the positive Rwandan experience, it is recommend-
ed that more substantial support be provided to medical 
education in partner countries. A strong commitment of the 
partner country to allocate sufficient financial and human 
resources to medical education, including the availability of 
counterparts for development workers, is crucial. Moreover, 
a combination of individual knowledge transfer and advisory 
assistance through development workers with other instru-
ments, such as advisory support at the national level and 
use of basket funding, is recommended in order to increase 
overall effectiveness of support to HRD.
Phase-out process
BMZ
24. For phase-out processes under similar conditions, relevant 
stakeholders at the decentralized level should be involved in 
a strong way, and sufficient human and time resources should 
be provided in order to guarantee sustainability. GDC should 
encourage policy dialogue as a means to allow the line min-
istry to take ownership of the phase-out process. This should 
be a precondition to guaranteeing the sound management of 
institutional knowledge. 
25. Under similar conditions, time lines should be defined accord-
ing to the requirements of each component of a program. 
This will allow for gradual phasing out, instead of the handing 
over of “the stick” at a certain date. The evaluation team also 
recommends agreement on the mechanisms to accompany 
the handover process beyond the exit date in order to 
safeguard sustainability. This should be based on strategic 
reflection on achievements with major partner institutions, 
sharing of lessons learned, and future action.
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